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Abstract
Historically, infectious diseases caused considerable damage to human societies, and they continue to do
so today. To help reduce their impact, mathematical models of disease transmission have been studied to
help understand disease dynamics and inform prevention strategies. Vaccination–one of the most important
preventive measures of modern times–is of great interest both theoretically and empirically. And in contrast
to traditional approaches, recent research increasingly explores the pivotal implications of individual behavior
and heterogeneous contact patterns in populations. Our report reviews the developmental arc of theoretical
epidemiology with emphasis on vaccination, as it led from classical models assuming homogeneously mixing
(mean-field) populations and ignoring human behavior, to recent models that account for behavioral feedback
and/or population spatial/social structure. Many of the methods used originated in statistical physics, such
as lattice and network models, and their associated analytical frameworks. Similarly, the feedback loop
between vaccinating behavior and disease propagation forms a coupled nonlinear system with analogs in
physics. We also review the new paradigm of digital epidemiology, wherein sources of digital data such
as online social media are mined for high-resolution information on epidemiologically relevant individual
behavior. Armed with the tools and concepts of statistical physics, and further assisted by new sources of
digital data, models that capture nonlinear interactions between behavior and disease dynamics offer a novel
way of modeling real-world phenomena, and can help improve health outcomes. We conclude the review by
discussing open problems in the field and promising directions for future research.
Keywords: epidemiology; vaccination; human behavior; complex networks; data
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Infectious diseases have proven to be remarkably resilient foes of humanity. Despite major achievements
in other areas, such as discovering gravitational waves and landing humans on the Moon, we still have not
eradicated most vaccine-preventable infectious diseases [1]. Many of these diseases–measles, pertussis, in-
fluenza, and many others–have been burdening us for centuries, while new infectious diseases–such as Ebola,
Zika virus, and SARS–continue to emerge from animal populations and make the jump to human popula-
tions, or spreading to new human populations due to climate change or other anthropogenic disturbances
[2].
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Sometimes, successful infection control is a matter of ensuring access to preventive technologies such
as vaccines [3]. Barriers to access in lower-income countries remains an important reason why infectious
disease burden remains high in many poor populations [3]. However, there are reasons to be cautiously
optimistic that barriers to access will continue to fall, enabling more people to be vaccinated. For instance,
measles was completely eliminated from South America in the 1990s [4], prompting many health researchers
and policy experts to conceive of global measles eradication as a potentially realistic goal for the first time.
Mathematical and statistical models, often based on methods and concepts borrowed from physics, have
played a significant role in infection control by helping determine how to apply control measures in order
to quickly and most effectively contain epidemics and helping predict and understand disease outbreak
patterns, among their many other uses [5].
However, as our technologies advance and access to vaccines begin to become less important as a barrier,
it is becoming clear that our own behavior may prevent local elimination or global eradication in many
cases [6]. For instance, unfounded vaccine scares such as the ongoing measles-mumps-rubella vaccine autism
scare which started in 1997, or the oral polio vaccine scare in northern Nigeria in 2003-2004 which arguably
delayed global polio eradication by a decade, can enable a resurgence of disease in a population [7]. When the
infection spreads to other populations in turn, local elimination or even global eradication can be threatened.
Similarly, traditional infection control methods such as isolation, quarantine, and contact tracing require
adequate levels of support from the public. When this is lacking, sometimes due to mismanagement of
the situation by authorities or inadequate response of the international community, then infection control
can fail, as was observed in the early stages of the 2014 West African Ebola outbreaks and in many other
situations [8].
1.2. Motivation and objective
In summary, recent decades have seen the continual emergence of new infectious diseases together with
growing examples where the technologies exist to eliminate long-established infections, but human behavior
has prevented elimination. Moreover, more data on human behavior are available than ever before, at very
high levels of spatial and temporal resolution through sources such as internet search engine data, Bluetooth
technologies, and social online media.
These trends may partially explain the surging interest in incorporating human behavior directly into
mathematical models of infectious disease transmission, in order to understand the two-way interplay be-
tween the dynamics of human behavior and the dynamics of infectious diseases. By accounting for human
behavior, mathematical models may provide more insight, and better predictions, than models that neglect
the enormous impact that behavior can have on infectious disease dynamics. For brevity, we will refer to
such models as ‘coupled behavior-disease models’ through the remainder of this report, although models
that only explore one direction of the coupling, from human dynamics to disease dynamics, or from disease
dynamics to human dynamics, are also relevant to our report.
Much of this work relies upon methods and concepts from physics, either directly or indirectly. This
is neither new nor surprising. For instance, exponential decay can describe radioactive decay of particles,
or exponential growth can just as well describe the early growth of an invasive species. Hence, physics in
general, and statistics physics in particular, is highly relevant to the development of disease transmission
models that take human behavior into account.
The two objectives of our report are (1) to give a state-of-the art overview of the literature on mathemat-
ical models of the impact of human behavior on disease dynamics (and vice versa), with special emphasis
on the connections to concepts and methods from physics; and (2) to provide an outlook on the future of
the field, including open questions and promising directions for future research. We attempted to include
as much of the relevant literature as possible, but we were also cognizant of the need to limit the list of
references to a realistic number. Therefore we selected references that best captured the full breadth of
research being undertaken in the field.
1.3. Outline of the report
In Section 2 of the report we provide a brief summary of basic ideas in epidemiology that are necessary to
understand and develop mathematical models of infectious disease transmission. Classic mean-field models of
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infectious disease transmission are then described in Section 3. Subsequently we describe models of infectious
disease transmission on networks and other spatially structured populations, including both simulation-based
approaches (Section 4) and analytical approximations (Section 5) to network dynamics. Sections 3-5 are
concerned with models of infectious disease transmission that do not explicitly include human behavior,
since understanding such models is a necessary precursor to understanding models that explicitly do include
human behavior. Section 6 provides a rationale for studying models of the interactions between human
behavior and disease dynamics (some of which has already been described in the preceding subsections),
while section 7 introduces some basic concepts and methods in the modelling of human behavior. Section 8
provides an overview of mean-field models of coupled behavior-disease dynamics, while Section 9 provides
an overview of such models in the context of networks and spatially-structured populations. The next
two sections are concerned with ‘traditional’ sources of data on human behavior (Section 10) and digital
sources of data on human behavior (Section 11) from which we can test and validate models of coupled
behavior-disease dynamics. The report concludes with a discussion in Section 12.
2. Basic concepts in infectious disease epidemiology
Infectious disease epidemiology is the study of contagious parasites of humans. Parasitization is one of
the oldest ecological relationships, and has been hypothesized to be a major driving factor in the evolution
of a very broad range of species (the ‘Red Queen hypothesis’) [9]. Indeed, infectious diseases are likely to
have been with humans for our entire existence. The Bible and ancient Greek historical writing contain
apparent references to epidemics and case isolation [10, 11]. This section describes the basic biology and
ecology of infectious diseases, and how such diseases are controlled through interventions such as vaccines.
Parasites are traditionally divided into two main groups: microparasites and macroparasites. The dis-
tinction between them is their size and parasitic life cycle [12]. Macroparasites are larger forms of pathogens
and include ticks, mites, helminthes and flukes [13]. Macroparasites grow in one host but reproduce by infec-
tive stages outside of the host organism [14]. They can be either external parasites (ectoparasitic) or internal
parasites (endoparasitic) [15]. Comparatively, microparasites are small, generally single-cell organisms, and
are either viruses, bacteria or protozoans [16, 17]. They generally exhibit short generation times and a
high rate of direct reproduction within the host organism [13]. For simplifying assumptions in modeling,
we focus on the body of literature pertaining to microparasites, where extensive long-term data and a solid
understanding of disease transmission dynamics have contributed to the development of well-parameterized
models [18].
Infectious diseases (both micro- and macroparasitic) can be transmitted to susceptible hosts in a variety
of ways. Routes of transmission are classified as direct and indirect transmission [19]. Direct transmission
occurs when there is physical or close contact between an infected individual and a susceptible individual
that permits transmission via droplets or aerosols [20]. Although some exceptions exist, the majority of mi-
croparasitic diseases are directly transmitted and exhibit short survival periods outside of the host organism
[18]. Conversely, indirectly transmitted parasites are passed through vectors or are transmitted vehicularly
via the environment [20]. Most macroparasitic diseases are indirectly transmitted, spending part of their
life cycle outside of their host organism [18]. Indirect transmission occurs via another organism through a
vector or via an intermediate host [21]. A vector is an organism that does not directly cause disease, but
that transmits infection of pathogens from one host to another [22]. Vectors can be mechanical or biological.
A mechanical vector transmits an infectious pathogen without it being altered while on the vector [23]. In
contrast, biological vectors harbor pathogens within their bodies and deliver pathogens to new hosts in an
active manger, usually a bite [24]. Biological vectors are usually continuously infected with the disease and
in some cases are a required part of the organisms life cycle [23]. Increases in populations and urbanization,
habitat loss, and international travel and trade all contribute to the spread of vectors and indirect transmis-
sion of pathogens [25]. Consequently, the mechanisms of transmission and transmissibility are key factors
of pathogens that influence disease spread and what interventions, if any, are effective [26]. Timing of the
onset of infectiousness relative to the onset of symptoms and duration of infectious periods are additional
important factors in transmission dynamics [26].
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Integral to understanding infectious disease dynamics is distinguishing three time periods involved in
these processes: the latent period, defined as the time from infection to the time when a host is able to
transmit the pathogen to another host [22]; the incubation period, defined as the time from infection to the
onset of disease [27]; and the infectious period, defined as the period from the end of the pre-infectious period
until the time when a host is no longer able to transmit the infection to other hosts [28]. The distinction
between the incubation period and the latent period of a disease is integral when considering the effect of
control methods based on symptomatic surveillance in a population. If the latent period is shorter than the
incubation period (i.e., infectiousness proceeds with the onset of symptoms), then interventions targeted
toward symptomatic individuals are generally ineffective [29]. Diseases whereby the onset of symptoms
coincides with, or proceeds with infectiousness are more effective at being controlled using symptomatic
surveillance methods [21]. Consequently, an important metric in the controllability of handling a disease
outbreak requires the consideration of the proportion of transmission that takes place before the onset
of symptoms occurs [29]. Both incubation period and latent period are generally modeled following an
exponential, log-normal, Weibull, or gamma distribution [21].
Three important characteristics of pathogens that affect transmission of infectious diseases are infectivity,
virulence and pathogenicity. In epidemiology, infectivity is the ability of a pathogen to cause infection in a
susceptible host [21]. Infectivity can also vary between different strains of the same pathogen. The route of
the infection, and the age and innate resistance of the host are key factors which contribute to the infectivity
of a disease [30]. The gauge of infectivity is measured by the secondary attack rate (the proportion of exposed
hosts who develop the disease [31]). Infectivity has been shown to positively correlate with virulence [32, 33].
Virulence, although often used interchangeably with pathogenicity, refers to the severity of disease after
infection occurs [21]. The capacity and vigor of the disease to cause severe and fatal cases of illness is
virulence [34]. Pathogenicity refers to the ability of a pathogen to induce disease [21]. Pathenogenicity and
virulence are determined by the interaction between host and pathogen [20]. Characteristics of infectious
pathogens that affect virulence include their ability to replicate, invade organisms and damage the host
[20]. Host characteristics also affect the ability of a pathogen to cause disease, in that pathogeneticity and
virulence depend on the resistance and immunity system of the host, in addition to genetic factors, age,
gender, and physiological condition [20].
Herd immunity is a form of indirect protection from infectious disease that is brought about by the
presence of immune individuals in a population [35]. With certain diseases that spread from host to host,
the level of population immunity is critical in determining the potential of an epidemic from occurring,
and therefore the risk of infection for a susceptible host in a population [21]. In that transmission occurs
between an infected and susceptible host, if the number of immune individuals is large, then the likelihood
that a susceptible individual being in contact with an infected individual is reduced. Immunity can be
conferred through natural immunity, previous exposure to the disease, or through vaccination [36]. The
level of immunity required to attain herd immunity depends on the characteristics of the infectious disease.
Generally a disease with high infectivity requires a higher proportion of immune individuals to achieve
immunity than diseases with lower infectivity rates [36]. Additional considerations are: seasonality, to what
effect it has on population mixing and the viability of the pathogen; the number of susceptible individuals,
their age and geographic distribution; and social habits of the population with respect to mixing and type of
contacts made [37]. Mass vaccination to induce herd immunity is common practice and has proven successful
in preventing the spread of many infectious diseases globally [38]. Opposition to vaccination has posed a
challenge to herd immunity, allowing preventable diseases to persist in or return to communities that have
inadequate vaccination rates [39].
An integral application in infectious disease modeling is the need for evaluating intervention strategies
and their effects on new and re-emerging pathogens. The development and widespread use of antibiotics was
an important advance in the treatment of infectious diseases [26]. Antibiotics are a type of antimicrobial
used in the treatment and prevention of bacterial infection, by killing or inhibiting the growth of bacteria
[40]. Several antibiotics are effective against fungi and protozoans [41], but are not effective against viruses
[42]. In many cases, their effectiveness and accessibility has led to their overuse, prompting bacteria to
develop resistance [43–45]. Increasing travel and migration have also contributed to the growth of antibiotic
resistance problems [46]. The consequences of antibiotic-resistant infections may result in more prolonged
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Figure 1: Summary of commonly used interventions against infectious diseases. We note that this list is not
exhaustive, and interventions are often used in combination, such as contract tracing and isolation.
illnesses, longer hospitalization, increased risk of death and higher health care costs than do infections with
antibiotic-sensitive strains of the same species [20].
A primary way to boost immunity in a population is through vaccination [47]. Vaccines are any bio-
logically derived substance that produces a protective immune response when administered to a susceptible
host [21]. Vaccine effectiveness is the result of the vaccine’s direct effect, which refers to its ability to protect
individuals from infection, and its indirect effect, which is its ability to reduce the spread of infection in a
population [48, 49]. Notably, no current vaccine is entirely effective. It is estimated that non-preventable
primary vaccine failure rates range from 2 to 50 percent for licensed vaccines under ideal circumstances in
clinical trials [50]. Vaccine effectiveness can be determined by comparing risk of the disease among vaccinated
and nonvaccinated groups. Important variables to consider are that groups are comparable with respect
to exposure, risk of infection, accessibility of the vaccine, and opportunity for diagnosis [21]. Vaccines,
antibiotics, and other interventions are summarized in Fig. 1.
Social distancing is another strategy used to reduce the transmission of infectious diseases. Governments
and public health agencies may promote targeted social distancing as a strategy, in the form of school or
workplace closures. Social distancing also arises as individuals respond to news about disease spread, ob-
tained from media reports, public announcements, rumours and individual experience [51]. Recognizing the
importance of behavioral responses in populations has altered the way epidemiological modelers consider
transmission [52–58]. Such models have shown that social distancing can be effective at reducing the at-
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tack rate of an epidemic [59, 60] and that social distancing behavior is a plausible explanation for certain
phenomena arising in real epidemics, such as multiple outbreaks or waves of infection [60, 61].
Hygiene refers to environmental conditions and practices that contribute to maintaining health and
prevent the spread of diseases [62]. Aiello and Larson [63] examined the epidemiological evidence for causal
relation between hygiene and infections and found that personal and environmental hygiene significantly
reduced the spread of infections. In particular, the importance of hand hygiene in preventing infections
has been widely recognized. Hands are a key step in the transmission of many infectious agents, and the
importance of hand hygiene and interrupting hand contact with body fluids in preventing spread of infections
is well documented [64–66]. Diseases related to hygiene in general disproportionately affect poorer members
of society due primarily to accessibility of services and/or less polluted environments [67].
Despite the complexities of the biology of infectious diseases on the cellular and organismal levels, it
is often possible to mathematically model the transmission of infectious diseases at the population level.
In fact, some of the earliest research in mathematical biology concerned the analysis of population-level
transmission of infectious diseases using differential equations [68]. The mathematical modelling of infectious
disease transmission is the subject of the next section.
3. Basic concepts and methods in epidemiological modeling and vaccination: compartmental
(mean-field) models
Epidemiological modeling has nowadays become a global discipline, playing a key role in policy decisions
about prevention and control of communicable diseases. With hindsight, much of this success is due to a few,
extraordinarily fecund, deterministic models, first of all the two classical susceptible-infective-removed (SIR,
see Table A1 in Appendix for this and other abbreviations used in our review) models for outbreaks and
for endemic infections (and related extensions). These models represent the direct legacy of the intuitions
of a few innovators who, at the beginning of the 1900s, imported the mass-action law of statistical physics
to describe infection transmission. This intuition, which represents the building block of the transmission
process of a communicable disease, namely the social mixing between the individuals of a community, as
collisions between particles in a certain medium, has allowed mathematical epidemiology to take-off as a
scientific discipline. This section reviews the key concepts and results of basic deterministic mean-field
models of theoretical epidemiology, departing from an historical overview of the founding role of the mass-
action principle (section 3.1). Notably, the current behavioral epidemiology revolution stems, one hundred
years after the birth of mathematical epidemiology, from a twofold awareness, first that humans, unlike
particles, are thinking agents that might depart from the mass-action rule especially when the threats from
infections are serious, and second that we now have easier access to the tools that are necessary to finally
model such departures. The rest of the section is organised as follows: section 3.2 introduces a basic
compartmental modeling framework for infection transmission and the underlying key concepts; section
3.3 reports a non-technical presentation of reproduction numbers, which are key summary parameters of
transmission; the main results about models for infection with permanent immunity, namely the SIR and
SEIR models for outbreaks and for endemic infections, follow in sections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively; the effects
of mass vaccination for SIR infections are reported in section 3.6, while the consequences of immunity losses
follow in section 3.7; the section ends with a discussion of a number of extensions of basic models (section
3.9), and of the epidemiological meanings and implications of the use of mean-field approximations (section
3.8).
3.1. Mathematical epidemiology: a story shaped by statistical physics
The first application of mathematics to epidemiology dates back to Daniel Bernoulli [69] investigation of
the gain in life expectancy that would be allowed by elimination of smallpox, then a major cause of humans’
death. Though historically important and far-seeing - smallpox is so far the only infection ever eradicated
in mankind history - Bernoulli’s study cannot however be taken as the birthday of modern mathematical
epidemiology, since it neglected the building block of the diffusion of a communicable disease, namely, the
transmission process of an infective agent and its social spread in a population. The consideration of the
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transmission process took 150 further years i.e., following the nice historical reconstruction by Heesterbeek
[70], the lapse of time necessary to build a solid scientific background to the idea of contagion. It is indeed
only in the 1870s that the conclusive confirmation by Koch and Pasteur that infectious diseases are caused
by living organisms, definitely paved the way to the explanation of observed epidemic curves (which today
we call incidence curves), giving credit to a number of central earlier intuitions. The main one was the John
Snow (Fig. 2) hypothesis that epidemics come to an end when the availability of susceptible individuals - the
“epidemic fuel”- goes down. Some decades later, while analyzing UK measles incidence data, William Hamer
[71] identified the biennial period of outbreaks in towns, and in particular explained the recurrence of measles
epidemics by Snow’s hypothesis, i.e. a new epidemics will start “when there is a sufficient accumulation of
susceptible persons”. In addition he computed from data a relationship of the form “New cases at time
t + 1=(New cases at time t) × (susceptibles at time t)”. However, he failed to recognize this as a general
mechanistic rule, nor did he draw any implications from it [70]. The key step finally turning mathematical
epidemiology into a scientific discipline occurs when two fine innovators working independently but in strict
touch, namely the 1908 Nobel Prize for medicine Sir Ronald Ross [72, 73] and Anderson McKendrick [74] (Fig.
2), formulated and analyzed the first modern epidemic models [70]. It was in particular McKendrick who, by
importing from a stronger domain of knowledge, namely statistical physics, the mass-action law of chemical
reaction kinetics to describe infection transmission as the outcome of the social contact process between
infective and susceptible individuals, sets-up the building block of modern epidemiology, thereby generating
a true Gestalt shift in scientific knowledge. McKendrick’s ground-breaking intuition is summarized in his
metaphor of “collisions”, that he applies to an animal infection: “The rate at which this epidemic will spread
depends obviously on the number of infected animals, and also on the number of animals which remain to
be infected, in other words the occurrence of a new infection depends on a collision between an infected and
an uninfected animal.”[74].
This observation makes McKendrick’s seminal study a true - in contemporary language - transdisci-
plinary paper in statistical physics. He makes the counter-factual hypothesis that the population behaves
as a collection of “particles”of different types randomly moving in the environment, where each encounter
(“collision”) between a particle of susceptible-type and one of infective-type has a uniform probability that
the S-type particle switches into I-type. Translating this into mathematical language for an infection with-
out immunity in a stationary population of size N , letting Y and X respectively denote the numbers of
infective and susceptible individuals (X + Y = N), and k′ a proportionality constant, McKendrick derived
the following ordinary differential equation (ODE) for the rate of epidemic spread
Y ′ = k′Y (N − Y ), (1)
as the first true model of modern epidemiology. Passing to the epidemiological fractions S = X/N , I = Y/N ,
S + I = 1 and defining kˆ = k′N one gets
I ′ = kˆI(1− I). (2)
This simple logistic equation, having I = 1 as a globally asymptotically stable (GAS) state reached by
a sigmoid temporal pattern, implies that an infection without immunity spreading according to the mass
action principle will eventually affect the entire population. McKendrick’s full contagion principle represents
the first principle of theoretical epidemiology.
By pursuing further his mass-action formulation, McKendrick definitely launched mathematical epi-
demiology in a famous series of papers with Kermack [75], where they introduced the celebrated threshold
theorem for infections imparting permanent immunity, studied conditions for endemicity, and introduced
and analyzed the first age-structure epidemiological models. The momentum impressed by Kermack and
McKendrick work yielded, with a certain delay, an explosion of bio-mathematical studies, mostly devoted
to the investigation of a number of variants of the key models introduced by the forerunners. For further
historical details see [76].
There is a second major shift however, dating 1975-1980, when another group of innovators [77–79]
started and systematically using mathematical models to interpret epidemiological data and trends aiming
to deep the perspectives for infection control. In this phase, dramatically accelerated first by the HIV/AIDS
epidemics in the 1980s, and in the 2000s by the emergence of influenza pandemic threats, mathematical
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Figure 2: Forerunners of mathematical epidemiology: John Snow (left), Sir Ronald Ross (centre), Anderson
McKendrick (right).
models of infectious diseases definitely left the boundary of bio-mathematics and became a central supporting
tools for public health decisions, such as determining the duration of travel restrictions or of school closure
during a pandemic event, or the fraction of newborn to be immunized for a vaccine preventable infection,
as measles. It is this fine tuning of epidemiological models that eventually raised the key question of
behavioral epidemiology: given that humans are not “particles”, which is then the role they play for infection
transmission and prevention? [80].
3.2. Basic concepts: homogenous social mixing, infection incidence, force of infection
Regardless of their nature (e.g., directly vs sexually transmitted), for most human infectious diseases
the individual life-course of infection is conveniently represented by a sequence of transitions between a few
epidemiological classes, or compartments, triggered by specific processes and parameters [79, 81]. For new
pathogens, such as a pandemic flu virus, all individuals are initially susceptible to the infection (class S),
which they acquire at a rate λ entering the exposed class (E), a latency or incubation phase where individuals
are infected, i.e. the virus is replicating in their body, but not yet infective, which they become at some
rate α. Individuals belonging to the infective class (I) will usually recover, at a rate γ, acquiring immunity
and entering the removed class (R). This Susceptible-Exposed-Infective-Removed course, SEIR for brevity
(Fig. 3), is shared for example by a number of vaccine-preventable infections of childhood yielding lifelong
immunity, such as measles, mumps and rubella. For other, as pertussis and varicella, clinical reinfection
through return to susceptibility (at some rate δ) is possible, so that their actual course would be SEIRS.
Based on this representation of the individual course, epidemiological models seek to describe the dynam-
ics of infections at the population level, by associating to each compartment a dynamic variable denoting
the number (or the proportion) of individuals in that class at each instant of time. Denoting by N the total
population size, we let X (S = X/N), H (E = H/N), Y (I = Y/N), Z (R = Z/N) to denote the numbers
(proportions) of individuals who respectively occupy the various classes at time t, with N = X+H+Y +Z,
and S+E+ I+R = 1. The key process, namely infection spread, focuses on the number of transitions from
compartment S to compartment E per unit of time, which is the absolute incidence (U) of new infections per
time-units. In simple models the mass action formulation of incidence occurs by the concept of homogeneous
(or random) mixing [79, 81]. This refers to an infection spreading by direct person-to-person contacts in
a closed homogenous social medium, the population, whose agents have an approximately identical social
activity, summarized by the average number of contacts C per unit time, the same probability I = Y/N
that a given contact occurs with an infective individual, and the same constant probability βI of infection
transmission per single adequate social contact (i.e., per single social link in networks jargon) between a
susceptible and an infective individual. Therefore, the expected instantaneous per-capita rate λ at which
susceptible individuals acquire infection, called the force of infection (FOI), can be written as: λ = βICI
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Figure 3: Compartmental representation of the individual course for some important classes of infections:
SEIRS model (top); SIRS model (middle); SIS model (bottom). Boxes identify epidemiological classes and
arrows identify the processes governing transitions between classes, and in-out flows due to demographics.
or, setting β = βIC, as: λ = βI. The corresponding absolute incidence U is then given by
U = λX = β(Y/N)X, (3)
which is the standard mass action formulation of the incidence and the FOI [81, 82]. It depends on the
complex parameter β, representing the total transmission rate per unit of time, which embeds distinct
sub-processes, namely social behavior (mean number and type of contacts per unit of time) as well as the
biological process of contagion. Note that, assuming the frequencies S and I as the "molar concentrations"
of the "particles" susceptible subjects and infectious, and the total population size N as the "Avogadro’s
number" of the model in study, then the change per time unit of such "molar concentrations" is equal to
(U/N), which in turn is equal to βSI, i.e. the kinetic mass action law.
Also common in biomathematics is the bilinear incidence U = β˜XY [81, 83], which, however, is less
supported empirically [79], and moreover postulates that C is linearly increasing in population size which
seems to be reasonable only in a few special cases, and also in the quite artificial case where the numerical
value of β˜ scales as 1/N . This means that one can write U = β˜XY = β(Y/N)X. In other words, in such
cases the models, although formally built on the bilinear incidence, in reality are ruled by the standard mass
action law for the contagion mechanism.
To complete the model formulation we make a few further hypotheses. First, we assume that all other
epidemiological processes in Fig. 3, namely, transfers E → I, I → R, R → S, occur at constant rates,
meaning that the duration of sojourn in the involved states is exponentially distributed. This means for
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example that γ = 1/D, i.e. that the rate of recovery is the reciprocal of the average duration D of the
infective phase. Second, we assume that the population is large, so that the law of large numbers rules out
large chance fluctuations, and closed to migration, i.e. it evolves over time due the natural balance between
exits due to mortality (from all compartments), at a per-capita rate m(N), and entries due to new births,
occurring at a per-capita rate b(N) into the susceptible class only. Last, we rule out complications such as
infection-related mortality, or vertical transmission from mother to foeta during pregnancy. We can then
translate the SEIRS diagram in Fig. 3 into the following mean-field system of ODEs
X ′ = b(N)N + δZ −m(N)X − βX Y
N
, (4)
H ′ = βX
Y
N
− αH −m(N)H, (5)
Y ′ = αH − γY −m(N)Y, (6)
Z ′ = γY −m(N)Z − δZ, (7)
where the population size obeys
N ′ = (b(N)−m(N))N. (8)
Given that the population evolution is known, one equation can be discarded, since e.g., Z = N(t) −
X − H − Y . Assuming that the population N has a unique and globally stable equilibrium Ne such that
b(Ne) = m(Ne) = µ, and that the population is at its steady state Ne, yields
S′ = µ(1− S) + δR− βSI, (9)
E′ = βSI − (α+ µ)E, (10)
I ′ = αE − (γ + µ)I, (11)
complemented by R = 1− S − E − I. Model of Eqs. 9-11 is the so-called deterministic SEIRS model [81].
By suitably restricting some parameters the SEIRS model can be specialized into various “classical”models
appeared in the biomathematical literature. For example, by assuming a negligibly short duration of the
exposed phase (i.e. α >> 1) and applying a quasi-steady state approximation
E ≈ β
α+ µ
SI (12)
yields
S′ = µ(1− S) + δR− βSI, (13)
I ′ ≈ α
α+ µ
βSI − (γ + µ)I ≈ βSI − (γ + µ)I, (14)
i.e. the SIRS model (see (Fig. 3), to be complemented by the algebraic equation R = 1 − S − I. Further
assuming that the immune phase is permanent (i.e. setting δ = 0) yields the celebrated SIR model with
vital dynamics
S′ = µ(1− S)− βSI, (15)
I ′ = βSI − (γ + µ)I. (16)
On the contrary, the assumption of absence of an immune phase (i.e. δ >> 1) brings to the SIS model (Fig.
3)
S′ = µ(1− S)− βSI + γI, (17)
I ′ = βSI − (γ + µ)I. (18)
Finally, by considering epidemic models for which the epidemiological time scales are fast compared to
demographic ones, i.e. by setting in the above model µ ≈ 0, one obtains models for outbreaks, which include
the celebrated SIR epidemic model by Kermack and McKendrick [75].
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3.3. Reproduction numbers of epidemic spread
What happens when a new infectious agent, such as a pandemic virus, enters (e.g. via an infected
traveler) a population of susceptible individuals? Will the virus start spreading and causing an outbreak?
And if it does, how fast and how many people will be eventually hit? Though detailed answers to such
questions depend on the characteristics of the infection considered, a great deal of intuition can be obtained
by a few summary parameters. The most well-known is the basic reproduction number (BRN) of infection,
a dimensionless quantity universally denoted by R0, and intuitively defined as the expected number of
secondary infection cases caused by a single typical infective case during his entire period of infectivity in a
wholly susceptible population [79, 82, 84, 85]. Under homogeneous social mixing R0 can be defined as
R0 = βCCD = βD, (19)
where D is the expected duration of the infective phase. In a large homogeneous population living a world
without uncertainty, R0 represents, by definition, a threshold parameter stating whether the epidemics takes
off, thereby invading the population (R0 > 1) or dies out (otherwise). In case of invasion R0 also represents
the exponential growth factor of infective cases counted per generations of infection. Let us consider for
example an infection imparting immunity, as influenza, and take R0 = 2, a figure close to the estimates
for 1918 Spanish pandemic flu [86]. The initial case (the “traveler”, representing the zero generation) would
cause R0 = 2 cases in the first generation, which would in turn cause R0 = 2 cases each one in the second
generation, and so on, according to the geometric progression 2n after n generations. This exponential
growth according to
Un = Rn0 (20)
holds for the initial invasion phase, that is as far as the depletion of susceptible subjects is negliglible. The
corresponding real time growth of infective cases will be U(t) ≈ ert. Assuming a stationary distance between
any two consecutive generations of infection, what today we call the infection generation time [87], and that
this equals D, the duration of the infective phase, leads to the fundamental relation between generational
growth and real time growth: R0 = erD, which enables to estimate R0 based on the observed rate of real
time growth of cases and the infection generation time. Once epidemic spread has depleted the susceptible
fraction S to levels well below 100%, the definition ofR0 does not apply anymore, and the outbreak evolution
is described by the quantity (still assuming homogenous mixing)
RE(t) = R0S(t) (21)
known as the effective reproduction number (ERN), often denoted by RE . The ERN captures the fact that
contacts with immune people do not contribute to the further growth of the epidemics. Therefore, still under
the Spanish flu assumption R0 = 2, when the epidemics has immunized 25% of the initial population, cases
will temporary grow at the reduced generation speed RE = 1.5, meaning that on average each infective case
will now generate only 1.5 secondary cases. With further progressing of the epidemics, RE further declines,
and when the immune proportion reaches 50%, implying RE = 1, the incidence curve reaches its maximum,
after which the epidemics enters its declining phase, and eventually dies out.
Reproduction numbers allow to also understand some key effects of mass vaccination. For sake of
simplicity we consider a perfect vaccine, i.e. one with 100% take and ensuring lifelong protection against
infection. Under the threat of an outbreak, vaccination by a perfect vaccine of a fraction x of the population
initially susceptible would decrease the transmission potential from R0 to RV = R0(1 − x), the so-called
vaccine reproduction number (VRN). Therefore, choosing x so as to bring the VRN below one, namely
x > 1− 1/R0 = xc, (22)
would prevent the outbreak to occur. This argument extends to infections that prior to vaccination were
persisting endemically. Assume that vaccination is administered to a constant proportion x of newborn
individuals. If vaccination is continued thoughout many consecutive birth cohorts, the susceptible fraction
in the population will eventually follow S ≤ (1− x), which in turn implies the inequality RE = R0(1− x).
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Therefore the condition R0(1− x) < 1, yielding again x > xc, represents in this case a correct condition of
infection elimination (Anderson and May 1991), since it implies that the ERN is definitely forced below 1.
The quantity xc is termed the critical vaccine coverage. This result, indicating that a sufficiently large (but
always smaller than 100%) vaccine uptake is capable to eliminate infection by breaking the transmission
chain, is referred to as the herd immunity principle. The critical coverage xc is increasing and concave in
R0. Therefore, for measles, for which R0s was estimated to be about 15 in England and Wales prior to
vaccination, the corresponding critical coverage is xc = 93.3%, requiring effective vaccination of nearly all
newborns.
Both R0 and RE actually are model-dependent parameters. That is, any well posed mean-field epidemi-
ological model as those presented in section 3.2 (i.e., SIS, SIR, SIRS, SEIR, SEIRS, etc) will have its own
R0 and RE , depending more or less complexly on the model parametric structure, as illustrated in forth-
coming subsections. However, fully general routes to compute RNs are available for very broad families of
epidemiological models [82, 84, 85, 88]. The key underlying idea is that of next generation operator (NGO),
which is the positive operator associating to any given distribution of infective cases, representing a certain
generation of infection, the number of cases in the subsequent generation. Properties of positive operators
ensure that iteration of the NGO will eventually bring the exponential growth (per generation) of infective
cases at a factor - the dominant eigenvalue of the NGO - which is currently taken as the most general
definition of RN in deterministic epidemiological models. Historical notes on the ubiquitous role of R0 in
mathematical population dynamics are reported in [89].
3.4. SIR and SEIR models for epidemic outbreaks
What does the framework of Eqs. 9–11 further tells us about epidemic outbreaks? For example which is
the outbreak’s temporal profile? When is the epidemic peak reached? Which is the fraction of the population
eventually infected? Let us depart for simplicity from an SIR communicable infection (i.e. we disregard
the E class) that is introduced, by importation of a few infective cases, in a wholly susceptible population,
that is with an initial susceptible fraction S(0) ≈ 1. As we are interested here in short outbreaks - such as
seasonal influenza, whose outbreaks last a few months, as opposed to tuberculosis, whose historical onset
required many decades - we also neglect the population change, setting µ = 0, which amounts to consider
a fixed population. This is a strong assumption making such a model purely transient. We are thus led to
the classical Kermack and McKendrick’s SIR epidemic model [75]
S′ = −βSI, (23)
I ′ = βSI − γI, (24)
where γ = 1/D.
As expected from the presence of a communicable disease, the susceptible fraction S is decreasing, as
reflected in Eq. 23. As for the dynamics of the infective fraction, or prevalence, I(t), it is useful to rewrite
Eq. 24 as
I ′ = γI (R0S − 1) , (25)
where R0 = β/γ indeed represents the BRN specific to the above model, given that β = βIC, and γ = 1/D.
R0 fully determines the behavior of the system. Indeed, since S(t) < S(0) < 1, the differential inequality
I ′ ≤ γI (R0S(0)− 1) implies that if
R0 ≤ 1/S(0), (26)
then no outbreak occurs. Note that the initial infective cases will cause a few other cases but the infection
will not represent a threat since there is no increase in prevalence with respect to its initial level I0. On the
other hand, an outbreak is only possible if I ′(0) > 0, i.e. if
R0 > 1/S(0). (27)
Thus R0 is the key parameter which determines the threshold character of the system, as first noted by
Kermack and McKendrick [75]. The result in Eq. 27, can be put in a number of informative ways. First, if
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the population is largely susceptible, i.e. it holds S(0) ≈ 1, the threshold value for model of Eqs. 23-24 is 1,
as claimed in the previous subsection. In the presence of a substantial immune component (i.e. S(0) < 1),
as is typically the case for seasonal influenza, then the condition R0 > 1/S(0) can be written as R0S(0) > 1,
i.e. RE(0) > 1, meaning that the occurrence of the outbreak requires an initial ERN greater than 1 (see
previous subsection). A further noteworthy reading of condition in Eq. 27 is Kermack and McKendrick’s
original one [75]: S(0) > 1/R0, which, in line with John Snow’s seminal intuition, states that an outbreak
requires a large initial susceptible fraction.
The temporal dynamics of the outbreak under Eq. 27 shows, by linearization of Eq. 25, an initial
exponential growth in prevalence according to I(t) ≈ I(0)Exp(γ(R0S(0) − 1)t), which will be faster the
bigger the difference between the initial value of the ERN and its threshold. This initial exponential growth
is followed by a non-linear deceleration due to the decline in the susceptible pool S, and consequently in the
ERN R(t) = R0S(t). Moreover, at the time tx when S(tx) = 1/R0 it is I ′(tx) = 0, while for all t > tx it
is I ′(t) < 0, given that S(t) < S(tx) due to the decrease of S(t). In words, the infective prevalence attains
its maximum when the susceptible fraction S becomes equal to the inverse of the BRN, after which the
epidemics enter its declining phase until it eventually dies out.
The maximum of the prevalence can be determined by the curve I(S), which is obtained from Eqs. 23-24
by taking
dI
dS
=
1
R0S − 1, (28)
whose solution in 0 < S ≤ S(0) (remind that S(t) is decreasing) is
I(S) = I(0) + S(0)− S + 1R0Log
(
S
S(0)
)
. (29)
This implies that the extremum of I is
Imax = I(0) + S(0)− log(1 +R0S(0))R0 . (30)
Therefore, given a wholly susceptible initial population (S(0) ≈ 1), the maximum prevalence is increasing in
R0. For example, under the Spanish flu hypothesis Imax ≈ 45%, while for R0 ≈ 15, as commonly observed
for measles, then Imax ≈ 80%.
Moreover, the cumulative fraction hit by the infection at time t is given by
J(t) = S(0)− S(t) = I(t)− I(0) +R(t)−R(0). (31)
Therefore the fraction eventually infected at the end of the outbreak, the so-called final attack rate (AR),
is given by
AR = J(∞) ≈ 1− S(∞). (32)
Setting in Eq. 29 I = 0, S(0) + I(0) = 1, S∞ ≈ 1 − AR yields the following trascendental equation for
the AR
AR = 1− exp(−R0AR). (33)
The AR is therefore an increasing and concave function ofR0. For example, under the Spanish flu hypothesis
(R0 ≈ 2) the predicted AR is close to 80%. More important, Eq. 33 shows that for infections imparting
immunity, the outbreak will never hit the entire population (though the AR may reach levels only slightly
lower than 100% for measles-like values of R0). Also this incomplete contagion principle was first noted by
Kermack and McKendrick [75]. Starting from Eq. 29, the case where an initial pool of immune subjects is
present (R0 > 0) - as in the case of seasonal influenza outbreaks - is straightforward.
The behavior of Eqs. 23-24 above the invasion threshold (R0 > 1) (Fig. 4) clarifies the nonlinear tuning of
R0 on both the intensity (left panel, based on Eq. 29) and the time-course of the outbreak (central panel).
In particular the decline of the ERN following the decline in the susceptible pool during the outpbreak
modulates the changes in the form of the infective prevalence (right panel of Fig. 4).
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Figure 4: Dynamics of the epidemic SIR model for different values of the BRN: R0 = 2, 3, 5. Left panel:
dynamics in the S, I phase plane, based on Eq. 29. Central panel: time course of the infective prevalence
I(t). Right panel: time course of the infective fraction I(t) and the ERN for R0 = 2. The duration of the
infective phase D = 1/γ is set to 3 days
Public health actions aimed at reducing the AR, or at slowing down the outbreak course, e.g. by
vaccination and/or by reducing transmission, can be easily accomodated. For example, the effects of an
awareness campaigns aimed at favouring behavioral changes affecting the contact rate, could be modeled by
means of a time-varying decreasing transmission rate β(t).
3.4.1. The SEIR model for outbreaks
The more realistic case where a time-lag between exposure and onset of infectivity exists due to the
presence of an exposed, non-infective, phase, can be tackled by the epidemic SEIR model
S′ = −βSI, (34)
E′ = βSI − αE, (35)
I ′ = αE − γI, (36)
As for Eqs. 23-24, it holds S(t) < S(0). The joint dynamics of (E, I) is, instead, more complex. However,
observe that the subsystem (E, I) is cooperative [90] since
∂E′
∂I
= βS > 0, (37)
∂I ′
∂E
= α > 0. (38)
Thus the dynamics of (E(t), I(t)) is such that for all t it holds (E(t), I(t)) < (U(t),W (t)), where
U ′ = βS(0)W − αU, (39)
W ′ = αU − γW, (40)
(with initial conditions U(0) = E(0) and W (0) = I(0)), whose characteristic polynomial is λ2+ (α + γ)λ
+α(γ − βS(0)). Therefore, if R0 < 1/S(0) the infection dies out also for SEIR model. Note also that
the system of Eqs. 39-40 is the one (approximately) governing the initial phase of the epidemics, when
S(t) ≈ S(0). Thus, if R0 > 1/S(0) then there is an initial phase of exponential growth. Finally, for those
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Figure 5: Biennal pre-vaccination oscillations of measles in New York, 1943-1963
t > 0 such that S(t) remains bigger than 1/R0, it is (E, I) > (U1,W1), where
U ′1 = β
(
+
1
R0
)
W1 − αU1, (41)
W ′1 = αU1 − γW1, (42)
(with initial conditions U1(0) = E(0) and W1(0) = I(0)), which is unstable (characteristic polynomial: λ2+
(α + γ)λ −αβ). In other words, as long as S(t) remains bigger than 1/R0, it follows that (E, I) is bigger
than an increasing vector.
Summarizing, in vectorial sense, the BRN of the SIR transient model governs also the dynamics of the
SEIR transient model. However, note that a vectorial increasing system, i.e. characterized by eigenvalues
that have all positive real part, may have some of its components that can be transitorially decreasing. For
example, if E(0) = 0 then initially I(t) is decreasing: I ′(0) = −γI(0) < 0.
Finally, let us consider the case of a latent phase of average duration 1/α much longer than the infective
phase: α << γ and such that E(0) = 0, and that there is initially a single infectious subject I(0) = 1/N ,
so that S(0) = 1 − 1/N ≈ 1. In such a case, in the time interval [0, D] there is no new infectious subjects
I(t) = constant = 1/N . It follows from
J = N
∫ D
0
βS(t)I(t)dt ≈ βD = R0, (43)
where the number J of secondary infections caused by one infectious subject during his entire infectious
period in a wholly susceptible population is equal to the BRN.
3.5. Emergence and features of endemicity: the SIR and SEIR models with vital dynamics.
The SIR and SEIR epidemic models unavoidably predict the extinction of the infection due to the
depletion of the susceptible population. This means that further factors are necessary to sustain endemicity,
that is the ability of a communicable disease to persist in a population in the long-term, with its peculiar
patterns, such as the biennial pre-vaccination oscillations of measles in large UK and US cities (Fig. 5).
The first candidate among such factors is the birth process which allows to rebuild the susceptible pool
after an outbreak. The simplest reference model is therefore the SIR model with stationary vital dynamics
[79, 81], which is obtained from Eqs. 9-10 by disregarding the exposed phase:
S′ = µ(1− S)− βSI, (44)
I ′ = βIS − (γ + µ)I. (45)
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Note that system of Eqs. 44-45 has a disease-free equilibrium DFE = (1, 0). The BRN specific to this model
is given by
R0 = β
γ + µ
. (46)
Indeed, from I ′ = (γ + µ)I(R0S − 1) < (γ + µ)I(R0(1− I)− 1) it follows that if R0 ≤ 1 then I(t)→ 0 and
S(t) → 1, i.e. DFE is globally attractive. Moreover, linearizing Eq. 45 around the DFE gives, letting i to
denote the linearised prevalence, i′ = (γ + µ)(R0 − 1)i, implying that if
R0 > 1
then the DFE is unstable and an introduction of infective subjects i(0) << 1 in a wholly susceptible
population induces an outbreak, initially growing as i(t) ≈ i(0)Exp((γ+µ)(R0−1)t). Moreover, for R0 > 1
an equilibrium with positive infective prevalence, termed an endemic equilibrium, appears
EE = (Se, Ie) =
(
1
R0 ,
µ
µ+ γ
(
1− 1R0
))
. (47)
Note that in the case where γ >> µ, common for childhood infections, it is Ie < (µ/γ) << 1. The EE is
globally attractive, as it follows by applying the Poincaré-Bendixon theorem with multiplying factor 1/I
div
(
1
I
(S′, I ′)
)
= −µ
I
− β. (48)
To sum up, technically speaking, R0 > 1 induces a transcritical bifurcation at R0 = 1, such that below
threshold only the DFE exists and is GAS, while above threshold the endemic state appears, which inherits
the GAS, and promotes an infective prevalence which is strictly increasing in R0 > 1. In words, if R0 ≤ 1
then the infection is not able to self-sustain and dies out, whereas if R0 > 1 the infection will invade the
population and remain endemic. The behavior of the endemic state is studied by linearizing around the EE
and computing the associated characteristic polynomial
λ2 + µR0λ+ µ(µ+ γ)(R0 − 1) = 0. (49)
The associated discriminant is ∆ = µ2R20− 4µ(µ+γ)(R0−1) ≈ −4µ(µ+γ)(R0−1) < 0, implying dumping
oscillations of prevalence about its endemic level with natural (pseudo-) period:
T =
2pi√
µ(µ+ γ)(R0 − 1)
. (50)
In the case of measles, for which 1/γ ≈ 1week, and estimates of R0 in the region of 15 [79] were common in
western countries in the pre-vaccination epoch, by taking a life expectancy at birth of 1/µ = 75years, one
finds T ≈ 2.01years, therefore reproducing the measles inter-epidemic period observed in the UK and the
US cities before the advent of vaccination.
The global dynamics of the system, particularly the interplay between infection and demographics, can be
unfolded by a time-scale argument, departing from the introduction of the infection in a wholly susceptible
population. Assume for simplicity that R0 is greater than 1 and large, and that epidemiological and
demographic time scales are well-separated i.e. γ >> µ. In this case there is an initial phase where model
dynamics is essentially described by model of Eqs. 23-24 for outbreaks, yielding a large initial epidemics,
which exhausts most of the susceptible population, bringing the ERN (and prevalence) to very low levels, as
clear by the thick line overlapped with the vertical axis in Fig. 6. This implies that thereafter the S-equation
takes the approximate form S′ ≈ µ, which has a twofold effect: it promotes a phase of rebuilding of the
susceptible pool due to the new births on the one hand, while on the other hand it slows down the decline
in prevalence, which avoids the infection to simply die out as in Eqs. 23-24. The growth in susceptible
population will eventually end by a new, but less severe, epidemics, which will in turn be followed by a new
phase of replenishment of the susceptible pool, and so on [79] until the endemic equilibrium is achieved (Fig.
6). The global dynamics then consists in continued alternation between epidemic phases, followed by epochs
of demographic replenishment, which is how we know the natural history of many infectious diseases. The
biennal period of quasi-linear oscillations about the EE is emphasised in the sub-graph of Fig. 6.
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Figure 6: The SIR model with vital dynamics: pre-vaccination dynamics of the effective reproduction
number (RE(t)), with convergence to the endemic state. The pattern of linear oscillations about the EE is
reported in the subgraph, showing the biennial inter-epidemic period. The demographic and epidemiological
parameters are: µ = (1/75)year−1, γ = 52year−1, R0 = 15.
3.5.1. Periodic contact rates
The simple endemic SIR model with constant transmission rate β and stationary population dynamics
plays a fundamental role as trigger of the studies on vaccine-preventable infections of childhood, since it well
reproduces, by minimal ingredients, their main qualitative and quantitative features such as the endemic
oscillation and the observed inter-epidemic period [79, 81]. However, the model fails to capture a number of
further characteristics, ranging from the sustained biennial pre-vaccination oscillations of measles in US and
UK cities (see again Fig. 5), to the more complicate dynamics observed in other contexts, both prior and
after mass vaccination [91–93]. Motivated by the fact that both the weather and certain social processes,
namely school-recruitment following the yearly school calendar, have one year periodicity, an important
strain of the literature has focused on 1 − year periodic β(t) in endemic SIR models. If the corresponding
period Tβ is around 1 year, then nonlinear resonance may appear, inducing phenomena such as biennal and
multi-year periodicity, and chaos [91, 93–99] that partially explain a number of observed epidemiological
time-series.
The effect of periodic forcing in the contact rate on the stability of the disease-free equilibrium, is found
by defining
R0(t) = β(t)
µ+ γ
, (51)
and operating as in the case of constant BRN, i.e. by differential inequality and linearization. Letting
〈R0(t)〉 to denote the average of R0(t) over [0, Tβ ], one easily gets that: 1) 〈R0(t)〉 ≤ 1 implies the global
attractiveness of DFE; 2) 〈R0(t)〉 > 1 implies the instability of the DFE. It is important to note that in
the SIR model the stability and instability of DFE are independent of the specific shape of β(t): they only
depend on its average value. However, this independence of the behavior on the entire shape of β(t) is a
peculiarity of the SIR and of some other epidemic models, but it cannot be generalized.
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The inclusion of a latency period in the SIR endemic model leads to the SEIR endemic model
S′ = µ(1− S)− βSI, (52)
E′ = βIS − (γ + α)E, (53)
I ′ = αE − (γ + µ)I, (54)
whose BRN is given by
RSEIR0 =
α
α+ µ
β
µ+ γ
. (55)
Note that if µ << α then RSEIR0 ≈ RSIR0 . It holds that i) if RSEIR0 ≤ 1 then the DFE is the unique
equilibrium and it is GAS; ii) if RSEIR0 > 1 then there is a unique EE, which is GAS. The latter property
has been demonstrated by Li and Muldowney [100] as an application of their 3D extension of Poincaré-
Bendixon theorem. As for the SIR case, nonlinear resonances are possible for a 1 − year periodic contact
rate under parameter constellations characteristic of childhood infections.
Interestingly, in the SEIR model the deterministic periodic fluctuations of the contact rate have nontrivial
effects also on the stability of the DFE. As regards the global stability of the DFE, also here the cooperativity
of subsystem (E, I) implies that for all t > 0 (E(t), I(t)) < (U(t),W (t)), where
U ′ = β(t)W − αU, (56)
W ′ = αU − γW, (57)
with initial conditions U(0) = E(0) andW (0) = I(0). It follows that if both the eigenvalues of the Floquet’s
matrix F associated to Eqs. 56-57 are interior to the unit circle in the complex plane, then
(U(t),W (t))→ (0, 0)⇒ (E(t), I(t))→ (0, 0) (58)
in turn implying that S(t) → 1. As regards the instability of DFE, by linearizing the SEIR model around
the DFE one gets a linear time-varying system equivalent to Eqs. 56-57. Thus if the eigenvalues of the
matrix F are outside the unit circle of the complex plane, then the DFE is unstable.
It is of interest to note that although RSEIR0 (t) ≈ RSIR0 (t), for the SEIR endemic model the stability
of the DFE is deeply different from the SIR case. Indeed, in the SIR model the behavior of the DFE is
uniquely determined by the average of the transmission rate β(t), while in the SEIR case the stability of the
DFE depends on the "whole shape" of β(t).
The computation of Floquet’s matrices is usually nontrivial. However, matrix F can be easily computed
in the noteworthy case where β(t) is switching between two constant values, which mimicks well the realistic
school-holiday scenario where students have a large number of contacts during the school period, which
remarkably reduces during holidays [92, 101]. Setting
β(t) =
{
β1, if t ∈ [0, T ],
β2, if t ∈ (T, 1],
(59)
the linear time-varying system of period one year is equivalent to the following two systems
X ′1 = M1X1; 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (60)
X ′2 = M2X2;T < t ≤ 1, (61)
where for i = 1, 2
Mi =
[−α βi
α −γ
]
. (62)
As a consequence F is the product of two matrix exponentials:
F = Exp(M2(1− T ))Exp(M1T ). (63)
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The generalization to more complex patterns of alternance between school and holidays can also easily
handled.
In the general case, if one eliminates the first state variable in the above equivalent linear systems, one
obtains the following family of Newton’s equation[90]
w′′ + (γ + α)w′ + (γ − αβ(t))w = 0. (64)
Further, by setting y(t) = w(t)Exp((γ + α)t/2) [102], one yields the Hill family of equations
y′′ +
(
− (γ + α)
2
4
+ γ − αβ(t)
)
y = 0. (65)
The families of Eqs. 64-65 are ubiquitous and widely studied in various fields of mathematical physics [102–
108]. For example, in mechanics they model the periodic perturbations in the elastic force of damped or
undamped oscillators respectively, which are at the base of several theories, such as that of parametric reso-
nance [106–108]; while in applied electromagnetism Eq. 65 models the frequency modulation[104]. Analytic
solutions for t ∈ [0, 1] are known for a number of particular forms of β(t). For example, if β(t) is linearly
increasing, the solutions of Eq. 65 in t ∈ [nT, nT + 1) are Airy’s functions, whereas if the contact rate is
sinusoidally varying around an average value, the solutions of Eq. 65 are Mathieu’s functions.
3.5.2. Nonlinear contact rates as a phenomenological route to behavior change
A limitation of mass-action-based SIR and SEIR models with and without vital dynamics, and of other
epidemic models, is that they assume that the behavioral component is either constant (resulting in a con-
stant β) or influenced by exogenous phenomena such as the school/work calendar (resulting in a periodic
time-varying β(t) with one-year period). Capasso and Serio were first in pointing out this shortcoming
[109], and in stressing that agents might respond to the threat posed by the outbreak by changing their
social behavior (i.e. reducing their average number of contacts C), and/or by adopting protections against
transmission. They modelled these effects by a prevalence-dependent transmission rate of the form β(I),
β′(I) < 0, showing that behavior change may deeply modify the quantitative dynamics of an outbreak [109].
In a more general study on the SIR endemic model [110], it was stressed that prevalence-dependent behav-
ior is influenced by a range of information variables, some of which can be made available to agents with
time-lags. The inclusion of delayed prevalence-dependent behavior in the SIR endemic model can destabilize
the endemic equilibrium by triggering sustained oscillations, and, in turn, these endogenous oscillations may
interact with the one-year periodicity of the contact rate, resulting in chaotic fluctuations [110]. Finally,
another seminal paper is Hadeler and Chavez [111], which models the spread of a vaccine/education pre-
ventable sexually transmitted disease in a population split in two groups: an inactive group with β = 0 and
a core active group where β > 0. The model included a unidirectional prevalence-depending flux of subjects
from the inactive to the core group, with tranfer rate r(I) decreasing with I.
3.6. Mass vaccination and herd immunity for vaccine preventable infections: the SIR model with vaccination
at birth
In modern communities new vaccines, targeting different infections and different populations, appear at
a continuously increasing rate, making the mosaic of characteristics of the different available vaccines quite
articulated. Nonetheless, much of the main dynamic effects of mass vaccination in controlling communicable
diseases can be understood by the following simple variation of the endemic SIR model of Eqs. 44-45
S′ = µ(1− x)− µS − βSI, (66)
I ′ = βIS − (γ + µ)I, (67)
V ′ = µx− µV. (68)
Model of Eqs. 66-67-68 (of course R = 1 − S − I − V ) considers vaccination of a time-invariant, randomly
chosen, proportion x of newborn susceptible individuals per unit of time by a perfect vaccine, i.e. one
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with 100% take and lifelong duration (see section 3.3). Under a perfect vaccine the fraction successfully
vaccinated coincides with the vaccine coverage, i.e. the fraction vaccinated. Vaccinated individuals are fully
protected against infection (and ensuing disease) and therefore behave, in practice, as removed individuals.
This does not need to be the case if, for example, the vaccine has waning immunity, or leaves some residual
susceptibility - as is the case e.g. for the varicella vaccine - in which case further compartments are required.
After discarding the V equation, the analysis of Eqs. 66-67 goes along exactly the same lines as Eqs. 44-
45. Since we are interested in infections that are endemic prior to vaccination, we assume R0 > 1, where
R0 still represents the BRN. The key threshold quantity is now represented by the VRN
RV = β
γ + µ
(1− x). (69)
It can then be easily shown that Eqs. 66-67 have the DFE = (1 − x, 0), which is globally attractive if
RV ≤ 1, and unstable for RV > 1. For RV > 1 the model also has the globally attractive (by the same
Poincaré-Bendixson argument) endemic state
EEV = (Se, Ie) =
(
1
R0 ,
µ
µ+ γ
(
1− x− 1R0
))
. (70)
This endemic state is also characterised by damped oscillations, with pseudo-period
TV =
2pi√
µ(µ+ γ)(R0(1− x)− 1)
. (71)
Though the mathematical analysis is the same as for the basic endemic SIR model, there is a number of
substantive implications of vaccination. Indeed, the threshold for the VRN implies the already met coverage
threshold: xc = 1 − 1/R0 (i.e. formula 22), so that if x ≥ xc then the infection is eliminated (technically,
the introduction of mass vaccination above threshold causes the EE to disappear, leaving only the DFE,
which becomes GAS). In the opposite scenario, i.e. if the coverage is insufficient to achieve elimination
(px ≤ xc), the infection will continue to persist endemically, in the new long-term regime described by
Eqs. 70. This post-vaccination regime is characterized by the same susceptible proportion (1/R0) as in the
pre-vaccination history, but by a different distribution of immune individuals between natural and vaccine-
induced, and especially by a smaller prevalence and an increased inter-epidemic period with respect to the
case where no vaccination campaign is enacted. The increase in T straightforwardly follows from the reduced
replenishment of the susceptible class due to vaccination. For example, considering again a measles-type
parametrization (R0 = 15, 1/γ = 1 week, µ = (1/75)/year), yielding a pre-vaccination inter-epidemic period
of about 2 years, a mass vaccination program with x = 0.9 would increase the inter-epidemic period to a
post-vaccination figure TV in excess of 10 years.
The dynamic implications of the introduction of a mass vaccination for a measles-like infection are
illustrated in Fig. 7 for different vaccination programs (respective coverages: x = 0.80, x = 0.90 and
x = 0.95) initiated at time t = 20years under the hypothesis that infection spread for t < 20 was evolving
in its pre-vaccination regime, characterized by an almost biennial inter-epidemic period. As expected for
x = 0.95 the infection is eliminated, since x > xc. In the two remaining cases the infection remains endemic
with a much lower prevalence but with an amazing increase in the inter-epidemic period. For example,
for x = 0.90 the inter-epidemic period initially increases to a level in excess of 20years before gradually
contracting and converging in the long-term to the above predicted figure of TV ≈ 10years. The inflation in
the inter-epidemic period has far reaching consequences since it implies that unvaccinated individuals who
did not acquire infection early in life might do so at somewhat later ages, where they might be exposed
at a much larger risk of serious disease from the infection [79, 81]. The increase in the average age at
infection in the post-vaccination regime is the consequence in the decline in the individual risk of infection,
as clear from the decline in the endemic FOI βIe, which shifts from its pre-vaccination level of µ(R0− 1) to
µ(R0(1−x)−1). These phenomena are of importance, besides measles, for essentially all vaccine preventable
infection, particularly for rubella [79, 81].
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Figure 7: The SIR model with vital dynamics: pre- and post- vaccination dynamics of the effective repro-
duction number RE(t) (left panels) and the infective prevalence I(t) (righ panels) under different programs
of vaccination at birth initiated at time t = 20years with coverage of x = 0.80 (upper panels), x = 0.90
(central panels) and x = 0.95 (right panels) respectively. The demographic and epidemiological parameters
are: µ = (1/75)year−1, γ = 52year−1, R0 = 15.
3.7. Return to susceptibility: SIS and SIRS models
If infection-acquired immunity is not lifelong, recovered subjects will eventually become again susceptible.
A first possible scenario is the one where infective subjects directly return to susceptibility, yielding the so-
called SIS model (Fig. 3)
S′ = µ(1− S)− β(t)IS + γI, (72)
I ′ = β(t)IS − µI − γI. (73)
Since S + I = 1, one gets the scalar model
I ′ = (µ+ γ)I(R0(t)(1− I)− 1), (74)
where
R0(t) = β(t)
µ+ γ
(75)
and we still take β(t) as a 1-year periodic function. Unsurprisingly, if 〈R0(t)〉 ≤ 1 then the DFE I = 0
is globally attractive, whereas if 〈R0(t)〉 > 1 the DFE is unstable, and I(t) tends to a one-year periodic
solution, i.e. the model predicts that the disease remains endemic via a series of annual epidemic outbreaks.
For a constant transmission rate β Eq. 74 is logistic, therefore implying a constant, globally attractive,
endemic state:
IEE = 1− 1R0 , (76)
where the susceptible fraction is still given by the inverse of R0. Note that the establishment of a globally
attractive EE also holds in absence of vital dynamics (i.e. for µ = 0, suggesting that the loss of immunity
per se is a further source of endemicity through rebuilding of the susceptible pool, as first noted by [75].
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A second more general scenario occurs when return to susceptibility is buffered by a long sojourn time
in the recovered class, yielding the SIRS endemic model (Fig. 3)
S′ = µ(1− S)− βSI + δR, (77)
I ′ = βIS − γI − µI, (78)
R′ = γI − µR− δR, (79)
where 1/δ is the average length of the immunity conferred by the disease. From S = 1− I −R one gets
I ′ = (µ+ γ)I(R0(t)(1− I −R)− 1), (80)
R′ = γI − (µ+ δ)R, (81)
where
R0(t) = β(t)
µ+ γ
. (82)
Again, the infection ultimate fate, namely extinction vs endemicity, depends on whether 〈R0(t)〉 is smaller
or bigger than one. Under constant β , the threshold condition R0 > 1 allows the existence of an endemic
state:
SEE =
1
R0 , IEE =
(
1− 1R0
)
µ+ δ
µ+ δ + γ
, (83)
which can be shown to be globally attractive by applying the same Dulac-Bendixon test used for the SIR
endemic model.
Mass vaccination by a perfect vaccine can be introduced in SIS and SIRS models along the same route
followed for the SIR model, with analogous results. However, for infections with only temporary, or without,
immunity, the hypothesis of a perfect vaccine is mostly unattainable. If the vaccine is imperfect, several
scenarios are possible i.e. vaccinated individuals might either (i) not produce any immune response, therefore
remaining fully susceptible, or (ii) produce a weaker immune response. This weaker immune response might
occur in the form of a temporary immunity which however typically wanes faster than natural one, eventually
returning the individual to susceptibility, or in the form of reduced susceptibility, putting the individual at
risk of breakthrough infection, at some reduced force of infection λ = σβI with σ < 1. For example, all
these possibilities are known to occur for the current varicella vaccine [112]. This opens a more complicate
scenario which makes infection elimination more difficult. Indeed, as it can be demonstrated even for simple
SIS models with vaccination at birth, there is a range (x0c , x∗c) of the vaccinated proportion p where a
bistability phenomenon arises, i.e. where the disease-free equilibrium is locally stable but it coexists with
two endemic equilibria: one unstable and one locally stable. Therefore, infection elimination requires that
x > x∗c , whereas if x < x0c then there is only one endemic steady state, coexisting with the DFE which is
unstable. This whole scenario is termed as backward bifurcation [113].
3.8. Remarks on the wise use of the mean-field principle in theoretical epidemiology
Thanks to the use of a few important deterministic models, theoretical epidemiology has become a key
supporting tool to public health decision makers. These models, historically derived from classical physical
chemistry and other deterministic applications of statistical mechanics, are, however, only approximations
of the underlying real-world stochastic processes, obtained from the mean-field limits of stochastic birth and
death processes analogous to those adopted in chemical kinetics [114].
In this subsection we therefore concisely remind some well-known tools of nonequilibrium statistical
physics [114, 115] with the aim to recall how deterministic epidemic models arise as limits on the underlying
stochastic processes on the one hand, and their shortcomings, on the other hand.
For example, let us consider an epidemic (i.e. no vital dynamics) SIR infection process, with state
variables (X(t), Y (t), Z(t) = N −X(t)− Y (t)). In this process there are two types of events: the infection,
responsible for the S → I transition with infinitesimal probability
Prob ((X(t+ dt), Y (t+ dt)) = (X(t)− 1, Y (t) + 1)) = β Y (t)
N
X(t)dt, (84)
22
and recovery, responsible for the I → R transition with infinitesimal probability
Prob ((X(t+ dt), Y (t+ dt)) = (X(t), Y (t)− 1)) = γY (t)dt. (85)
For the SIS model (still without vital dynamics), since X(t) = N−Y (t), the S → I transition has probability
β(Y/N)(N − Y ).
The behavior of the realizations of these epidemic stochastic processes can be simulated exactly by means
of the Gillespie algorithm [116], whereas the probability density function of its state variables is described
by a multivariate Master equation (ME) [114, 115], which is bivariate for the epidemic SIR process, and
univariate for the SIS process. For example, for the epidemic SIS model the ME reads
d
dt
P (t, Y ) = β
Y − 1
N
(N − (Y − 1))P (t, Y−1)−β Y
N
(N − Y )P (t, Y )+γ(Y+1)P (t, Y+1)−γY P (t, Y ). (86)
Taking the average 〈Y (t)〉 = ∑Y P (t, Y ) from Eq. 86, we get
d
dt
〈Y (t)〉 = (β − γ)〈Y (t)〉 − β 1
N
〈Y 2(t)〉. (87)
Essentially the mean field hypothesis applied in theoretical population models stands, for large populations,
in neglecting the correlations between the state variables and assuming that the average of the product of
two state variables is approximately equal to the product of the averages [117], for example in Eq. 87 above
〈Y 2(t)〉 ≈ (〈Y (t)〉)2.
However, due to the approximate nature of deterministic epidemic model and their impact of public health
sciences, it is important to go beyond the mere application of the mean-field limit, and to understand under
which conditions deterministic differential equations (whose state variables are continuous function of time)
can safely be used in place of the originary "exact" stochastic formulation of the epidemic process (whose
state variables are time-continuous stochastic processes taking integer non-negative values). Moreover, it
is also important to have a feeling of the behavior of the system at least in the regime of small stochastic
deviations from the deterministic behavior.
If the total population size is small, birth-death stochastic epidemic models must be used. On the
other hand, when the size of the state variables becomes large (which is the case intuitively leading to the
deterministic approximation), it is hard to simulate the process due to the crowding of events. In such a
case, however, one can use a system-size approximations [114, 115]. This methodology allows approximating,
respectively, the solution of a multivariate ME with a multivariate Fokker-Plank equation (FPE) [114] (this
approximate equation is sometime called Chemical FPE [114]). In turn, from the obtained FPE one can
derive a corresponding system of Stochastic Differential equations (SDEs) that approximate the dynamics
of the state variables vectors. In physical chemistry it has been proposed a reverse equivalent approach,
the Chemical Langevin equation (CLE)[118], where first the approximating SDE system is obtained from
the definition of the model, and only then the FPE is written. Namely, a spatially homogeneous system of
particles/subjects with state variable u characterized byM "events" having probability aj(u)dt j = 1, . . . ,M
can be approximated by the following system of SDEs [118]
u′i =
∑
j
νi,j(aj(u) +
√
aj(u)ξj(t)), (88)
where the ξj(t) are M uncorrelated white noises, and ν is the stechiometric matrix where νi,j ∈ {0,−1,+1}
depending on the changes induced by the j-th event into the i-th state variable. Note that here the original
state vector, whose components were integer non-negative numbers, is approximated by a real vector.
For example, in the case of the SIR epidemic model, the CLE reads
X ′ = −β Y
N
X − ξ1(t)
√
Y
N
X, (89)
Y ′ = β
Y
N
X − γY + ξ1(t)
√
Y
N
X − ξ2(t)
√
γY . (90)
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Since N is constant, we can pass to the fractions (S, I)
S′ = −βSI − ξ1(t) 1√
N
√
βSI, (91)
I ′ = βSI − γI + ξ1(t) 1√
N
√
βSI − ξ2(t) 1√
N
√
γI. (92)
As a consequence, in the limit N → +∞ we obtain the deterministic model.
It is interesting to note that the use of the force of infection FOI=β1Y leads, after passing to fractions,
to a stochastic term ξ1(t)
√
β1SI which is not scaling as 1/
√
N , and thus it does not disappear in the limit
N → +∞. Moreover, note that an hypotetical model where the contact rate is decreasing to 0 with the
population size N , would yield the following trivial uncoupled model of the type S′ = 0, I ′ = −γI.
As stressed by a few authors among which Gillespie [118], the accuracy of the approximation given by
Eq. 88 or by those derived by the system-size expansion [114, 115], depends on the fulfillment of specific
conditions that are time-varying since they are state-variable dependent. We can roughly summarize these
conditions as follows: for all times aj(u)dt must be sufficiently larger than
√
aj(u)dt. This in turn implies
that all state variables must be sufficiently large. Thus the above mentioned approximations require caution,
since a rigori they are invalid even when only one of the state variables becomes small.
For the specific case of the SIR model, note that in the initial epidemic phase if one setsX(t) ≈ X(0) ≈ N
the ensuing stochastic process for Y (t) is linear and its mean is given by E[Y ] = Y (0)Exp((βS(0) −
γ)t) as in the approximation of the deterministic SIR epidemic model. The corresponding variance is
V ar[Y ] = Y (0)(e(βS(0)−γ)t − 1)/(βS(0) − γ). Of course, this approximation is valid for a relatively short
time-interval. However, as Bartlett noted in his pioneering work on measles [119], the most critical difference
between deterministic and stochastic models arises in the intervals between epidemics (for example during
the undamped oscillations caused by periodic changes in the contact rate) when the prevalence can become
so small that extinction of the infective population almost certainly occurs in the stochastic formulation
also in presence of a large population while deterministic models (e.g. the periodically forced SIR and SEIR
models with vital dynamics) simply predict that system trajectories will be positive for all times. This is
of relevance in presence of vaccination because stochasticity may cooperate with the further reduction in
prevalence caused by vaccination in inducing infection elimination [120].
The study of stochasticity-induced infection extinction led Bartlett to introduce [119] the key concept
of critical community size (CCS). This is the (heuristically defined) threshold over which, in absence of
vaccination, the infection is likely to persist, and below which extinction is very likely. Over the CCS it
is therefore safe to "read" the output of a deterministic model as an average behavior. For example pre-
vaccination measles data indicate a CCS in the region of 250000- 400000 [119, 121]. The CCS is only weakly
associated to the BRN, while it is strongly dependent on the duration of the infectious and latent periods.
As for the latter, it was noted that simple stochastic models based on exponentially distributed durations,
tend to severely overestimate the CCS [121], while instead adequate predictions can be obtained by resorting
to more realistic, e.g. bell-shaped, distributions of the latent and infectious periods [121]. On the other
hand, the effect of space on the CCS is extremely complex [120].
Stochastic epidemic models are characterized by a range of interesting phenomena not shown in their
deterministic counterparts. The simplest is obviously stochastic extinction after importation, i.e. the fact
that an infectious individual introduced in a fully susceptible population has a probability of recovering before
being able to infect anyone (given by 1/R0 (1/Rk0) [120]), in which case no epidemics will occur, unlike the
deterministic model. Other stochastic effects are more subtle. For example, in the SIR model with vital
dynamics, the stochastic fluctuations of the total populationN(t) around its deterministic equilibrium (which
can be approximated by the CLE: N ′ = ξb(t)
√
µN − ξd(t)
√
µN), may transform the damped oscillations
around the endemic equilibrium of the corresponding deterministic model in sustained oscillations[122]. This
phenomenon, termed stochastic amplification, is an instance of the more general phenomenon of coherence
resonance [122]. The theoretical possibility of strochastically inducing the disease eradication with a limited
amount of vaccines via periodic delivery of vaccinations so that to induce resonances, and the related role of
seasonal fluctuations of the contact rates, are invstigated in [123] by means of methodologies of the theory
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of fluctuation-induced population extinction. Further details on the stochastic theory of epidemics can be
found in the complementary books [124, 125].
3.9. Space and beyond: mean-field metapopulations
Everytime a new epidemic focus appears, the first concern of public health is to assess whether this
isolated focus will remain localized or will spatially spread. This leads to a key missing dimension in the
previous simple models, namely space. The most straightforward way of modelling the geographical spread
of infections is to add spatial diffusion to the basic SIR and SEIR model [83, 126, 127], leading to equations
that are analogous to the reaction-diffusion equations of theoretical biochemistry [126, 128]. This approach,
which is proved useful to understand some basic aspects of spatial epidemic behavior by using tools of
reaction-diffusion theory, has obvious shortcomings. The first one is that human beings have patterns of
movement dramatically different from that of particles moving under Fickian diffusion [129, 130]. This is
a major complication leading to complex integro-differential equations where the diffusion part interacts
with the reaction part, i.e. transmission [131]. Moreover, human movement often includes rapid commuting
between areas with highly clustered population, such as cities [120, 132].
To cope with the above problems, population ecology and mathematical epidemiology have increasingly
used the metapopulation, or multi-patch approach, where a large populations is split in a finite number of
patches, for example cities, where: i) each city obeys its own deterministic “local ”epidemic model, e.g. SIR-
type; ii) local dynamics are linked through population fluxes, e.g. due to commuting for work. Commuting
plays a fundamental role in the geograpical spread of infectious diseases in contemporary societies [120, 132],
by favouring the geographical spread and persistence of infections through the interlink between patches. The
multi-patch approach was used in the pioneering work by Baroyan and Ravchev, who linked a large number
of SIR epidemic models to simulate the spread of flu in URSS cities [127]. Multi-patch epidemiological
models have since then developed fast both on the theoretical and the applied side, e.g. for predicting the
world-wide spread of pandemic influenza [133–136].
As for the mathematical viewpoint, multipatch epidemic models show the same spatial phenomena we
may observe in traditional reaction-diffusion models, namely: i) emergent phenomena such as the onset of
spatial heterogeneities by means of spatial instability of spatially homogeneous equilibrium points (Turing-
like instabilites) or even of limit cycles [137, 138]; ii) the onset of traveling waves and solitons, representing
the spatial displacement of epidemic outbreaks [120]; iii) the emergence of various spatio-temporal asyn-
chronous/synchronous complex patterns [120, 139]. To these classes of phenomena, one has to add those
induced by parametric heterogeneities between patches [120], which might mirror heterogeneities in the epi-
demiology (e.g. in social contacts), public health interventions (e.g. in vaccine uptake), demographics (e.g.
population density and age-structure), as well as environmental (e.g. climate, temperature, etc). As regards
the onset of Turing-like patterns is concerned, let us consider the following system [137] for an infection with
m epidemiological states (m = 4 for a SEIR system) spreading among n interacting patches. If patches are
isolated, the local spread is modeled by n m-dimensional ODE systems of the form u′j = f(uj). In presence
of linear population flows between patches one has the following interlinked dynamical systems
u′j = f(uj) +
n∑
i=1
ci,jMui, (93)
where ui ∈ Rm are the state variables associated to patch i, U = (u1, . . . , un) is the m ∗ n matrix of all
state variables, M is a m ∗m diagonal matrix reporting the different mobility coefficients of individuals in
the different epidemiological compartments (e.g. the mobility of infectious subjects might be reduced with
respect to that of susceptible and removed [127]), C is the n ∗ n connection matrix whose elements are the
transmission rates between individuals of different patches.
A spatially homogeneous solution of Eq. 93 is one such that in all the patches the state vector is the
same uj = s(t), with s(t) ∈ Rm. Linearizing around the spatially homogeneous solution and applying some
similarity transformation one gets the following n independent systems in Cm [137]
ψ′ = (Df(s(t)) + λhM)ψ, h = 1, . . . , n, (94)
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where λh are the eigenvalues of the connection matrix C. Eq. 94 is the discrete equivalent of the linearization
equation arising in the study of the Turing bifurcation [126]. Notably, this methodology can also be applied
in the case of nonlinear population fluxes [138].
Among multi-patch models, a fairly well-studied class is represented by the following multi-group, cross-
coupled SEIR model ([138] and refs therein) in a constant population
S′i = µ(1− Si)− Si
n∑
j=1
βijIj , (95)
E′i = Si
n∑
j=1
βijIj − (µ+ α)Ei, (96)
I ′i = αIi − (µ+ γ)Ii, (97)
Ri = 1− Si − Ei − Ii. (98)
Unlike Eq. 93 where all contacts are local, through inter-patch movements, in Eq. 95 fluxes between patches
are disregarded on the rationale that movements from own patch to other patches are short-lasting. The
core of the description stands in the spatial transmission matrix βij assigning the per-capita rate at which
a susceptible from patch i is infected by an infective individual belonging to patch j regardless of the patch
where the at-risk contact occurred [120, 138, 140]. For Eq. 95 fairly general results are available, incuding a
decoupling equivalent to those of Eq. 94 [138]. In particular, Eq. 95 was used to study the conditios under
which the local (i.e., in each patch) oscillations of SIR and SEIR models become synchronised [138, 140], as
observed for measles in UK cities in the pre-vaccination era [92]. Notably, synchronization of unforced SIR
and SEIR models arises at very low levels of patches connection, while seasonal forcing, besides inducing
complicate behavior, allows maintenance of some phase differences in local dynamics [140], and yields more
plausible prevalence levels at the inter-epidemic intervals compared to the simple SIR and SEIR models.
Introduction of vaccination can have a complex impact on the spatio-temporal dynamics of multi-patch
systems [120]. For example metapopulation models can explain the observed de-correlation observed in the
time-series of UK major cities after the introduction of measles vaccination [92, 141].
3.9.1. Large scale meta-population networks
In very recent times, the increasing availability of data on both the spread of infectious diseases and
human movements is allowing to finely model the dynamics of outbreaks on larger and larger scales, even
world-wide [133]. This has led to a number of investigations on the role of the topology of the networks of
inter-patches contacts as resulting from population mobility [142]. These analyses have shown that though
the condition R0 > 1 still guarantees that the epidemics is not self-extinguishing and that there are patches
here and there in the network where the infection is circulating, in order to have global macroscopic spread a
second threshold has to be overcome [142, 143]. This second threshold, larger than the first one, depends both
on population mobility and on the topology of network. Not suprisingly, if the network is heterogenous, i.e.
its degree distribution P (k) (which summarizes the probabiity for a node of the underlying graph of having
k links to other nodes of the networks) has a heavy tail, global epidemic spread is easier. However, for very
large heterogeneous network structure the second threshold is close to the classical one, quite independent
of population mobility. This can have profound implications as it implies that measures aimed at limiting
international mobility to reduce infection spread might have little impact.
3.9.2. Metapopulation models beyond space: social and age-specific heterogeneities
Multi-group and metapopulation models are one of the most active and effective fields of investigation
in the theoretical epidemiology of infectious diseases, as they latu sensu represent a convenient frame-
work for modeling a much wider class of epidemiological phenomena than geographical spread only. This
has been done by straightforwardly extending the interpretation of patches to different types of internally
homogeneous groups, such as social groups, age groups, etc, still relying on appropriate contact or transmis-
sion matrice, having elements βi,j reflecting heterogeneous contact patterns between social or age groups.
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Though the first works in the field were following a more mathematical vein, i.e. the need to remove the
homogeneous mixing hypothesis, the public health modelling revolution described in section 3.1 is much the
legacy of this intuition. Indeed, the multigroup SIS model analogous to the SEIR model of Eqs. 95-98 [138],
first introduced by Lajmanovich and Yorke [144] to model the spread of an infection among societal groups
with different social/sexual behavior, and later extended to model gonorrhea transmission in the US [78],
has represented the departure point for the explosion of studies on the modeling of sexually transmitted
infections that was subsequently triggered by the onset of the HIV/AIDS epidemics in the early eighties.
Noteworthy extensions of Ref. [144] to heterogeneous networks of contacts are available in [145–147].
On the other hand, in the field of common childhood infections, such as measles and pertussis, the large
availability of age-specific infection data triggered the development of the “standard ”age-structured model
[77, 79, 81]. The “standard ”model is nowadays extensively used to investigate the nonlinear effects of mass
vaccination programs, including the complicate patterns of increase in the average age at infection following
the reduction in transmission, and the related perverse increase in the number of cases of serious disease, as it
may be the case for rubella, measles and varicella [77, 79, 81]. The key ingredient of the “standard ”model is
represented by the age-specific transmission matrix of elements βi,j , representing the per-capita transmission
rates in contacts between individuals of different age groups. In a first phase these matrices were computed
by resorting to simplifying hypotheses about contacts patterns between age groups, aimed to reduce the
number of unknowns in the βij matrix from n2 to n, thereby making them identifiable from standard age-
specific epidemiological data. These approaches include the so-called Who Acquires Infection From Whom
(WAIFW) matrices ([79] and refs therein), and the proportionate and preferred mixing hypotheses ([81]
and refs therein). Recently, considerable advances were made thanks to studies aimed to directly observe
population contact patterns [148–151], or to reconstruct them from official data [152, 153].
Apart the anagraphical age of subjects, two other chrono-biological variables impact on the in-population
dynamics of infectious diseases. The first is the so called age since infection [154], which is the time elapsed
from the infection, a key factor modulating both the contact rate of infected subjects, the disease duration
and the disease-related risk of death. Quite remarkably, this variable was first introduced in mathematical
epidemiology by Kermack and McKendrik in their 1927 paper [68], but later ignored for decades [154]. The
second is the age since vaccination [155, 156], which is the time elapsed since the vaccine inoculation, and
which modulates both the vaccine-induced immunity [156] and the occurrence of vaccine-related side effects
[155]. Note that if any of these temporal variables is modeled as a continuous variable, then the resulting
model, due to the impact of these variables on the contact rate and other parameters, is not differential
multi-patch but integro-differential, as in the seminal work [68].
Finally, a number of recent re-assessments of the main future challenges for multi-group and metapopu-
lation studies can be found in [157–160].
4. Basic concepts and methods in (non-behavioral) epidemiological modeling and vaccination:
network models
A real population is mix of heterogeneous individuals and the heterogeneity exists in several aspects,
especially in contacts. The foundations of epidemiology and early epidemiological models were based on
population wide random-mixing, which was well described in the last section. However, in practice, each
individual has a finite set of contacts or individuals whom they can pass the infection. The ensemble of all
such contacts forms a network. Structural pattern of this contact network among individuals allows models
to compute the epidemic dynamics at the population scale from the individual-level process of spreading
infections.
In the recent years, overwhelming data explosion in human sciences shows complex and heterogeneous
connectivity patterns in a wide range of biological and social systems. Network theory provides a natural
gateway to understand all these complex patterns. Ideas from network theory have also inspired research
in many fields to study interactions between elements and their dynamics in areas like computer science,
system biology, social sciences, economic and statistical physics. However, epidemiological study has also
used potentiality of network theory like any other scientific disciplines. The complex properties of networks
have a profound impact on studying equilibrium and non-equilibrium phenomena in epidemic processes.
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Dated back to mid-eighties, the researchers have shown that understanding the spreading process of an
infection have considerable overlap with the studies of network properties [151, 152]. The group of individuals
and their connections in a population naturally defines a network in which disease spreads from one node
(individual) to another distantly related node. So, insights from topological structure of the underlying
network provides useful information that helps predicting spreading process including growth of infection at
the first stage and subsequently its distribution over the entire contact network.
Although it has long been acknowledged that network theory is the key ingredient of epidemic modeling,
recent abundance of data exemplifies the huge complexity in the spreading and persistence of infection in a
population and thus calls for detailed theoretical understanding of the interplay between epidemic processes
and networks. Previous works have shown that most real-world networks exhibit dynamic self-organization
and are statistically heterogeneous – typically all marks of complex systems [161–169]. A regular lattice
rarely represents the real-world networks of relevance for epidemic spreading. In a real population, there
are few individuals that may act as hubs (or ‘super-spreader’), whereas the majority of the population
have very few interactions. Both social and infrastructure networks are organized in communities of tightly
interconnected nodes of individuals [170]. Although randomness in the connection process of nodes is
always present, organizing principles and correlations in the connectivity patterns define network structures
that are deeply affecting the evolution and behavior of epidemic and contagion processes [145, 171–173].
Furthermore, the complex features of networks often find their signature in statistical distributions which
are generally heavy-tailed, skewed, and varying over several orders of magnitude [174]. The evidence of
large-scale fluctuations, clustering and communities characterizes the connectivity patterns of real-world
systems; and this has prompted the need for mathematical approaches capable to deal with the inherent
complexity of networks.
However, the connection between infectious disease epidemiology and the network theory goes far beyond
the general discussion. Understanding network topology may help identifying disease transmission routs,
which may help designing strategies to control the disease. For instance, ‘contact tracing’ is a very powerful
public health strategy during first phases of the spreading process. It relies on underlying transmission
routes to control further spread without even any information on epidemiology of the infectious disease
[167]. Thus studying network theory and how it can be applied to relate the infection spreading process
may be a vital tool for understanding the disease and, designing control strategies. With a discussion of
basic network metrics and topologies, here we review the development of current research at the interface
of epidemiological studies and network theory including immunization to control the disease.
4.1. Networks: types and topologies
4.1.1. Definitions and Notations
Graph theory [175] can be used to mathematically formalize networks [169]. A graph is a collection
of points, called vertices (or nodes), and a set of connections, called edges (or links). Edges indicate link
between vertices, representing the presence of an interaction or relations between those vertices. Interaction
can be bidirectional which defines undirected networks, or it can be directional which defines directed net-
works or digraphs. We represent a graph of size N (say, with N vertices, and L links) using N×N adjacency
matrix A, with elements aij = 1 if an edge is connecting nodes i and j and zero otherwise. A is symmetric
matrix in undirected graphs, and asymmetric in directed graphs.
• Degree and Degree distribution: The degree (or connectivity) ki of vertex i in an undirected network
is the number of edges emanating from i, i.e. ki =
∑
j aij . In the case of directed networks, we have both
in-degree, kin, and out-degree, kout, as the number of edges that end in i or start from i, respectively. The
total degree, however, in directed network is defined by ki = kin + kout. The degree distribution P (k) of
a network is the probability that a randomly chosen vertex has degree k. In a finite network, it denotes
the fraction of vertices with degree exactly equal to k. In case of directed networks, there are instead two
different distributions, the out-degree Pout(kout) and the in-degree P in(kin) distributions, though in-degree
and out-degree of a given vertex might not be independent. It is also useful to consider the moments of the
degree distribution, < kn >=
∑
k k
nP (k). The first moment < k >= 2L/N is called the average degree,
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provides information about the density of the network. The degree distribution defines classes of networks
with similar statistical features. A network is called sparse if its number of links L grows at most linearly
with the network size N ; otherwise, it is called dense. In directed networks, since every edge contributes to
one node in-degree and other node out-degree we have that < kin >=< kout >.
• Connectedness, Shortest path length, and Diameter: A path Pi,n is a sequence of different edges
(ij , ij+1), j = 0, ..., n− 1, connecting vertices i0 and in; the number of edges traversed, n, is also called the
length of the path. A graph is connected if there exists a path connecting any two vertices in the graph. A
component C of a graph is defined as a connected subgraph. The shortest path lij between two nodes i and
j is defined as the length of the shortest path (though may not be unique) joining i and j, and the average
shortest path length < l > is the average of the value of lij over all pairs of vertices in the network. The
diameter of a network is the maximum value of all the pairwise shortest path lengths.
•Degree correlations: The degree correlation between two vertices is defined as the conditional probability
P (k′|k) that an edge departing from a vertex of degree k is connected to a vertex of degree k′ [145]. A network
is called uncorrelated if this conditional probability is independent of the originating vertex k. In this case,
P (k′|k) can be simply estimated as the ratio between the number of edges pointing to vertices of degree k′,
k′P (k′)N/2, and the total number of edges, L =< k > N/2, to yield Pun(k′|k) = k′P (k′)/ < k >. The
most popular measure of degree correlation is Pearson correlation coefficient r. Proposed by Mark Newman
[176, 177], the degree correlation coefficient is defined as
r =
∑
jk
jk(ejk − qjqk)
σ2
, (99)
where
σ2 =
∑
k
k2qk −
[∑
k
kqk
]2
.
eij is the degree correlation matrix that represents the probability of finding node with degrees i and j at
the two ends of a randomly selected link, and qk is the probability that there is a degree-k node at the end
of the randomly selected link. The degree correlation varies between −1 ≤ r ≤ 1. For instance, r > 0 the
network is assortative, for r = 0 the network is neutral and for r < 0 the network is disassortative. In reality,
social networks are assortative, whereas technological and biological networks are disassortative [177]. For
example, for the scientific collaboration network we obtain r = 0.13, in line with its assortative nature; for
the protein interaction network r = −0.04, supporting its disassortative nature and for the power grid we
have r = 0. Another related measure of correlations is the average degree of the nearest neighbors of vertices
of degree k, denoted by k¯nn(k) which is formally defined as [145]
k¯nn(k) =
∑
k′
k′P (k′|k).
• Centrality and Betweenness: The concept of centrality encodes the relative importance of a node
inside a network. Together with the degree and the closeness of a node (defined as the inverse of the average
distance from all other nodes), another standard measure of node centrality is node betweenness, which is
obtained by counting the number of geodesics going through it. More precisely, the betweenness bi of a node
i, sometimes referred to as load, is defined as
bi =
∑
j,k∈N,j 6=k
njk(i)
njk
, (100)
where njk is the number of shortest paths connecting j and k, while njk(i) is the number of shortest paths
connecting j and k and passing through i. Betweenness distributions have been investigated in [178–185].
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Betweenness-betweenness correlations and betweenness-degree correlations have been studied respectively
in [186] and in [187]. The concept of betweenness can also be extended to edges. The edge betweenness is
defined as the number of shortest paths between pairs of nodes that run through that edge [188].
• Clustering: Clustering refers to transitivity property of the network, i.e. the relative propensity of two
nodes to be connected, provided that they share a common neighbor. The clustering coefficient C is defined
as the ratio between the number of loops of length three in the network (i.e. triangles), and the number
of connected triples (three nodes connected by two edges). An alternative definition is also available by
Watts and Strogatz [189]. A local measure ci of clustering is defined as the ratio between the actual number
of edges among the neighbors of a vertex i, ei, and its maximum possible value, measuring thus directly
the probability that two neighbors of vertex i are also neighbors of each other. The mean clustering of
the network < c > is defined as the average of ci over all vertices in the network. The clustering spec-
trum c¯(k) is defined as the average clustering coefficient of the vertices of degree k [186, 187], satisfying
< c >=
∑
k P (k)c¯(k).
• Community Structure: A community or cluster (or cohesive subgroup) of a given network of vertices
N and set of edges L is a subgraph G′(N ′, L′), whose nodes are tightly connected, i.e. cohesive. Since the
structural cohesion of the nodes of G′ can be quantified in several different ways, there are different formal
definitions of community structures.
A related terminology of community structure of a network is clique. A clique is a maximal complete
subgraph of three or more nodes all of which are adjacent to each other, and such that no other nodes exist
adjacent to all of them. This definition can be extended by weakening the requirement of adjacency into a
requirement of reachability: a n-clique is a maximal subgraph in which the largest geodesic distance between
any two nodes is no greater than n. A detail description is given in [163, 190].
4.1.2. Type of networks
Based on the qualitative and quantitative features of the degree distribution, the networks can be classi-
fied into a series of important types of networks, which are also useful for the epidemiological applications.
• Random graph: The simplest network model is the classical random graph model proposed by Erdös
and Rényi (also named ER graph) [191, 191–193]. A random graph model Gp(N) is constructed from a set
of N nodes in which each one of the N(N − 1)/2 possible links is present with probability p. The degree
distribution is given by a binomial form, which, in the limit of constant average degree (i.e. p =< k > /N)
and large N can be approximated by a Poisson distribution P (k) = e−<k>< k >/k! . The clustering co-
efficient is given by < c >= p, and the average shortest path length is < l >∼ logN/ log < k > [194].
This model is therefore adequate in the case of networks governed only by stochasticity, although Gp(N)
tends to a regular graph for large N and constant p. Extensions of the basic model to allow for other degree
distributions lead to the class of models known as generalized random graphs, random graphs with arbitrary
degree distributions and the configuration model [195].
• Small-world (SW) network: A more sophisticated and tractable model of a network with small prox-
imity and high clustering coefficient is the small-world network model proposed by Watts and Strogatz (i.e.
WS model) [174]. This network model is based on rewiring procedure of an ordered lattice. The initial
configuration starts with a ring of N vertices, each one of which symmetrically connected to its 2m nearest
neighbors. This represents the model with a structure which has large clustering coefficient and large aver-
age shortest path length. Starting from it, a fraction p of edges in the network are rewired, by visiting all
m clock-wise edges of each vertex and reconnecting them, with probability p, to a randomly chosen node.
There is another version of the model proposed by Monasson [196], where a fraction p of edges are added
between randomly chosen pairs of vertices. The overall effect of the rewiring processes is to add long-range
shortcuts, that, even for a small value of p ∼ N − 1, greatly reduce the average shortest path length, while
preserving a large clustering for not very large values of p. This model, although better suited for social
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networks with high clustering coefficient, has a degree distribution and centrality measures decaying expo-
nentially fast away from the average value. The small-world model thus generates homogeneous networks
where the average of each metric is a typical value shared, with little variations, by all nodes of the network.
• Scale-free (SF) network - static and dynamic: In contrast to random graph, and small-world
network models, real-world networks are structured in a hierarchy of nodes with a few nodes having very
large connectivity (the hub nodes), while the vast majority of nodes have much smaller degrees. In precise,
these heterogeneous networks exhibit heavy-tailed degree distributions often approximated by a power-
law behavior of the form P (k) ∼ k−ζ , which implies a non-negligible probability of finding vertices with
very large degree. The degree exponent ζ of many real-world networks takes a value between 2 and 3.
In such cases, these network models are called scale-free. Several variations of the classical random graph
models have been proposed in order to generate networks with a power-law degree distribution. For example,
configuration model [178, 197, 198], fitness model by Caldarelli et al. [199], threshold graph model by Masuda
et al. [200] and gradient network models by Toroczkai and Bassler [201], where directed graphs induced by
local gradients of a scalar field distributed on the nodes.
So far, we have not discussed evolution process of these scale-free networks, i.e. nodes and links do not
change over time. There are many examples of real networks in which the structural changes are ruled by the
dynamical evolution of the system. Most well-known and useful evolving network model is Barabási-Albert
model [202]. The Barabási-Albert (BA) network is a model of network growth inspired to the formation of
the World Wide Web and is based on two basic ingredients: i) growth (of nodes) and ii) preferential attach-
ment (connection of vertices). A description of the growth precess and attachment function is discussed in
[203]. Variations in preferential attachment function produced several other evolving network models like
Dorogovtsev-Mendes-Samukhin (DMS) model (linear preferential attachment), Krapivsky model (nonlinear
attachment probability), etc.[204]. The Barabási-Albert (BA) model has been generalized further by the
same authors, and also by others including certain characteristics of underlying growth process of nodes [203].
•Weighted networks: In the real world settings, many networks exhibit varied intensity of connections.
For example, social network, where existence of strong and weak ties between individuals are seen [205–
208], metabolic reaction pathways, predator-prey interactions in food webs [209, 210], different capabilities
of transmitting electric signals in neural networks [211], unequal traffic on the Internet [212] or of the
passengers in airline networks [213]. These types of complex systems can be explained with model networks
in which each link carries a numerical value measuring the strength of the connection. Considering weights
of the connections puts another dimension of complexity in the topology of weighted network. Similarly, we
can also have networks with weighted nodes. Detail descriptions of the measuring and modeling weighted
networks has been discussed in [163].
There are also other type of networks, which are important to study real world phenomenon. These
networks include spatial network (whose nodes occupy a precise position in two or three-dimensional Eu-
clidean space, and whose edges are real physical connections) [214–217], adaptive networks [218], temporal
or time-varying networks [219–221] (for more details, please also see Section 11).
All the previous networks are single-layer. But there are many real world complex systems that can
be conceived as multiple layers of such single networks. Most complex systems from physical, social, en-
gineering, information and biological sciences include multiple subsystems and layers of connectivity, and
they are often open, value-laden, directed, multilevel, multicomponent, reconfigurable systems of systems,
and placed within unstable and changing environments. An example of multilayer networks conceived from
age-dependent contact network is shown in Fig. 8. The recent development of multilayer networks in net-
work theory provides radical views of understanding these multilayer systems. For more information about
single-layer and multilayer networks, please see the comparison in Table 1. Descriptions and examples of
more different type spatial and multilayer networks are given in [203].
4.2. Epidemic spread over networks
Most infectious diseases such as influenza, SARS, HIV spread through human populations by physical
contact between infective and susceptible individuals. The pattern of these disease-causing contacts forms
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Figure 8: Schematic illustration of age-dependent contact networks into a multilayer system. Network with
different color shades in (a) indicates network of individuals in the same age group, where network in gray
region denotes connections across different age groups. Blue lines point to the same individuals from colored
regions to gray region. (b) The same network can be conceived as multilayer networks.
a network, which has substantial influence on success of the spreading process. The traditional epidemic
models such as classic SIS or SIR epidemic models do not explicitly incorporate the topological structure
of the underlying contract network that facilitates the spread of a pathogen. Instead they assume that
any individual can come into contact with any other individual (homogenous mixing hypothesis) and so all
individuals have comparable number of contacts. It also assumes that probability of disease transmission is
same across all individuals in the network. Both of these assumptions are limited in most of the diseases: in
reality an individual can transmit a pathogen only to those it comes into contact with and also transmission
occurs in varied probabilities. Hence pathogens spread can be assumed on complex contact networks.
Spreading epidemics on complex networks has been studied by many researchers including May and
Lloyd [222]. Most detail and systematical study is done by Newman [223]. Considering an SIR model with
uniform recovery rate γ, i.e. where infected nodes become removed at rate γ after infection, and infection
rate βI . Then the transmissibility T is defined as the probability that the infection will be transmitted
from an infected node to a connected susceptible neighbor before recovery takes place. For continuous-time
dynamics, the transmissibility computed as [223]:
T = 1− lim
δt→0
(1− βIδt)γ/δt = 1− e−γβI . (101)
In general, βI and γ will vary between individuals, and assume initially that these two quantities are
independent and identically distributed (iid) random variables chosen from some appropriate distributions
P (βI) and P (γ). Hence, transmission of the disease between two individuals is simply the average T (i.e.
homogeneous case) of Tij over the distributions P (βI) and P (γ), which is
T =< Tij >= 1−
∫ ∞
0
P (βI)P (γ)e
−γβIdβIdγ. (102)
Computing threshold transmissibility for spreading the disease in a special non-degenerate case of SIR model
has been discussed in [224].
Now, starting from a single infective individual, disease spreads across the contact networks and a
outbreak occurs. The ultimate size of the outbreak would be precisely the size of the cluster of vertices that
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Table 2: Epidemic thresholds for SI, SIS and SIR models over Erdös and Rényi (ER) and Scale-Free (SF)
networks
Model Type Model expression Characteristic time (τc) Spreading rate (λc)
SI dik
dt
= βI [1− ik(t)]kθk(t) SF (ζ ≥ 3): <k>βI (<k2>−<k>) SF (ζ > 3): 0
SF (ζ < 3): 0 SF (ζ ≤ 3): 0
ER: 1
βI<k>
SIS dik
dt
= βI [1− ik(t)]kθk(t)− γik(t) SF: <k>βI<k2>−γ<k>)
<k>
<k2>
ER: 1
βI (<k>+1)−γ
1
<k>+1
SIR dik
dt
= βIsk(t)θk(t)− γik(t) <k>βI<k2>−(γ+βI )<k>)
<k>
<k2>−<k>
sk(t) = 1− ik(t)− rk(t)
ik: infected nodes with degree k.
sk: susceptible nodes with degree k.
rk: recovered or immune nodes with degree k.
θk: fraction of the neighbors of node k that are infected.
βI : transmission rate.
γ: recovery rate.
ζ: degree exponent SF network.
can be reached from the initial vertex by traversing only occupied edges (i.e., edge in the graph across which
the disease is transmitted, say with average probability T ). This is precisely a similar model equivalent to
a bond percolation model with bond occupation probability T on the graph representing the community.
The connection between the spread of disease and percolation was in fact one of the original motivations for
the percolation model itself. Below in the next subsection, we discuss how disease spread can be realized as
the percolation problem on random graphs with arbitrary degree distributions discussing size of outbreaks,
presence of an epidemic, transmissibility thresholds, etc.
4.2.1. Percolation theory and spreading process
Like mean-field method (mentioned in section 3), which is a useful tool to analyze the transmission
dynamics in homogeneous mixing population, percolation theory also plays a significant role in prediction
of epidemic or vaccination dynamics, such as emerging threshold and phase transition, in network popula-
tion. One convenient universal approach to deal percolation problem with bond occupation probability T
on complex networks is considering generating functions [223]. Generating functions and the problem of
percolation in networks have been discussed in many earlier studies [178, 225–227]. We define generating
functions G0(u) and G1(u) to describe a network as follows:
G0(u) =
∞∑
k=0
P (k)uk, (103)
G1(u) =
G′0(u)
G′0(1)
, (104)
where P (k) is the degree distribution of random graph G with N vertices. We can calculate back the degree
distribution P (k) and also all the higher moments using G0(u) with
< kn >=
∑
k
knP (k) =
[(
u
d
du
)n
G0(u)
]
u=1
. (105)
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G1 calculates the distribution of the degrees of vertices reached by following a randomly chosen edge. A
modified set of generating functions is required to solve percolation problem with bond probability T :
G0(u, T ) and G1(u, T ), where Gi(u, T ) = Gi(1 + (u − 1)T ) [228, 229]. Gi(u, T ), i = 0, 1 represents the
distributions of the number of occupied edges attached to a vertex, as a function of the transmissibility T .
Outbreak size of a disease on a network precisely depends on the distribution of sizes of clusters of
vertices together by occupied edges in the corresponding percolation model. Using the generation functions
G0(u, T ) and G1(u, T ), we can find the mean outbreak size < s > in closed form as
< s >= 1 +
G′0(1;T )
1−G′1(1;T )
. (106)
So, given the values of generating function Gi, we can completely evaluate this expression to get the mean
outbreak size for any value of T and degree distribution. The outbreak size critically depends on the relation
TG′1(1, T ) = 1. This point indicates the onset of an epidemic; it is the point at which the typical outbreak
ceases to be confined to a finite number of individuals, and expands to fill significant fraction of the graph.
This defines the critical transmissibility Tc, at which the critical transition occurs
Tc =
1
G′1(1)
=
∑
k kP (k)∑
k k(k − 1)P (k)
=
< k >
< k2 > − < k >. (107)
For T > Tc, we have an epidemic, or “giant component” in the language of percolation. This equation
is valid for degree of uncorrelated networks which have no loops in the clusters. However, in the case of
heterogeneous networks with degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−ζ , it was found that the percolation threshold
tends to zero for ζ < 3 in the limit of an infinite network size N → ∞ ([226]). That is, an epidemic
can spread in this network regardless of how small the infection probability and how quick is the recovery
process. In general, the expansion of the generating functions around the nonzero solution yields the scaling
behavior of the order parameter in the vicinity of the critical point: PG(T ) ∼ (T −Tc)βIc , where the critical
exponent βIc assumes following values
βIc =
 1/(3− ζ) for ζ < 3,1/(ζ − 3) for 3 < ζ ≤ 4,
1 for ζ ≥ 4.
(108)
For the case ζ = 3, a stretched exponential form PG(T ) ∼ e1/p is expected. For more details about disease
thresholds, we provide a brief summary in Table 2.
There are other approaches of modeling spreading process of infectious disease over networks such as
Degree-based mean-field theory (DBMF) and Individual-based mean-field theory (IBMF). DBMF considers
the dynamics of node of degree k to be infected or remain susceptible, and assume that all the nodes with
degree k are statistically equivalent. The value of the epidemic threshold can be obtained by means of
a linear stability analysis [145, 224]. It was the first approach to the study of the SIS model in complex
networks [171]. Global stability of the disease-free state in such model, the role of seasonal oscillations
and the coexistence of an endemic equilibrium state via multistability have been investigated in [147]. In
contrast, the state of the system in the disease model (such as SIS) in the IBMF framework is fully defined
by a set of Bernoulli random variables Xi(t) ∈ 0, 1 : Xi(t) = 0 for a healthy, susceptible node and Xi(t) = 1
for an infected node; altogether it defines a 2N Markov chain for a network with N nodes [228, 229], which
specifies exactly the time evolution of the disease model. However, the Markov chain approach complicates
analytical calculations of the model. A discussion on both DBMF and IBMF can be found in [230].
4.2.2. Disease spreading in multilayer networks
In many situations, disease spread can be modeled over interconnected networks instead of a single-
layer network (or called monoplex network). For example, spreading of an infection amongst groups of
communities, or even groups of individuals of different age profiles 8. Studying the diffusion of pathogens
over interconnected network or multilayer networks has got very recent attention in epidemiology. Multilayer
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networks are made of multiple layers, where each layer is a monoplex network, where the same nodes can
appear in multiple layers and nodes on different layers can be connected to each other. One important
aspect of spreading infection across multilayer networks is that it can also spread from one layer to another.
Generally, there are three possibilities for spreading process [231, 232]: same-node, inter-layer, when infection
switches layer but remains on the same node, e.g., when an infected individual travels from one city to
another city; other-node inter-layer, when infection continues spreading to another node in another layer,
e.g., spreading of infection between individuals in different age profiles through direct physical contact. In
third type, other-node intra-layer, when infection spreads across the same community. In the context of
interacting spreading processes in multilayer networks, two types of thresholds have recently been introduced,
called survival threshold measuring if infection will survive and absolute-dominance threshold indicating
whether it can completely remove another competing process [231].
Most of the works on modeling the dynamics of diffusion over multilayer networks have used epidemic
models such as SIS, SIR [203, 232–241]. In a similar approach with single-layer networks, the dynamics of
epidemic spreading according to the SIS and SIR models over multilayer networks are described as a two-
or three-state process, respectively. Thereafter, many extensions have been applied to SIR and SIS models.
One of the most important extensions, Goldenberg et al. [242] proposed a discrete-time version of the SIR
model called Independent Cascade Model (ICM), where time proceeds in discrete time steps. In this model,
each infected node u at time t can infect each of its neighbors. If the infection succeeds, then neighbor v
will become infected at step t+ 1. ICM is often used in the literature on influence spreading. In [231], the
authors extended this model to analyze the dynamics of multiple cascades over multiplex networks.
Unlike a monoplex network, the infection may diffuse over inter- and intra-layer connections at different
speeds over multiple networks, meaning that we may have different infection rates (i.e., transmissibilities)
across the links of each layer and also the links between the layers. Therefore, most of the works on
spreading processes over multilayer networks [234, 239, 240, 243–248] have extended epidemic-like models
by considering different infection rates dependent on the types of the layers. A recent contribution in this
context proposed a generalized epidemic mean-field (GEMF) framework, which was capable of modeling
epidemic-like spreading processes with more complex states in multiplex network layers (compared to two
or three states in the SIS and SIR models).
4.2.3. Simulation-based models
Simulation-based modelling, like analytical models described above, has similar appeal in epidemic theory
[174, 249–255]. There are many good examples of simulation based network models of infectious diseases
such as sexually transmitted diseases (STD) that highlight the importance of network structure (e.g., role
of core groups or interconnected individuals with a large number of contacts) in disease transmission and
persistence [256–264].
There are several simulation-based works that attempt to model airborne disease outbreaks [253, 265,
266]. Such models consider large population, like of order ∼ 106 with certain specified social connections
among individuals. The networks used are generated by computer simulation to conform to several observed
demographic and social characteristics such as given age distribution, household size, public crowding. Vari-
able activities in the entire day are also assigned to the individuals such as working place, public gathering,
or even spending time at home. Different activities reflect the change in contact pattern in different time of
the day. Children are assigned to school, day-care centre or play group where they interact (and therefore
form connections) with other children. The simulation model puts emphasis particularly on transmission
within households and family groups, which are probably the main routes of transmission for this disease.
There are models that attempt similar tasks, using census data to determine interaction patterns estimating
demographic and disease parameters [250]. Despite the number of approximations involved, the inherent
stochasticity of such microsimulations allows a direct estimation of the variability between epidemics. For
example, Meyers et al [251] generates a network model to characterize the spread of SARS in Vancouver,
British Columbia. They have used census data of Vancouver and using computer simulations generated a
plausible contact network that reflects an urban setting. They had chosen N = 1000 households at ran-
dom from the Vancouver household size distribution, which yields approximately 2600 people. Household
members were given ages according to the census data of Vancouver. Kids were then assigned to schools
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according to school and class size distributions to occupations according to (un)employment data, to hospi-
tals as patients and caregivers according to hospital employment and bed data, and to other public places.
Within each location then random connections were created among individuals with variable probabilities
at households, hospitals and schools, workplaces, and other public places. They have also chosen the param-
eters of the Poisson and power law networks so that all three networks share the same epidemic thresholds.
Conventional epidemiological models shows clear threshold effects, that is, the disease is expected to die out
when transmission probability falls below a critical threshold level. Olinky and Stone [267] have shown that
epidemic propagation depends equally on the infection process and also on the network topology. Their
recent analyses of infection processes on highly heterogeneous networks (e.g., scale-free networks) concludes
that diseases spread and persist even for vanishingly small transmission probabilities.
However, network-based simulation models have certain pitfalls as well. As mentioned by Keeling and
Eames [268], these models are limited to ascertain the sensitivity of the epidemiological results to the
details of the network structure. For example, the study by Halloran et al [265] may be limited to answer
questions like whether the network is representative of an average American community, whether variation
between communities will bias the results if large population sizes are considered and whether rare but
epidemiologically important contact structures are missing from the network. It is difficult to answer such
questions or gain an intuitive understanding of network structure if our experience is limited to simulations
of sampled networks. However, a range of idealized networks and analytical tools have been developed that
can reveal the elements of network structure, which are important determinants of epidemic dynamics.
4.3. Vaccinations over networks
Designing optimal vaccination strategies to prevent and control infection has been widely addressed in
the epidemic modeling of infectious diseases. Vaccination over networks can be modeled as a site percolation
problem [269]. Each vaccinated node can be regarded as a site which is removed from the network. The
goal of the vaccination process thus is to reduce the transmissibility and pass the percolation threshold,
which leads to minimization of the number of infected individuals in the network. Thus implementing the
SIR model and vaccination can be considered as a site - bond percolation model, and the vaccination is
considered successful if the network is below the percolation threshold [269, 270]. However though, the
epidemic threshold decreases with the standard deviation of the connectivity distribution in the heteroge-
neous networks [145, 171, 271]. This feature is paradoxically amplified in SF networks that have diverging
connectivity fluctuations. In fact, epidemic processes in SF networks do not possess, in the limit of an
infinite network, an epidemic threshold below which diseases cannot produce a major epidemic outbreak
or the inset of an endemic state. SF networks are, therefore, prone to the spreading and the persistence
of infections, whatever virulence the infective agent might possess. In view of this, it becomes a major
task to public health policy makers designing optimal vaccination strategies oriented to minimize the risk of
epidemic outbreaks on networks such as SF networks. However, population with heterogeneous connected
networks may take different paths to extinction and thus control of infection. A recent paper by Hindes and
Schwartz (2016) discussed such issues on heterogeneous random networks under various configuration [272].
The simplest hypothetical way to experiment the effect of vaccination over networks is the random
introduction of immune nodes in the network population, in order to get a uniform vaccination density
[271, 273]. Immune nodes cannot become infected and, thus, do not transmit the infection to their neighbors.
In this case, for a fixed spreading rate βI , the relevant control parameter is the immunity x, defined as
the fraction of vaccinated nodes present in the network. At the mean-field level, the presence of uniform
vaccination will effectively reduce the spreading rate βI by a factor (1 − x); i.e. the probability of finding
and infecting a susceptible and non-immune node. In homogeneous networks, such as the Watts-Strogatz
(WS) model, it is easy to show that in the case of a constant βI , the critical vaccination rate xc is given by
xc = 1− βIc
βI
. (109)
Thus, the critical vaccination that achieves eradication is related to the spreading rate and the epidemic
threshold of the infection, which implies that the critical vaccination allows the complete eradication of the
disease over the network.
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However, in an heterogeneous population with a uniform vaccination scheme, it is necessary to vaccinate
a fraction of the population larger than the estimate given by a simple (homogeneous) assumption [271].
In this case, it can be proved that optimal vaccination programs can eradicate the disease by vaccinating
a smaller number of individuals. A straightforward way to reintroduce an intrinsic vaccination threshold
in heterogeneous networks consists in using different fractions of vaccinated individuals according to their
connectivity. Let us define xk as the fraction of immune individuals with a given connectivity k and averaging
xk over the various connectivity classes, we have the critical vaccination threshold as
xc =
∑
k>β−1I
(
1− 1
βIk
)
P (k). (110)
Scale-free networks can be considered as a limiting case of heterogeneous systems and it is natural to
look for specifically devised vaccination strategies. This however, does not work on SF network. Because of
the absence of any epidemic threshold in SF networks, it becomes impossible to find any critical vaccination
rate that ensures the eradication. In scale-free (SF) networks, the pervious equation takes the form
1− xc = 1
βI
< k >
< k2 >
. (111)
This shows that only a complete vaccination (xc = 1) of the network works to eradicate the disease over
scale free network with < k2 >→∞.
While uniform or proportional vaccination fails to protect contagion over scale-free networks due to its
peculiar nature, it has been seen that scale-free networks are strongly affected by selective damage. For
example, if a few of the most connected nodes are removed, the network suffers a dramatic reduction of its
ability to carry information [225, 226, 269]. With this idea, one can design a targeted vaccination scheme to
progressively make immune the most highly connected nodes, i.e., the ones more likely to spread the disease.
In scale-free networks, it produces an significant increase of the network tolerance to infections at the price
of a tiny fraction of immune individuals [270, 274, 275].
Suppose, a fraction x of all nodes with connectivity k > kc are vaccinated in a network. Then x =∑
k>kc
P (k). At the same time, this also implies that all links emanating from vaccinated individuals can
be considered as if they were removed. So, if we assume that the fraction of links is effectively removed from
the network, the new connectivity distribution after the vaccination of a fraction x of the most connected
node is
Px(k) =
kc∑
q>k
P (q)
(
q
k
)
(1− p)kpq−k. (112)
This gives, calculating the first two moments, the critical fraction of vaccination needed to eradicate the
infection given by the relation:
< k2 >xc
< k >xc
≡ < k
2 >c
< k >c
[1− p(xc)] + p(xc) = β−1I , (113)
where < k >c=
∑kc
kmin
kP (k), < k2 >c=
∑kc
kmin
k2P (k). An explicit calculation for Barabási-Albert network
model, the approximate solution for the vaccination threshold is given by
xc ∼ exp(−2/kminβI). (114)
This clearly indicates that the targeted vaccination program is extremely convenient in scale-free networks
where the critical vaccination is exponentially small in a wide range of spreading rates βI . Also in this case,
the present result can be generalized for scale-free networks with arbitrary connectivity exponent ζ.
A comparative analysis of targeted vaccination over SW and BA models exhibit contrastive results [275].
In the case of the SW networks, the behavior of the prevalence as a function of x is equivalent in the
uniform and targeted vaccination procedures. On the contrary, in the case of the BA networkss, we observe
38
a drastic variation in the prevalence behavior, though it is sensitive to random choice of immune nodes.
This however, confirms that targeted strategies do not have a particular efficiency in systems with limited
heterogeneity, but are highly sensitive to the network with higher degree of heterogeneity such as scale-free
networks. Targeted vaccination of a small fraction of the most connected nodes in scale-free networks shows
significant impact on spread process of infection.
Another target-based strategy is acquaintance vaccination that tries to target all of the most highly
connected nodes for vaccination [270, 275–278], but this strategy requires no knowledge of the node degrees
or any other global knowledge. In this approach a random group of nodes are chosen and then a random
set of their neighbors are selected for vaccination. The most highly connected nodes are far more likely
to be in this group of neighbors. So immunizing this group results in targeting the most highly connected
nodes, and it requires far less information about the network [278–280]. Another variant of this strategy
again calls for the random selection of nodes but instead asks for one of their neighbors with a higher degree,
or at least more than a given threshold degree and immunizes them [276]. These degree based strategies
consistently require fewer nodes to be vaccinated and as such improve a network’s chances against epidemic
attacks [270, 278].
This however, is just a brief summary about vaccination on networks. For more details about mathe-
matical and physics framework, please see next section.
5. Non-behavioral epidemiological vaccination on networks
Due to the potential threat posed by the spreading of infectious disease, ample research has been devoted
to the mitigation and prevention of epidemics. To date, one of the most popular and effective methods is
network vaccination [230, 275, 281–285], where certain nodes in network are effectively immunized by a
perfect vaccine, and are thus no longer able to transmit the disease to their neighbors [286]. More precisely,
given a fixed effevctive spreading rate βI/γ (βI and γ are the infection rate and recovery rate respectively.
Without loss of generality, γ = 1 is fixed since it only affects the definition of the time scale of epidemic
spreading.), the relevant control parameter is the immunity rate x, which is simply defined as the fraction of
vaccinated nodes in a network. The challenge is how to arrive at a minimal value of x, which is the so-called
vaccination threshold xc, to reduce the spreading rate of the disease βI under the critical threshold βIc,
such that the disease dies out completely [287–289].
This section is devoted to the systematic review of such non-behavioral vaccination techniques, where
networks are effectively immunized by means of a targeted vaccination of certain nodes. We will review
research done on single-layer and multilayer networks, on static and adaptive networks, and theoretical as
well as empirical results.
5.1. Uniform (or random) vaccination
The simplest vaccination strategy that one can conceive, the implementation of which requires no prepa-
ration or information at all, is uniform or random vaccination [271, 275]. Here a fraction x of nodes are
randomly selected and then vaccinated. Accordingly, only the remaining 1− x fraction of nodes contributes
to the spreading of the disease. The effective number of neighbors that each susceptible node possesses thus
decreases from its degree k to k(1− x). If one considers the standard SIS model as an example, then after
vaccination the evolution equation of the probability ρIk(t) that a node with degree k is infected at time t is
dρIk(t)
dt
= −ρIk(t) + βIk(1− x)[1− ρIk(t)]
∑
k′
P (k′|k)ρIk′(t), (115)
where the first term defines the rate at which infected nodes of degree k recover and become susceptible
again, and in the second term P (k′|k) refers to the conditional probability that an infected node with degree
k′ points to the node with degree k.
It can be observed that in the mean-field model, where individuals interact randomly with one another,
the uniform vaccination is equivalent to the simple decrease of the spreading rate of the disease from βI to
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βI(1−x). Since eradicating an epidemic by uniform vaccination requires βI to be below its critical epidemic
threshold βIc, we obtain
βI(1− xc) = βIc, (116)
where xc is the critical vaccination threshold, above which the density of infected individuals in the stationary
state is zero.
However, in predominantly homogeneous networks, such as random or small-world networks, βIc =
1/(〈k〉 + 1) for the SIS model and βIc = 1/〈k〉 for the SIR model [145, 281]. Based on Eq. 116, the
vaccination threshold is
xc = 1− 1
βI
1
〈k〉+ 1 (117)
for the SIS model, and
xc = 1− 1
βI
1
〈k〉 (118)
for the SIR model. Thus, if the uniform vaccination level is larger than xc, homogeneous networks will be
completely protected and no large epidemic outbreaks will be possible.
Conversely, the situation is much different for strongly heterogeneous networks, such as scale-free net-
works, where the epidemic threshold vanishes [226, 290]. Here uniform vaccination will fail. In particular,
the absence of an epidemic threshold (βIc = 0) in the thermodynamic limit implies that no matter how one
rescales βI → βI(1− x), the epidemic will not be stopped unless x = 1.
Based on the fact that in heterogenous networks βIc = 〈k〉/〈k2〉 for the SIS model and βIc = 〈k〉/(〈k2〉−
〈k〉) for the SIR model [145, 172, 291], and by using Eq. 116, the threshold of uniform vaccination is given
by
xc = 1− 1
βI
〈k〉
〈k2〉 (119)
for the SIS model and
xc = 1− 1
βI
〈k〉
〈k2〉 − 〈k〉 (120)
for the SIR model.
In a scale-free network with degree exponent ζ < 3, we have 〈k2〉 → ∞, which indicates xc → 1 for both
the SIS and the SIR model [145, 275]. In other words, a complete vaccination of the network is required to
stop an epidemic. As emphasized before, uniform vaccination is largely inefficient for disease eradication in
heterogenous networks [225, 226]. This theoretical prediction is also consistent with the finding that many
infectious diseases require that 80%-100% of the population be vaccinated to prevent an outbreak. For
example, measles require 95% of the population be vaccinated [271], while for digital viruses the strategies
relying on uniform vaccination call for practically 100% of the computers to install the appropriate antivirus
software [145, 226, 292].
5.2. Targeted vaccination
5.2.1. Degree-based targeted vaccination: theoretical prediction of the vaccination threshold
The problems encountered with uniform vaccination are rooted in the vanishing epidemic threshold.
Therefore, to successfully eradicate a disease in a heterogenous network, we must increase the epidemic
threshold. This requires us to modify the underlying contact network to reduce the degree variance 〈k2〉.
Evidently, large-degree nodes are known to be responsible for the large variance of heterogenous networks.
Thus, if we vaccinate only the nodes whose degree exceeds a preselected threshold value kc, it should be easy
to decrease the variance and increase the epidemic threshold [275, 282, 293]. To this aim, Pastor-Satorras and
Vespignani have proposed a degree-based targeted vaccination strategy in which the most highly connected
nodes are progressively immunized, given that these are the ones that are most likely to spread the disease
[275, 276, 278, 284, 293–300].
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The vaccination of a fraction x of large-degree nodes can be regarded as the removal of nodes whose
degree is larger than a certain value kc. Accordingly, x thus can be implicitly defined as
x =
∞∑
k=kc+1
P (k). (121)
Moreover, the average 〈k〉c and the second moment 〈k2〉c of the degree distribution with maximum degree
kc of the network are
〈k〉c =
kc∑
k=kmin
kP (k), (122)
and
〈k2〉c =
kc∑
k=kmin
k2P (k), (123)
where kmin denotes the minimal degree of the node in a network.
However, the removal of large-degree nodes will modify the degree distribution of the remaining nodes,
owing to the deletion of the links between removed and remaining nodes. The probability that the link
connected to the removed nodes is also removed equals the probability that the link points to a node whose
degree is larger than kc. We thus have
f =
∞∑
k=kc+1
kP (k)
〈k〉 , (124)
and the degree distribution of the resulting network becomes [275, 290]
P ′(k′) =
∞∑
k=k′
(
k
k′
)
fk−k
′
(1− f)k′P (k). (125)
Finally, the average degree 〈k′〉 and the second moment 〈k′2〉 of the resulting network are [275, 290]
〈k′〉 =
kc∑
k′=kmin
k′P ′(k′) = (1− f)〈k〉c, (126)
and
〈k′2〉 =
kc∑
k′=kmin
k′2P ′(k′) = (1− f)2〈k2〉c + f(1− f)〈k〉c, (127)
respectively.
For the SIS model, the epidemic threshold of the resulting network can be calculated as
βI
′
c =
〈k′〉
〈k′2〉 =
(1− f)〈k〉c
(1− f)2〈k2〉c + f(1− f)〈k〉c . (128)
Assuming 2 < ζ < 3 and combining Eqs. 122-124, we obtain [282]
βI
′
c =
[
3− ζ
ζ − 2k
3−ζ
c k
ζ−2
min −
3− ζ
ζ − 2k
5−2ζ
c k
2ζ−4
min + k
2−ζ
c k
ζ−2
min
]−1
. (129)
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A similar approach to the SIR model yields
βI
′
c =
[
3− ζ
ζ − 2k
3−ζ
c k
ζ−2
min −
3− ζ
ζ − 2k
5−2ζ
c k
2ζ−4
min + k
2−ζ
c k
ζ−2
min − 1
]−1
. (130)
In both the SIS and the SIR model, if kc  kmin, we have [282]
βIc ≈
ζ − 2
3− ζ k
2−ζ
mink
ζ−3
c . (131)
For here it follows that if more large-degree nodes are vaccinated, and thus kc becomes smaller, the epidemic
threshold will become larger. By vaccinating an appropriate fraction of large-degree nodes, we enable βIc to
increase beyond the spreading rate βI of the disease. Accordingly, the network is then protected completely.
In order to assess the efficiency of degree-based targeted vaccination, it is useful to derive the explicit
expression for the vaccination threshold in an uncorrelated network with a power-law degree distribution
P (k) = ck−ζ and c ≈ (ζ − 1)/k−ζ+1min , where ζ = 3 [275]. In this case, we obtain x = k2mink−2c , f = x1/2,
〈k〉c = 2kmin, and 〈k2〉c = 2k2minln(x−1/2) based on Eqs. 121-124. The critical vaccination threshold xc
needed to eradicate the disease is then 〈k′〉
〈k′2〉 = βI . (132)
By inserting above values into Eq. 132 and combining Eqs. 126-127, we obtain the approximate solution for
the vaccination threshold in the case of targeted vaccination [275]
xc ∼ exp(−2/kminβI). (133)
This equation indicates that the degree-based targeted vaccination strategy can be very effective, giving a
critical vaccination threshold that is exponentially small for a wide range of spreading rates.
This theoretical prediction can be tested numerically with simulations of the SIS model on a scale-free
network. Results presented in Fig. 9 compare the efficiency of targeted vaccination and random vaccination,
respectively. It can be observed that for random vaccination the disease prevalence decays very slowly and
vanishes only in the x→ 1 limit. Conversely, for targeted vaccination there is a very sharp drop towards the
vaccination threshold (indicated by the arrow), above which the system is infection-free. A linear regression
from the largest value of x yields an approximate vaccination threshold xc ' 0.16 in this case, which proves
that scale-free networks are very sensitive to degree-based targeted vaccination even if a very small fraction
of large-degree nodes is selected for vaccination
5.2.2. Centrality-based targeted vaccination: definitions and simulation-based models
The procedure of degree-based targeted vaccination is equivalent to altering the structure of the net-
work. Namely, by vaccinating the large-degree nodes, we fragment the contact network, thus making it
more difficult for the disease to reach the nodes in the other components. Based on this principle, it is
possible to devise alternative vaccination strategies which take advantage of the heterogenous connectivity
patterns in order to achieve a high level of tolerance towards infections [275]. Accordingly, other centrality
indexes, such as betweenness, closeness, eigenvalue, or PageRank, can be used to design targeted vaccination
strategies [289, 294, 295, 297, 298, 298, 301–311]. In what follows, we will briefly survey these centrality
indexes and their applications in targeted vaccination.
Betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality is defined as the number of shortest paths between pairs
of nodes that pass through a given node [312–314]. More precisely, if σvw is the total number of shortest
paths from node v to node w and σvw(i) is the number of those shortest paths that pass through the node
i, the betweenness of i is given by bi =
∑
v 6=w 6=i
σvw(i)
σvw
.
Since nodes with large betweenness centrality are often bridges between different communities in the
network [305, 315], the vaccination of these nodes has a good potential to break up a large network into
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Figure 9: Reduced prevalence of disease ρx/ρ0 for the SIS model on a scale-free network, as obtained with
random (circles) and targeted (squares) vaccination at a fixed spreading rate βI = 0.25, respectively. A
linear extrapolation from the largest values of x yields an estimation of the threshold xc ' 0.16 for targeted
vaccination. Source: Adapted with permission from Ref. [275]. Copyrighted by the American Physical
Society.
smaller parts. Hence, if an epidemic starts in a particular component of the network, it cannot infect
nodes in other components. Additionally, betweenness centrality is an effective measure to identify high
risk individuals, as it determines the volume of flow passing through each node [295]. That is also one of
the main reasons why largest betweenness-based vaccination is considered to be the most effective targeted
vaccination algorithm [316].
Random-walk centrality. Betweenness is, in some sense, a measure of the influence a node has over the
spread of the epidemic through the network. By counting shortest paths, betweenness-based vaccination
simply assumes that epidemics spread only along those shortest paths, which, however, is inconsistent with
most empirical observations. To relax this hypothesis, Newman proposed the random-walk centrality that
involves the contributions from essentially all the paths between nodes, though it still gives more weight to
short paths [317]. The random-walk centrality of a node i is a measure based on random walks, counting
how often the node i is traversed by a random walk between any pair of nodes s and v
ri =
∑
s<v
Isv(i), (134)
where Isv(i) = 12
∑
j Aij |Tis−Tiv−Tjs+Tjv| for i 6= s, v, and Tis is the element in the voltage matrix. This
measure is particularly useful for finding high-centrality vertices that do not happen to lie on geodesic paths
or on the paths formed by maximum-flow cut-sets, which are still important for the epidemic spreading
[317]. Salathé and Jones have proven that vaccination strategies based on random-walk centrality can result
in the lowest number of infected cases if the vaccination coverage is low [305].
Closeness centrality. Closeness centrality is based on the assumption that nodes with a short distance
to other nodes can spread the disease very effectively across the network [295, 312]. It is defined as
ci =
1∑
j 6=i lij
, (135)
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where lij is the distance between nodes i and j. This measure gives a large centrality to nodes which have
small shortest path distance to the other nodes. Therefore, immunizing largest-closeness nodes not only
vaccinates high risk individuals, but also postpones epidemic spreading through the network [312, 313].
Eigenvector centrality. Degree centrality awards one “centrality point” for every network neighbor a
node has. In reality, however, all the neighbors are not equivalent. Under many circumstances, a node’s
importance in one network increases via building connections to other nodes that are themselves important,
which is the concept behind eigenvector centrality [297, 316, 318, 319]. Instead of awarding just one point
for each neighbor, eigenvector centrality gives each node a score proportional to the sum of the score of its
neighbors. That is, the eigenvector centrality ei of a node i is proportional to the sum of the eigenvector
centrality of the nodes it is connected to. It is defined as
ei = Λ
−1∑
j
aijej , (136)
where aij denotes the adjacency matrix of the network, Λ is the largest eigenvalue and ei is the ith component
of the eigenvector associated with Λ of the network.
The impact of eigenvector centrality on epidemic control has been evaluated by [318, 320]. Tomovski and
Kocarev used nonlinear system stability analysis of the SIS model and proved that the epidemic threshold
equals to the reciprocal value of the largest eigenvalue of the network adjacency matrix [320], that is
βIc =
1
Λ
. (137)
Therefore, the risk of infection through networks can be reduced by decreasing Λ. Along the same lines,
Masuda defined Ii as the decrement of Λ owing to the removal of node i [321]
Ii = −∆Λ
Λ
≈ e
2
i∑
j e
2
j
. (138)
From here it is clear that the vaccination of a node with a large ei (Ii) will significantly increase the epidemic
threshold, and thus the epidemic will be effectively suppressed.
PageRank centrality. The PageRank centrality [308], introduced by Google for webpage ranking, is given
by
pi = c
∑
j∈Bi
pj
Nj
+ (1− c)1/N, (139)
where i is a web page, Bi represents the set of pages that point to i, and Nj denotes the number of pages that
j points to. Moreover, c is a random jumping factor which is introduced by assuming that the web surfer
will browse the web pages along the links with probability c, and leave the current page and open a random
page with probability 1− c. Similar to eigenvector centrality, PageRank supposes that the importance of a
node is determined by both the quantity and the quality of the nodes that point to it. In terms of epidemic
spreading, nodes with large PageRank centrality are more likely to be infected or infect others [297]. Their
vaccination can thus eliminate a large number of potentially very effective disease transmission routes. Since
nodes with large PageRank centrality have many low-degree neighbors, largest PageRank vaccination will
immunize influential nodes whose vaccination choice can strongly protect their neighbors [297].
To obtain a better understanding of all these proposed vaccination schemes, Shams et al. compared the
efficiency of different centrality indexes in terms of the vaccination threshold xc, and plotted it as a function
of the average degree 〈k〉 for different network models [316]. As shown in Fig. 10, it can be observed that
HP (for the meaning of the abbreviation please refer to the caption of Fig. 10) delivers the best performance
on all the networks, HB is second-best, while HE and HC deliver the worst performance. Despite of the
weak performance of HD in small-world networks, the approach performs well on scale-free and ER random
networks.
Moreover, we point out that targeted vaccination techniques can be improved by adaptive strategies, in
which the centrality is recalculated for the network of unvaccinated nodes at each step of the vaccination
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Figure 10: The critical threshold of vaccination xc, as a function of the average degree 〈k〉 on different
networks. The legend refers to the following vaccination strategies: targeted vaccination based on degree
(HD), betweenness (HB), closeness (HC), eigenvalue (HE), and PageRank (HP). Source: Reprinted figure
from Ref. [316]
process [314]. For example, degree-based vaccination with dynamic re-ranking entails an immediate update
of node degrees, and then the nodes with the largest number of unvaccinated neighbors are vaccinated at
each time step [297]. When a node has been vaccinated, the adaptive betweenness centrality is recalculated
for the remaining network composed of unvaccinated nodes [297, 298, 306, 314]. Although such adaptive
approaches are more efficient from the theoretical viewpoint, they usually require more information, and
the complexity of the procedure might make a practical implementation difficult for all but very small
populations [306].
5.3. Vaccination without global knowledge
Although targeted strategies are in principle very effective, an important drawback in terms of practical
applications in the real world is that they require complete knowledge of the network structure. Only so it
is possible to identify and then vaccinate the most influential nodes as determined by the employed metric.
However, the complete structure of the network is seldom, if ever, known, and often it is also not well-defined.
In social networks, for example, the number of links an individual has depends strongly on the criteria based
on which the network is constructed. To overcome the lack of global knowledge of the network structure,
several different strategies have been proposed that require information only about the local structure of the
network. The efficiency of these vaccination strategies can nevertheless be very similar to that of targeted
vaccination, as reviewed in what follows.
5.3.1. Acquaintance vaccination: theoretical prediction of the vaccination threshold
The so-called acquaintance vaccination was first proposed by Cohen et al. [270, 278], in which a fraction p
of nodes is selected at random, with the constraint that each node is required to have at least one connection
to another individual in the network. Subsequently, this neighbor, rather than the originally selected node,
is vaccinated. The strategy thus requires no knowledge of the degree of nodes or other global knowledge
about the network.
More precisely, the probability that a node with degree k is selected for vaccination is kP (k)/(N〈k〉).
This quantifies the known fact that randomly selected acquaintances have, on average, a higher degree than
randomly selected nodes [177, 322]. Based on percolation theory, Cohen et al. developed a theoretical frame-
work to determine the critical fraction pc and vaccination threshold xc. They followed a possible branch in
the course of the epidemic, starting from a random link of the spanning cluster. That is, they studied the
possible spreading of the epidemic by considering nodes that are not vaccinated, and are therefore suscepti-
ble to the epidemic and may become infected [278]. If nl(k) denotes the number of nodes with degree k in
some layer l (hop-distance from the starting point), the number nl+1(k′) of nodes with degree k′ that are
susceptible in layer l + 1 is given by
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nl+1(k
′) =
∑
k
nl(k)(k − 1)p(k′|k, sk)p(sk′ |k′, k, sk), (140)
where k − 1 means that the node with degree k in layer l has k − 1 new neighbors in layer l + 1 (excluding
the one through which we arrived). Moreover, p(k′|k, sk) is the probability of reaching a node with degree k′
by following a link from a susceptible node of degree k, while sk is the probability that a node with degree
k is susceptible. Lastly, p(sk′ |k′, k, sk) is the probability that the reached node is also susceptible.
Based on Bayes’ rule, it holds that
p(k′|k, sk) = p(sk|k, k
′)p(k′|k)
p(sk|k) . (141)
Furthermore, assuming that the network is uncorrelated, we have
φ(k′) = p(k′|k) = k′P (k′)/〈k〉, (142)
which is independent of k. The probability that the acquaintance is not selected in one particular vaccination
attempt by a random node of degree k, is 1− 1/(Nk), and in all Np attempts, it reads
vp(k) = (1− 1
Nk
)Np ≈ e−p/k. (143)
However, if the neighbor’s degree is not known, the average probability becomes vp = 〈vp(k)〉. Then the
probability that a node with degree k′ is susceptible (not vaccinated) is
p(sk′ |k′) = 〈vp(k)〉k′ , (144)
if no other information on its neighbors exists. But when the degree of one neighbor is known to be k′, we have
p(sk|k, k′) = e−p/k′ × 〈e−p/k〉k−1. (145)
Since the fact that a neighbor with known degree is vaccinated does not provide any further information
about a node’s probability of vaccination, it follows p(sk|k, k′) = p(sk|k, k′, sk′).
Substituting above results in Eq. 140, we obtain
nl+1(k
′) = nl(k′)
∑
k
φ(k)(k − 1)vk−2p e−2p/k. (146)
If the sum in the above equation is larger than 1, the branching process will continue forever, which is
referred to as the percolating phase. On the contrary, if it is smaller than 1, the vaccination is subcritical
and the epidemic will be contained. Thus, we obtain a relation for pc, which is∑
k
P (k)k(k − 1)
〈k〉 v
k−2
pc e
−2pc/k = 1, (147)
and the vaccination threshold is easily obtained from the fraction of nodes which are not susceptible, namely
xc = 1−
∑
k
P (k)p(sk|k) = 1−
∑
k
P (k)vkpc . (148)
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Figure 11: The critical vaccination threshold xc as a function of the degree exponent ζ of the contact
network on which the disease spreads via the SIS model. The curves correspond to two distinct vaccination
strategies: uniform vaccination (top curve) and acquaintance vaccination (lower curve). The continuous
lines represent the analytical results while the symbols represent simulation data for N = 106 and kmin = 1.
Source: Adapted with permission from Ref. [278]. Copyrighted by the American Physical Society.
Results presented in Fig. 11 show the critical threshold that is required to eradicate a disease in a scale-
free network. It can be observed that acquaintance vaccination is more efficient than random vaccination
for both high and low ζ values, corresponding to homogeneous and heterogenous networks, respectively.
5.3.2. Other strategies: definitions and simulation-based models
In addition to acquaintance vaccination reviewed above, similarly efficient strategies can be devised
based on local information about the structure of the network. An example is the so-called random walk
vaccination strategy [323], in which a random walker diffuses through the network, and every node that it
visits is vaccinated until a given fraction of the population is immune [324]. Given that a random walker
visits a node with degree ki with the probability proportional to ki, this strategy could lead to the same
effectiveness as achieved by acquaintance vaccination [230]. Another alternative to acquaintance vaccination
is common acquaintance vaccination, where only the common neighbors of the randomly chosen nodes are
selected for vaccination [277]. This may alleviate inefficiencies related to the fact that, of course, only very
few of the randomly selected nodes and their neighbors will be the hubs of the network. Indeed, common
acquaintance vaccination proves to be somewhat more effective than the simpler acquaintance vaccination.
The acquaintance vaccination strategy can also be improved by taking into account additional information
about the local structure of the network. For example, if each node has the local knowledge about the
degree of its nearest neighbors, and selects the neighbor with the degree to be vaccinated, then the efficiency
in comparison to acquaintance vaccination is significantly improved [325]. Similarly, the random walk
vaccination strategy can also be improved via a bias favoring the exploration of large-degree nodes during
the random walk process [324, 326].
Along the same line, if even more local information is available, for example if nodes have the knowledge
about the degree of their neighbors within short paths of length D, then the so-called D-steps vaccination
strategy can be employed [327, 328]. In particular, for every node i, simply look for the largest-degree node
within the distance D and vaccinate it. In case several nodes within the distance have the same largest
degree, then choose one of them uniformly at random.
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Figure 12: Comparison of different vaccination strategies for the Internet router map. R/RSIR represents
the ratio between the epidemic incidence (R) of the four proposed vaccination strategies and the epidemic
incidence (RSIR) without vaccination. The legend refers to the following vaccination strategies: D-steps
vaccination (Local), targeted vaccination (Kmax), random vaccination (Random) and single acquaintance
vaccination (SAI). In each case, 1% of the non-vaccinated nodes were initially infected at random. The
distance considered in the local algorithm is: (a) D = 1; (b) D = 2; (c) D = 3; (d) D = 5. Source: Adapted
with permission from Ref. [327]. With permission of Springer.
Based on these considerations, in [327] detailed numerical simulations of four different vaccination
schemes, including D-steps vaccination, degree-based targeted vaccination, random vaccination, and ac-
quaintance vaccination, were performed and tested in terms of their efficiency. As shown in Fig. 12, targeted
vaccination expectedly produces the best results, and this irrespective of the interaction topology. Also
understandably, the performance of random vaccination is not affected by the structure of the network.
Turning to local algorithms, it is found that the vaccination scheme based on the covering algorithm per-
forms better than acquaintance vaccination, even for small values of D. In fact, the D-steps vaccination
is only outperformed by the targeted procedure and lies between the most efficient and the acquaintance
vaccination scheme for all the values of D and βI . Moreover, from a practical point of view, the covering
strategy could be a good policy since it balances the degree of local knowledge and the efficiency of the
vaccination. As most empirical network topologies are neither completely known nor completely unknown,
this method thus allows us to fine-tune the value of D on a case-by-case basis, i.e., according to the degree
of local knowledge of the network.
In addition, Gao et al. evaluated the relationship between the threshold xc of the aforementioned
vaccination strategies and the power-law exponent of the degree distribution of the network, which is shown
in Fig. 13 [284]. A low level of xc with a small variation indicates that the immunization strategy is robust.
Results presented in Fig. 13 also show that the robustness of the D-steps vaccination strategy is close to
that of targeted vaccination.
Vaccination plays an obviously important role in the study of epidemic transmission and prevention.
Based on the above-reviewed research, we can conclude that the efficiency of vaccination depends significantly
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Figure 13: The critical vaccination threshold xc as a function of the power-law exponent of the degree dis-
tribution of the network. The legend refers to the following vaccination strategies: acquaintance vaccination
(Random Neighbor and Max neighbor), D-steps vaccination (D-steps D=2 and D-steps D=3), node degree-
based targeted vaccination (Target) and node betweenness-based targeted vaccination (NodeBetweenness).
Source: Adapted with permission from Ref. [284]. With permission of Springer.
on the amount of information we have about the structure of the network, and whether this information
concerns the global or the local structure. In the rare case information about the global structure is available,
targeted vaccination works best. If only information about the local structure is available, then the D-steps
vaccination seems to provide the optimal compromise between efficiency and flexibility. Table 3 gives a
systematic summary of the reviewed vaccination strategies, for a quick overview.
5.4. Vaccination on other types of networks
Up to now, we have focused mainly on research concerning vaccination on traditional network models.
This research provides vital insight in terms of the efficiency of vaccination under different circumstances, yet
empirical networks usually have particular topology properties that require special care. This includes taking
into account community structure [170, 188, 329–332], changes in the network structure over time [52, 218,
333–337], as well as multilayer properties that are typical for a large plethora of real-world networks [203,
231, 240, 241, 338–347]. In what follows, we will review vaccination programs that take into account the
particular aspects of these properties on various types of networks.
5.4.1. Vaccination on community networks
Community structure is ubiquitous in a variety of real complex systems, such as human contact networks
and social networks. The hallmark of this fact is that the connections among members of the same community
are much more common than connections among members of different communities [170, 188, 329–332]. For
networks with community structure, the weak ties that connect a pair of nodes belonging to different
communities, usually named the bridge nodes, therefore typically provide pathways for information and
disease to propagate from one community to the other. These nodes thus play a more important role in
the spreading of disease than the nodes with no or fewer inter-community links [348, 349]. However, their
importance is not necessarily reflected by their degree centrality. In this regard, identifying the bridge nodes
in community networks is crucial in preventing epidemic outbreaks [321, 350]. Identification of community
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bridges can be partially achieved by betweenness centrality or random-walk centrality, since both locate
nodes on the basis of important paths of epidemic spreading. On a similar note, Chen et al. proposed a
vaccination strategy based on an equal graph partitioning algorithm to identify the minimum group that
separates a network into several clusters of approximately equal size [294]. The role of the minimum separator
group is actually similar to that of the bridge nodes connecting different communities.
Salathé et al. [305] subsequently proposed a dedicated community bridge finder (CBF) algorithm that
searches for the bridge nodes, thereby requiring only local structural information about the structure of the
network. Their research showed that such a method is more efficient than vaccination strategies targeting
different kinds of hubs. The algorithm is based on the self-avoiding walk, which starts from a randomly
chosen node v0, and then follows the procedure outlined in Fig. 14. After t steps (t ≥ 2), the set of all
the visited nodes is denoted by {vt′} for t′ = 0, 1, . . . , t. Thus, vt is the node where the walker is located
after t steps, and vt−1 is the node visited at step t − 1. The first process is to examine whether the node
vt has a link or several links to the nodes in the set {vt′}, other than the link between vt and vt−1. If yes,
the self-avoiding walk proceeds towards step t+ 1; otherwise vt−1 will be considered as a possible target of
the bridge node. To determine whether the node vt−1 is one bridge node, two nodes are randomly chosen
among all the possible nodes that the walker could visit in step t+ 1, i.e. two neighbors of the node vt are
randomly chosen (except for the node vt−1 due to the self-avoiding restriction of the walk). If there exists
a path from any of the two chosen nodes back to any node in the set {vt′}, then the node vt−1 will not be
a bridge node and the walker moves to node vt+1. If there exists no path back to the set {vt′} from both
chosen nodes, vt−1 is regarded as a bridge node that connects two communities and is vaccinated. Then
a new self-avoiding walk starts and the above procedure is repeated until the desired vaccination ratio is
attained. An important idea behind the CBF algorithm is actually that a community is formed by a circle
of close friends. Thus, when two randomly chosen neighbors of vt cannot trace back to the community that
vt−1 belongs to, the link between vt−1 and vt is likely to be a bridge between two communities, and the
node vt−1 is hence a bridge node.
It has been found that community networks typically exhibit a heterogeneous distribution in the number
of weak ties originating from the bridge nodes [185, 351]. Inspired by this finding, Gong et al. turned their
attention to a particular kind of bridge nodes, named bridge hubs, which connect a community to many
other communities, i.e., bridge hubs have a large number of weak ties [350]. They proposed a vaccination
strategy named bridge-hub detector (BHD) to identify the bridge hubs. This algorithm extends the self-
avoiding searching scheme to examining the overlap and the existence of links from all the neighbors of the
last node back to the union of the friendship circles of all the nodes in the trail of the walk. A pair of nodes,
a bridge node and a bridge hub, are searched for vaccination via a self-avoiding walk. Compared with other
local vaccination strategies such as acquaintance vaccination and CBF, this strategy is proven to be more
effective in preventing the epidemic [350].
Also of note, Masuda recently proposed a vaccination strategy based on the eigenvector centrality for
community-structured networks [321]. In his work, a module based strategy technique is employed for
measuring the contribution of each node to the weighted community network in order to preferentially
vaccinate nodes that bridge important communities. The number of links that these nodes share gives the
weight of a link between any two communities. The influence of a node is thus related to the importance of
the community together with its connectivity to other communities.
5.4.2. Vaccination on adaptive networks
From the epidemiological viewpoint, when an infectious disease occurs in a population, individuals are
likely to adopt some self-protection measures to protect themselves from the disease. For example, susceptible
people may break their contacts with infected partners, which can significantly alter the structure of the
contact network, thus influencing the pathway of the epidemic spreading [52, 334–336, 352–355]. Both
SIS and SIR models have been studied on adaptive networks in which susceptible nodes rewire their links
adaptively from infected neighbors towards other non-infected nodes [52, 334]. Such adaptation typically
increases the epidemic threshold and reduces the number of infectious cases, thus contributing favorably to
the containment of epidemic spreading.
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Figure 14: A schematic presentation of the community bridge finder (CBF) algorithm. (a) A random walker
follows the path starting from v0 to v1 and v2, at which point it starts checking the connections from v2
to v0 and v1. (b) Since there is more than one connection (v2 − v1 and v2 − v0), the walker turns to v3.
(c) Except for the obvious v3 − v2, there are no connections from v3 to any of the previously visited nodes,
so v2 is a potential target. (d) The algorithm then picks two random neighbors of v3 to check connections
with previously visited nodes and finds one (to v0). (e) Hence, v2 is dismissed as a potential target, and
the random walker comes to v4. Again, v4 does not connect to any previously visited node (except to v3),
and thus v3 is identified as a potential target.(f) Again, two random neighboring nodes are picked to check
connections with previously visited nodes. Since no back connections can be found, v3 is identified as a
target and vaccinated. Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [305]
Figure 15: The effect of IMR strategy and IMSI strategy versus the starting time T0 of quarantine for (a)
∆i0(T0), (b) i0, imax, (c) ∆t(T0) and (d) r(T0). Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [352]
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Figure 16: The effect of ISR strategy and ISSI strategy versus the starting time T0 of quarantine for (a)
∆i0(T0), (b) i0, imax, (c) ∆t(T0) and (d) r(T0). Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [352]
Moreover on the subject, Shaw et al. have studied vaccine control of disease spreading on an adaptive
network to model the specifics of disease avoidance behavior [336]. Control was implemented by adding a
Poisson-distributed vaccination to the susceptible individuals. Their research showed that vaccine control
is much more effective in adaptive networks than static networks due to the feedback loop between the
adaptive rewiring and the administration of the vaccine. On the other hand, Yang et al. have focused on
the transient process rather than the steady state, and found that strong community structure (S nodes
community and I nodes community, connected by SI links) is induced by the rewiring mechanism in the
early stages of the epidemic spreading [352]. Subsequently, they proposed and examined various vaccination
strategies that build on this fact, targeting in particular such SI links. In particular, the vaccination of
randomly selected S bridge nodes from SI links (IMSI) and the vaccination of randomly selected I bridge
nodes from SI links (ISSI) were considered. To evaluate the efficiency of IMSI and ISSI strategies, the
vaccination of randomly selected S nodes from the network (IMR) and the vaccination of randomly selected
I nodes from the network (ISR) were also employed.
In terms of their results, in Figs. 15 and 16, T0 denotes the starting time of vaccination, ∆i0(T0) is the
difference between the maximal density of infected individuals imax(T0) that can be reached after vaccination
and the density of infected individuals i0(T0) at time T0, i.e. ∆i0(T0) = imax(T0)−i0(T0). ∆t(T0) represents
the time interval of this process, and r(T0) denotes the total percentage of vaccinated nodes in ∆t(T0). In
Fig. 15, the impact of the IMR strategy is almost equal to that of the IMSI strategy. Because most S
nodes are located on SI links when an epidemic prevails in an adaptive network, randomly vaccinating
S nodes can give rise to similar effects as vaccinating S nodes on SI links. Nevertheless, for ISR and
ISSI, quarantining I nodes on SI links is significantly more effective than quarantining I nodes randomly,
since the former can efficiently cut the pathways along which the disease could be invading the S cluster
(Fig. 16). Because of this fact, the ISSI strategy is more efficient in controlling the epidemic and has a
larger optimal region. More importantly, the consideration of these different vaccination strategies reveals
a counterintuitive conclusion: “the earlier the better” does not necessarily hold for the implementation of
vaccination measures. Optimal results can be expected more realistically if smart vaccination strategies are
implemented when the community structure emerges after the initial rewiring of links that sets in due to an
epidemic.
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Figure 17: Schematic illustration of a multiplex configuration. (a) In a multiplex network, six nodes are
connected through two different types of links, i.e., blue and black links. In this configuration, each node
simultaneously belongs to two layers, and it is thus termed as a multiplex node. (b) Multiplex networks are
composed of several, for example two, layers, each of which is composed by the same type of links. The term
layer node indicates that the node is connected only through the one type of link in the corresponding layer.
See main text for details with regards to the importance of this classification for vaccination strategies.
Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [356].
5.4.3. Vaccination on multiplex networks
Multiplex networks, as a typical kind of multilayer network structure, can be regarded as the combination
of several network layers, which contain the same nodes (or share at least some fraction of nodes) yet different
intra-layer connections [203, 231, 240, 241, 338–344, 356–358]. For each node, we term its counterpart in
every layer as a ‘replica’. Along the above definition, may real-world social and engineering systems, such as
online social networks [232, 359–365], airport traffic networks [358, 366, 367], biological metabolic networks
[368, 369], and scientific collaboration and citation networks [370], can be put into the framework of multiplex
networks. Multiplex networks naturally shed new light into the research of epidemiology (see Refs. [203, 231]
for a comprehensive understanding). For example, the well known acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS) usually propagates via three types of ways, namely sexual activity, blood, and breast milk. Different
transmission routes could be mapped into different network layers which contain the same individuals yet
different network topologies and dynamic properties [240]. Moreover, coupling methods from different layers
will greatly affect the onset of disease and its outbreak threshold [240]. In what follows, we will focus on
recent research concerning vaccination in multiplex networks.
To distinguish the node of a multiplex network and its replica in each network layer, Zhao et al. proposed
the terminology of the multiplex node and the layer node [344]. The former refers to the node which has
neighbors in each layer via different intra-layer connections, like node 3 of Fig. 17(a), whose neighbors are
nodes 1, 5 and 4 via blue and black links. While the latter is the partial case of a multiplex node and just
involves the local connections of a node in one given layer. For example, if we only consider blue (black)
links in Fig. 17(b), node 3 is the layer node of Layer-1 (Layer-2). Correspondingly, vaccination on multiplex
networks could be classified into multiplex node-based vaccination and layer node-based vaccination. Multi-
plex node-based vaccination means that all the replicas of one node simultaneously possess immunity in all
the layers, while layer node-based vaccination provides protection solely to nodes in a given network layer.
Similar to the vaccination strategies on single-layer networks, Refs. [344, 371–373] proposed the cor-
responding vaccination strategies (including random vaccination, targeted vaccination, and acquaintance
vaccination) on multiplex networks. Here, however, the aim of vaccination is specified to layer nodes and
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Table 4: Vaccinated probability of layer nodes and multiplex nodes for different vaccination strategies
vaccination type & probability layer node-based vaccination multiplex node-based vaccination
random vaccination x(kji) = xi, for ∀j x(
−→
kj ) = x, for ∀j
targeted vaccination x(kji) =
 1, if kji > kcifi, if kji = kci
0, if kji < kci
x(
−→
kj ) =
 1, if Kj > Kcf, if Kj = Kc
0, if Kj < Kc
where Kj =
m∑
i=1
βI ikji
acquaintance vaccination
x(kji) = 1−
(1− qi
∑
−→
k′j
k′jip(
−→
k′j)
zi
1
k′ji
)kji
x(
−→
kj ) = 1−∏
i=1,··· ,m(1− qm
∑
−→
k′j
k′jip(
−→
k′j)
zi
1
k′ji
)kji
−→
kj = (kj1, kj2, ..., kjm): the degree expression of multiplex node j; kji refers to its degree in layer i.
x(kji ): the vaccinated probability of layer node j in layer i with degree kji .
x(
−→
kj): the vaccinated probability of multiplex node j.
βI i: the infectious rate of the disease in layer i.
kci: the cutoff degree for vaccination of layer node in layer i.
Kj : the spreading degree of multiplex node j.
Kc: the cutoff spreading degree for vaccination of multiplex node.
zi: the average degree of layer i.
multiplex nodes. These vaccination strategies are determined by the vaccinated probability of layer nodes
and multiplex nodes, which are summarized in Table 4
Multiplex node-based vaccination refers to the case where a fraction of multiplex nodes is vaccinated. If
x(
−→
kj ) is defined as the vaccinated probability of multiplex node j, the generating function of the joint degree
distribution under multiplex node-based vaccination is given by
G0(
−→u ) =
∑
−→
kj
p(
−→
kj )(1− x(−→kj ))
m∏
i=1
u
kji
i . (149)
The generating function of the remaining joint degree distribution by following a randomly chosen link of
layer i is defined as
G
(i)
1 (
−→u ) = 1
zi
∂
∂ui
G0(
−→u ). (150)
Then, the probability υi that a multiplex node connects to the infected cluster by following a random link
of layer i is given by the coupled self-consistency equation
υi = G
(i)
1 (
−→
1 )−G(i)1 (
−−−−−→
1− βIυ), (151)
where
−−−−−→
1− βIυ = (1−βI1υ1, ..., 1−βImυm). It is worth mentioning that the cluster of multiplex networks is
defined as a set of connected multiplex nodes. A pair of multiplex nodes is regarded as having a connection
if there exists at least one type of link between them.
Thus, the existence of an epidemic regime under multiplex node-based vaccination just requires the largest
eigenvalue Λ of the Jacobian matrix of Eq.151 at (0,0,...,0) to be larger than unity [374]. Consequently, the
critical vaccination threshold xMc will be the value of immunity xM =
∑
p(
−→
kj )x(
−→
kj ) satisfying Λ = 1 in Eq.
151.
Layer node-based vaccination, in contrast, aims to vaccinate layer nodes. To calculate the critical vacci-
nation threshold, we just need to replace G0(−→u ) by
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G′0(
−→u ) =
∑
−→
kj
p(
−→
kj )
m∏
i=1
(xi(kji) + (1− xi(kji))u
kji
i ), (152)
in Eq. 150, where x(kji) is the vaccinated probability of layer node j in layer i with degree kji . Since
the vaccination of layer nodes is performed independently in each layer, the critical vaccination threshold
becomes a vector (xL1 , ..., xLm)c which can be obtained when the immunity xLi =
∑
kji
pi(kji)xi(kji) is satisfying
Λ = 1 in Eq. 151.
According to the above theoretical analysis, computer simulations have revealed that both multiplex
node-based random vaccination and layer node-based random vaccination strategies are more effective in
controlling disease spreading on multiplex ER networks [344]. On the contrary, multiplex node-based tar-
geted vaccination and layer node-based targeted vaccination strategies provide better protection on multiplex
SF networks. As on single-layer networks, random vaccination strategies work well only in largely homo-
geneous networks, while targeted vaccination strategies are required for useful results on heterogeneous
networks.
With regards to the efficiency of acquaintance vaccination in multiplex networks, we note that it is
closely related to the correlation between network layers [371]. Interestingly, as the correlation coefficient
increases, the vaccination threshold decreases for multiplex node-based acquaintance vaccination, but slowly
increases under the layer node-based framework. Moreover, Buono et al. considered vaccination of only
one layer and studied its effect on all the other layers while disregarding degree-degree correlations among
them [372]. Though, relative to the case of no vaccination, the size of the epidemic is drastically reduced
in the layer where the vaccination strategy is applied, the targeted strategy is still not as efficient as in
single-layer networks. Thus, the selection of the vaccination strategy has a major effect on the layer where
it is employed, but does not efficiently protect the individuals on other layers. Similar conclusions have
also been reported in Refs. [373, 375], thus corroborating the need to reconsider single-layer vaccination
strategies when applied to multilayer networks.
6. Rationale for studying behavior-disease dynamics
As demonstrated by the foregoing sections of this review, epidemiological models that do not capture
behavioral dynamics have been very successful over the past century, in terms of yielding rich theoretical
opportunities for research as well as in terms of providing insights into epidemiological mechanisms and how
to improve infection control. However, the impact of human behavior on disease dynamics is ubiquitous,
and vaccinating behavior is no exception.
This section is concerned with explaining the rationale for studying and modeling coupled behavior-
disease dynamics for vaccines, especially on networks. We start with a brief summary of vaccine use in
public health, discuss why vaccinating behavior may become an increasingly important part of disease
control in coming decades, and then discuss how models can help us to better understand and predict
behavior-disease dynamics.
The twentieth century saw enormous progress in public health, and especially in terms of preventing
and treating infectious diseases. For instance, medical use of antibiotics began during World War II, and
antibiotics have since changed how bacterial infections are treated and saved many lives. Improvements in
sanitation and hygiene are likewise credited with preventing many cases of cholera, typhoid fever, yellow
fever, dysentery, tuberculosis, and malaria by providing cleaner drinking water and living conditions and
improved hygienic practice [376]. The use of vaccines, although already available for smallpox since the
eighteenth century, expanded considerably in the twentieth century as vaccines were invented for more
infectious diseases, and were distributed to more people. Safe and effective vaccines now exist for many
of the most common infectious diseases that impose significant morbidity and mortality upon populations,
such as smallpox, measles, pertussis, influenza, hepatitis A and B, chickenpox, diphtheria, and others [3].
Global smallpox eradication was achieved in large part due to the success of ring vaccination [377].
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The use of vaccines has been estimated to save millions of children’s lives per year in the 1990s alone
[3]. In the 2000s, special immunization activities (SIAs)–ambitious large-scale immunization campaigns
in the world’s poorest regions and especially in sub-Saharan Africa–reduced the number of deaths due to
measles from an estimated 766,000 per year in 2000 to an estimated 164,000 per year in 2008 [378]. Global
eradication of measles in the coming decades is becoming seen as a real possibility for the first time in history
[379]. Thus, although challenges still remain, it is becoming significantly easier to get vaccines administered
to the people who need them. There are, however, important exceptions. For instance, the challenges of
administering vaccines in war zones have contributed to a large outbreak of polio in Syria as recently as
2015 [380]. At the same time in Pakistan, violence against WHO vaccinators has stymied efforts to combat
polio [381]. Despite this, global polio eradication is coming closer [382].
While some countries with resource limitations struggle to contain vaccine-preventable infectious diseases,
other comparatively wealthy countries are also struggling with infectious disease control, albeit for different
reasons. In countries such as the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Germany, measles circulation in the
2000s and 2010s has been relatively widespread compared to previous decades, and has often re-established
endemicity in some populations due to parental vaccine refusal or vaccine hesitancy on account of unfounded
concerns about the link between the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine and autism [383–385]. Similarly,
polio was on the cusp of global eradication and had been limited to northern Nigeria when an oral polio
vaccine scare in 2003 caused resurgence of the disease and spread of polio to countries like Syria and Pakistan
that had previously eliminated the infection [386]. These are only two examples where population resistance
to vaccines due to unfounded concerns has led to reduced vaccine coverage and resurgent infections, even in
resource-rich countries where it is easy for children to get vaccinated, if their parents want it.
Logistic, financial, technological, and administrative barriers to vaccination are likely to continue receding
in the coming decades, enabling it to become easier to improve vaccine coverage everywhere in the world. As
this happens, we speculate that vaccine refusal and vaccine hesitancy such as recently observed in the case
of MMR vaccine will become an important barrier–and perhaps even the most important barrier–to global
eradication of vaccine-preventable infections. Many factors contribute to the decision to become vaccinated
[6, 384, 387]. Also, vaccine refusal is not a new phenomenon, and even the first vaccine to be invented–the
smallpox vaccine–was subject to considerable resistance (see Fig. 18). However, growing herd immunity
generated by vaccine programs themselves can bring about the preconditions for vaccine refusal.
Vaccine refusal is often construed in the context of “free-riding”: individuals who do not vaccinate are
consciously free-riding on the herd immunity provided by those who do vaccinate. Debate on the usefulness of
coupled behavior-disease models often centers on whether individuals consciously free-ride when they make
vaccinating decisions or not. However, it is not necessary for individuals to consciously free-ride in order for
vaccine refusal to be linked to growing herd immunity, or for behavior-disease models to be useful (although
it is certainly possible that some individuals will consciously free-ride when making vaccinating decisions
[388]). It is well-known that perceived infection risk and past exposure to infections are determinants of
whether or not individuals will choose to be vaccinated [387]. In particular, a high perceived infection risk
and/or a past history of infection are positively associated with decisions to accept vaccination. Therefore,
lack of recent infection, such as caused by vaccine-generated herd immunity, can decrease the motivation to
become vaccinated. Parents who have never seen a case of measles infection leading to hospitalization will
tend to under-estimate the risk and/or probability of measles infection. Similarly, lack of a recent outbreak
can cause carelessness or de-prioritization on the part of physicians, and therefore lower vaccine uptake [389].
Whether or not non-vaccinators consciously free-ride is secondary in some respects. What matters is that
vaccine-generated herd immunity brings about lack of recent infections in a population, which can in turn
cause vaccinating to become less of a priority, as well as creating fertile conditions for false rumours about
vaccine risk to spread. Vaccine programs are victims of their own success.
This is also echoed in observed behavior for pertussis and MMR vaccines. When declining vaccine
coverage caused in partly by vaccine refusal leads to an outbreak, vaccine coverage responds by increasing
during and after the outbreak [390, 391]. This vividly demonstrates the coupled nature of disease dynamics
and vaccinating choices, completely aside from whether we need to characterize this behavior as free-riding,
or whether non-vaccinating individuals are aware that is what they are doing. Individuals may not answer
truthfully when surveyed about their motives for becoming vaccinated or not becoming vaccinated, or more
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Figure 18: Satirical cartoon by James Gillray capturing public fears of the smallpox vaccine in the 18th
century, the first “vaccine scare". Edward Jenner stands in the middle, administering the smallpox vaccine.
Vaccinated persons grow cow parts out of various parts of their bodies (the smallpox vaccine of the time
was based on the virus that causes cowpox, hence the fear among some that the vaccine would turn humans
into cow-like hybrids). A painting of the Worshippers of the Golden Calf hangs in the background. Source:
Wikimedia Commons.
importantly they may answer very differently in surveys conducted during an outbreak, than during a time
of elimination. However, when we observe vaccinating behavior responding to changes in disease prevalence,
as in the Disneyland, California measles outbreak of 2014 [392] and other examples, we see the proof in
the behavioral pudding that vaccinating behavior and disease dynamics are strongly linked to one another,
particularly near the elimination threshold.
The Disneyland, California measles outbreak and similar outbreaks illustrate the important role played
by social factors in determining individual vaccinating choices. The influences of peer groups and medical
professional opinions on vaccine decision-making are well-documented [6, 393]. Social contact networks can
be mapped out using Bluetooth and other technologies (see Section 11 for more details) [394]. Moreover,
social influence has often been described as a contagious process in itself, as ideas and behaviors spread
through networks [395, 396]. Therefore, social processes can be very naturally modelled by defining processes
on networks representing social contacts, and the methods of statistical physics concerned with the properties
of networks could therefore be very useful [397].
Because vaccine-generated herd immunity tends to create complacency toward vaccine programs in the
way we have described above, we expect vaccine hesitancy and outright vaccine refusal or vaccine “scares" to
become more common as eradication and elimination thresholds are approached for more vaccine-preventable
infectious diseases. Moreover, we have seen how the significant role of social context in influencing individual
decision-making is very naturally represented using the network paradigm. The study of coupled behavior-
disease dynamics on networks could therefore help us address this potentially growing problem [398]. In
particular, mathematical models, often based on methods borrowed from physics, can be a useful way of
better understanding and predicting these coupled dynamics.
Human behavior is doubtless more difficult to mathematically model than the motion of a single billiard
ball, for instance, or many of the slightly more complex systems studied by physicists. However, at some
levels of organization (in particular, the aggregate population level) it is often possible to develop simple
models that have some predictive power. For instance, mathematical models incorporating behavior-disease
interactions have been fitted to time series data of infectious disease prevalence, and model selection ap-
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proaches such as Aikaike Information Criterion (AIC) have shown that models that include behavior can
explain the data more effectively compared to models that neglect behavior, with little or no parsimony
penalty [391, 399, 400]. Such models have also shown retrospective predictive power [391]. Other model
fitting and data analysis exercises without mechanistic representations of behavior have likewise shown the
importance of accounting for behavior when explaining observed epidemic patterns [401, 402]. Similarly, the
results of experimental games and surveys have been useful in the parameterization of coupled behavior-
disease models [403, 404]. The advent of online social media promises another source of data on both
individual-level and population-level human behavior and this will be explored in greater depth in a later
section.
Hence, there appears to be a strong public health and scientific rationale for studying behavior-disease
interactions. The existing research shows that behavior and disease are strongly coupled to another. This
coupling is particularly important near the elimination threshold, hence vaccine refusal may become an
increasingly important barrier to achieving elimination and eradication, as logistic barriers recede into the
distance. Moreover, models show promise to help us better understand coupled behavior-disease dynamics,
and comparing models with data have often shown that behavior is important for understanding observed
epidemic patterns and that behavioral models may have predictive power. Finally, these models can show
interesting dynamics that are similar to those studied in physics–such as phase transitions, oscillatory so-
lutions, and spatio-temporal patterns–and therefore similar methodologies to those used in physics may
be helpful in their study. In the next section, we will introduce some of the basic concepts of behavioral
modeling that have been applied to study coupled behavior-disease interactions.
7. Basic concepts in behavioral modeling
Much of the recent research on modelling the coupled dynamics of vaccinating behavior and disease
dynamics has been conducted by investigators with training in the natural sciences, including physics,
applied mathematics and epidemiology. These investigators have borrowed concepts from the social sciences
in order to find behavioral models to couple with the existing infection transmission models they are more
familiar with. These behavioral models can be broken down into three main categories: phenomenological
models, game theoretical models, and psychological models. However, we note that the distinctions between
these categories are not always well defined, and the delineations depends to some extent on subjective
opinions. We also note that our goal here is to characterize different ways of doing behavioral modelling,
rather than different ways of modelling coupled behavior-disease interactions per se (see Refs. [405, 406] for
classifications of coupled behavior-disease models).
7.1. Phenomenological models
Phenomenological approaches to modeling behavior mathematically describe the observed effects without
positing mechanisms behind the observed behavior. For instance, arguably the first model to capture
the impact of adaptive human behavior on disease transmission used the mean-field ordinary differential
equations [407]
dS
dt
= −g(I)S,
dI
dt
= g(I)S,−γI (153)
dR
dt
= γI,
where S is the number of susceptible individuals, I is the number of infectious individuals, R is the number
of recovered individuals, γ is the per capita recovery rate, and g(I) is the force of infection. The form of g(I)
was chosen to reflect the phenomenological impact of unspecified psychological effects. One of the functional
forms explored in Ref. [407] included
g(I) =
βI
1 + βδI
, (154)
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which saturates at high prevalence of infection, I. Such saturation of the transmission rate at high levels
of prevalence could occur if individuals reacted to high prevalence by reducing their contact rate through
hand-washing or other means, which is a plausible assumption for a sufficiently dangerous infectious disease.
We describe this model as phenomenological because, although it is motivated by psychological factors, the
equations only describe the impact of such psychological factors on the transmission rate without actually
modelling specific psychological processes such as individual cognition or social learning.
Similarly, as noted in the previous section, a rapidly growing body of research uses the contagion metaphor
to describe the transmission of ideas and behaviors through social networks [395, 396]. We classify these
approaches as phenomenological because they describe the effect of behaviors and ideas being transmitted
between individuals, without positing the mechanisms that might bring about this transfer. Contagion of
ideas is a metaphor, and caution must be exercised when applying metaphors to complex social phenomena.
Vaccine scare and others panics undoubtedly share common features with contagious processes, and using
this metaphor can simplify and facilitate analysis of social processes. Moreover, the contagion metaphor
comes naturally to investigators experienced in modelling contagious diseases. However, the downside of
such metaphor is that it runs the risk of being too facile for some applications, by ignoring important
subtleties of real-world social behavior [408]. For instance, some social science literature distinguishes
between descriptive and injunctive social norms [409]. Descriptive social norms are those which describe
what other individuals do, whereas injunctive social norms describe what other individuals approve or
disapprove [409]. It is moreover possible to distinguish between social learning and social norms. Social
learning theory emphasizes the social aspects of cognitive processes: individuals do not learn many behaviors
by cogitating in isolation from others, but rather they learn through a more efficient process of imitating
others [410]. An individual may use social learning to choose among descriptive or injunctive social norms
that seem to be most acceptable, or most successful. It is not immediately clear how the contagion metaphor
applies to these nuanced distinctions of how we learn ideas and behaviors from others. Indeed, empirical
research seems to indicate that the contagion metaphor (unsurprisingly) is not universally applicable [408].
Moreover, many of the usual criticisms of memetics also apply to using the contagion metaphor for the
spread of ideas [411].
However, in many contexts, these limitations of the contagion metaphor may not matter. Science works
by adopting the simplest explanation that captures the observed behavior (Occam’s Razor) and there are
some contexts in which the contagion metaphor may be perfectly adequate to explain the observations.
This is often the value of phenomenological models over mechanistic models. For instance, to prove that
behavior influences the spread of infectious diseases, it is sufficient to construct a phenomenological model
that captures the impact of behavior and to show that it is superior to models that do not capture behavior
[391, 399]. And, precisely because phenomenological models are often simpler in structure, they may make
it easier to understand how simple mechanisms such as information spread through networks can give rise
to complex emergent phenomena, such as control of infection spread in a spatially structured population
[412]. In other contexts, mechanistic models may be desirable, and in the next two subsections we discuss
two broad categories of mechanistic models: game theoretical models and psychological models.
7.2. Game theoretical models
Game theory is the formalization of strategic interactions between individuals in a group of two or more
individuals [413]. Game theory is well exemplified by the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (so called because it was
originally explained as a decision process made by two prisoners being interrogated in separate jail cells who
must decide whether to confess their crime, or stick to their story of being innocent). Each player can choose
to either cooperate (’C’) or defect (’D’), and receives payoffs depending on what s/he chooses, and what
her/his opponent chooses (hence, the strategic interaction of the game). If you, (the focal player) cooperates
and your opponent also cooperates, then you receive $3 for instance (Fig. 19). But if you cooperate and
your opponent defects, you get no money. On the other hand, if you defect and your opponent cooperates,
you get a huge $10 payoff, but if your opponent also chooses to defect, you only get $1. Your opponent has
the same payoff outcomes, and therefore the payoff matrix is called symmetric.
What should you–the focal player–do in this situation? If your opponent cooperates, then it is optimal
for you to defect since you get $10 instead of $3. If your opponent defects, then it is also optimal for you to
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Figure 19: Payoff matrix describing the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a classic example from game theory. Players
must choose whether to Cooperate (C) or Defect (D) against their opponent, with the payoffs for taking
these two different courses of action also dependent on what their opponent chooses. The money values
are the payoff to the focal player, and the payoffs for the opponent are symmetrical hence payoffs for the
opponent are the same, if they are treated as the focal player instead.
defect, since you get $1 instead of $0. Therefore, regardless of what your opponent does, you should choose
‘D’, defect. Your opponent is thinking the same way, so s/he also chooses to defect. Therefore you both
defect and you get a payoff of $1 each. This is a shame, since if you had both cooperated, you would each
get $3, but the selfishly optimizing logic of maximizing personal gain in anticipation of what your opponent
will do prevents this socially (Pareto) optimal outcome. The Defect-Defect outcome is known as a Nash
equilibrium, since neither player has an incentive to unilaterally change his or her strategy away from Defect
and therefore we expect the Nash equilibrium strategy choices to be stable.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been used to illustrate the clash between what is optimal for the individual
and what is optimal for the group in a variety of contexts, including vaccination [414–416]. In the case of high
levels of vaccine coverage, non-vaccinators are the Defectors, who benefit from herd immunity generated by
vaccinators without paying any real or perceived cost of vaccination, while vaccinators are the Cooperators.
However, this analogy only applies at high levels of vaccine coverage, since at low levels of vaccine coverage
it is optimal for individuals to accept at least some vaccination.
Game theoretical models of interactions between vaccinating behavior and disease dynamics typically
define strategies such as Vaccinator or Non-vaccinator, define payoffs for those strategies, and attempt
to solve for a Nash equilibrium [416–418] or the analogue from evolutionary biology, the evolutionarily
stable state (ESS) [419]. The approaches may also attempt to determine whether the Nash equilibrium is
convergently stable, which indicates whether players will evolve, over time, toward the Nash equilibrium.
However, classical game theory may not be well suited to describing real-world vaccinating behavior. It
assumes that individuals are selfishly rational optimizers, but in fact, effects like social learning, bounded
rationality, and imperfect information are very important in vaccinating decisions [6, 393], and this can
impact predicted behavior [391].
Research has explored the statistical physics of games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma or the Snowdrift
Game played out on lattices [420–423], subsequently expanded to networks [424–431]. Likewise, game theo-
retical concepts have been applied to vaccination decisions on networks [432–435]. However, the resemblance
of this work with ‘game theory’ gradually fades, as investigators use increasingly computational approaches
in their work (and less rigorous proof of Nash equilibria) as a result of including more realistic cognitive
processes. Such cognitive processes better reflect the importance of social influences and social norms, and
the reality of imperfect information which makes individuals use ‘rules of thumb’ to make decisions, rather
than assuming individuals can predict the future. In the end, the only resemblance to ‘game theory’ may
be the use of utility functions where individuals make decisions (either non-strategic, explicitly strategic,
or implicitly strategic) based on how much utility (a measure of preference) they will receive for different
actions such as vaccinating or not vaccinating [432–435]. Hence, these more complex game theoretically-
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inspired models blur the distinction between ‘game theoretical’ models and ‘psychological’ models, the latter
of which is the focus of the next subsection.
7.3. Psychological models
Some models of the interaction between vaccinating choices and disease dynamics invoke psychological
theory in order to formulate mechanisms underlying vaccinating decisions. An example of a model that uses
social and psychological assumptions is the following SIR model modified to include mechanistic modelling
of vaccinating behavior according to an evolutionary game theoretical approach [436, 437]:
dS
dt
= µ(1− x)− βSI − µ,
dI
dt
= βSI − γI − µS, (155)
dx
dt
= ~x(1− x)(−1 + ωI),
where S is the proportion of susceptible individuals, I is the proportion of infectious individuals, x is the
proportion of individuals who adopt the vaccinator strategy, µ is the per capita birth/death rate, β is the
transmission rate, γ is the recovery rate, ~ is a rescaled parameter that essentially captures the rate of
social learning, and ω is a rescaled parameter that essentially captures the relative perceived risk of the
disease compared to the vaccine. In this model, individuals are not perfectly rational optimizers because
they only switch strategies through social learning (~), after they have interacted with individuals playing
a different strategy and moreover, they make the ‘rule of thumb’ assumption that their probability of
eventually being infected depends on the current proportion of infectious persons, I, rather than assuming
that they could solve the SIR equations explicitly and figure out their chances of becoming eventually
infected. This approach can be straightforwardly extended to spatial settings, where individuals imitate
successful strategies of their network neighbours [433]. A similar approach has also been adopted in models
of coupled human-environment systems [438, 439].
Other approaches incorporate specific theories from psychology and social psychology in order to formu-
late mechanisms in coupled behavior-disease models. For example, random walk subjective expected utility
(SEU) theory posits that individual decision-making can be modelled as a biased random walk in a one-
dimensional space of possible states with two decision outcomes on either end of the space. Individuals move
toward one decision or the other depending on the probability of certain outcomes of their decisions, and
the subjective utility associated with those outcomes, as formulated through a decision tree [440]. Once a
certain threshold has been crossed close to one end of the one dimensional space or the other, the individual
has finally decided on a course of action, and takes it. This has been applied to vaccinating decisions for
influenza on a contact network, to explore how decisions about influenza vaccination and decisions about
contact precautions interact with one another through their mutual coupled influence on disease dynamics
[441].
Another relevant theory from psychology is prospect theory, which mathematically formalizes the phe-
nomenon whereby humans tend to over-estimate the probabilities of very rare events. Since vaccine adverse
events and disease complications are rare events, the relevant of prospect theory to vaccinating decisions is
obvious. Prospect theory has been applied in mean-field models of coupled vaccinating behavior and disease
dynamics for paediatric infectious diseases, and has been found to significantly impact model predictions
[442].
A third example is the application of Dempster-Shafter theory, which is a general statistical framework
(closely related to Bayesian statistics) for dealing with decision-making under uncertainty [443]. This theory
has been incorporated into models of coupled dynamics of vaccinating decisions and disease dynamics, where
investigators have used the theory to explore how awareness of disease-related events and vaccine-related
events spreads through a group of socially connected individuals [444].
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8. Behavior-vaccination dynamics in well-mixed (mean-field) populations
The dynamics and control of vaccine-preventable infectious diseases under voluntary vaccination can
be quite complex, because of the role of human decisions. These are in turn based on information and
rumors gathered on: i) the perceived risks of getting the disease; ii) its spread; iii) the perceived risks of
being affected by vaccine-related side effects. This complexity becomes apparent in the modeling phase,
due to the intrinsic difficulty of quantitatively representing human behavior, and is mirrored by the features
of the resulting mean-field models, whose solutions are radically different from those of the basic model
with mandatory vaccination illustrated in Section 3. Here we review the recent literature on the dynamic
implications of the introduction of human behavior in mean-field SIR-like models for vaccine preventable
infections under voluntary vaccination. The presentation broadly follows the categorization proposed in
[445] (also refer to Section 7 for classification), contrasting phenomenological, or behavior-implicit models of
vaccinating behavior, with behavior-explicit ones, such as psychological or game-theoretical models. However,
this categorization is not always effective from the modeling viewpoint since, under certain conditions, the
various approaches can become mathematically indistinguishable. More mathematically focused reviews can
be found in [445–447].
8.1. Phenomenological SIR models with information-dependent vaccine uptake
A general phenomenological framework is represented by the SIR model with information-dependent
vaccination introduced in [448–451]. The underlying rationale is that the possibly complex behavioral rules
parents follow when deciding whether to vaccinate or not their children will often translate into simple
relationships between the individual probability to vaccinate, i.e. the vaccine demand, and the gathered
information on infection spread. These models therefore postulate relatively simple feedback rules whereby
trends of infection (and of vaccine adverse effects, VAE) can affect the current vaccine uptake, eventually
feeding-back on infection dynamics.
These ideas led to the following modified SIR model with vaccination by a perfect vaccine [448] (note
that for basic demographic and epidemiological quantities we use the notations adopted in Section 3)
S′ = µ (1− x(M))− µS − β(t)SI, (156)
I ′ = I(β (t)S − (µ+ γ)), (157)
where the vaccine demand x(.) is an increasing function of a new variable, M , which summarizes the
information available on current and/or past disease trend, used e.g. to formulate expectations about
future risks. Here we considered uniquely vaccination of newborns, however models considering ’delayed’
vaccination strategies targeted also to later ages, i.e. of the type
S′ = µ(1− S)− ψ(M)S − β(t)SI, (158)
where φ(M) is an increasing function of M , have a qualitative behavior that is similar to the one of the
model 156-157 [448].
Focusing on the perceived risk of disease as the driving force of vaccination decision, M might be any
continuous and increasing function g of the current infection prevalence or incidence. For linear g it would
hold M = h(t)β(t)SI (with h(t) > 0) or M = k(t)I (with k(t) > 0). Namely, the latter expression defines
the perceived risk of serious disease as the product of the perceived risk of infection, proportional to infection
prevalence I, times a constant perceived risk of serious disease given infection.
More realistically M also depends on past values of state variables, due e.g. to time-delays in the
reporting/acquisition of information, and mainly to the fact that parents might also include their experience
of past disease trends, etc. In this case, M can be modeled as follows
M(t) =
t∫
−∞
g(I(τ))K(t− τ)dτ, (159)
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where the delaying kernel K [452] is a probability density function. Besides the trivial caseK(t) = δ(t) (yield-
ing back the unlagged case), the literature has focused on kernels allowing reduction to ordinary differential
equations[448–451, 453], in particular on the exponentially fading memory kernel K(t) = a exp(−at), which
describe an exponential decay of the "‘memory"’ of agents, with characteristic memory lenght T = 1/a [452].
Another kernel investigated in [451] is the acquisition-fading kernel K(t) = a1a2(a2 − a1)−1(e−a1t − e−a2t).
This unimodal kernel is null at t = 0, and it mimics not only the exponential decay of memory, but also an
initial phase of information acquisition.
Finally, function x can be written as [448, 450, 451]:
x(M) = x0 + x1(M) , 0 < x0 < 1, (160)
where x0 is a non-null baseline constant coverage, mirroring awareness of disease severity also in absence of
spread, and x1(M) is a sufficiently regular increasing function, with x(M) ≤ 1.
For the sake of simplicity, from now on we shall assume that the information index M only depends
on (current or past values of) I, the so called prevalence-dependent case [445, 454]. In the current case
this assumption implies that epochs of increasing prevalence would rapidly promote an increase in vaccine
uptake in children (and vice-versa).
Two main substantive questions arise about model of Eqs. 156-160, namely how prevalence-dependent
vaccination affects infection control on the one hand, and, on the other hand, how it might affect the
dynamical pattern of infection and vaccination, e.g. by triggering oscillations. From now on we always
assume that in absence of vaccination the infection is endemic, i.e. R0 > 1.
8.1.1. Implications of information-dependent vaccination: elimination “mission impossible”
The basic SIR model with constant mandatory vaccination x at birth shows a simple threshold behavior
governed by the vaccine reproduction number (VRN) RV = (1 − x)R0 such that if RV ≤ 1 (i.e. x ≥ xc)
then the infection can be eliminated, otherwise the disease remains endemic. This simple result no longer
holds under prevalence-dependent vaccination which makes elimination impossible. This is a general fact
holding regardless of the form of the information index M , of the memory kernel K(.) and of the nature of
the transmission rate β(t). This may be inferred by investigating the local as well as the global stability of
the disease-free equilibrium (DFE): DFE = (1 − x0, 0, 0) of model in Eqs. 156-160, yielding the following
global eradication condition
B =
1− x0
µ+ γ
1
θ
θ∫
0
β(u)du ≤ 1, (161)
(where B represents the average VRN when the vaccine uptake is set to the baseline coverage x0) while if B >
1 the DFE is unstable. For constant β the condition B ≤ 1 is equivalent to the condition x0 > xc, in other
words elimination can only be achieved if the baseline vaccine uptake lies above the elimination threshold.
Actually, it is a documented fact that western countries have been able to maintain very high coverages -
i.e. above the estimated elimination threshold - against e.g. polio and diphtheria for decades. This however
has been possible under situations where these vaccinations were essentially mandatory. Whether similar
results could be maintained under fully voluntary vaccination regimes seems to be quite remote, given that
scenarios where prevalence is very small would also make the perceived reward of vaccination to vanish, so
that people would start escaping from vaccination.
8.1.2. Memory-triggered oscillations
Given that infection elimination is ruled out, the question turns into the types of dynamics that might
be triggered by prevalence-dependent vaccination. For R0(1 − x0) > 1 and constant β, the system of
Eqs. 156-160 has a unique endemic equilibrium EE = (Se, Ie,Me).
In the unlagged case the system becomes 2-dimensional and it is easy to prove that the endemic state
is globally asymptotically stable (GAS), so that only damped oscillations are possible [448]. Instead, in
the delayed case, stable oscillations - via Hopf bifurcation of the endemic state - already appear under the
simplest pattern of delay, namely the exponentially fading memory. In particular, assuming as key parameter
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the inverse of the average memory/delay lenght a = 1/T , and taking for simplicity g(I) = kI, it holds that
[448] if and only if
(βIe + µ)
2 − βIeµkx′1(Me) + 2 (βIe + µ)
√
βIe(γ + µ) < 0, (162)
there is a range [a1, a2] for a such that: i) for a ∈ (a1, a2) Yabucovich oscillations [455] occur via Hopf
bifurcations at a1 and a2; ii) for a /∈ [a1, a2] the endemic equilibrium EE is locally stable. The global
stability of EE, suggested by numerical sumulations, is nontrivial and it has been investigated in [456] by
means of the Li-Muldowney geometric theorem, which extends the Dulac-Bendixon theorem.
Note that Eq. 162 shows that sustained oscillations can appear only if x′1(Me) is sufficiently steep,
that is only if the behavioral response of vaccine uptake to changes in the perceived risks is sufficiently
intense. In this case oscillations occur in an appropriate intermediate window of the average delay 1/a.
These results continue to hold for more realistic patterns of delay, such as acquisition-fading and Erlangian
kernels [155, 448–451], for generic increasing g(I) functions [450], in presence of disease-related mortality
and a non-constant population [450], and when the incidence of VAE is taken as the key determinant of
the vaccine demand [155]. Finally, as shown in [457], oscillations in behavior-depending vaccination models
are also observed in absence of memory mechanisms but in presence of disease-intrinsic delays, such as in
the SEIR model (the latent period being, of course, equivalent to an exponentially distributed delay in the
onset of infectivity).
8.1.3. Dynamic pattern for a measles-like infection
We illustrate some of the above described dynamic oscillatory patterns, under the parameter values
adopted in section 3.6. As for behavioral rules we choose g(S, I) = I, and a Michaelis-Menten-type [128]
coverage function x1(M) = (1 − x0 − ε)DM/(DM + 1) where D > 0 is a shape parameter tuning the
reactivity of x1, and 1− x0 − ε represents the maximal coverage arising for large DM values. Behavioral
parameters are chosen in the oscillatory region, with the average delay T = 1/a set to 4 months, x0 = 0.75,
ε = 0.01 and D = 15× 104. The selected values of ε and D allow, in principle, the vaccine uptake to reach
values close to 100% during epochs of high perceived risk.
The model is initialized at time t = 0 at the endemic state determined by a constant coverage set at the
baseline level x0. Fig. 20 reports the transient (left-hand side) and long-term (righ-hand side) time paths
of the ERN RE(t) = R0S(t) (top), of the infective prevalence (medium), and of the overall vaccine uptake
x(M) = x0 + x1(M) (bottom), jointly with its time average. State variables converge to a stable limit cycle
in about 150 years, with a long-term inter-epidemic period around 12 years, i.e. about 2.5 times the pseudo-
period of the SIR model with constant coverage x0 = 0.75. The most striking fact is that though the vaccine
uptake x(M) reaches levels as high as 96% during epochs of high perceived risk, this is totally insufficient
for elimination, as witnessed by the average long-term coverage, which remains below 80%, i.e. well below
the critical coverage xc ≈ 0.93. This oscillatory nature appears to be intrinsic to SIR systems with delayed
prevalence-dependent vaccine demand: epochs of increasing prevalence will yield, after a certain period
of time, an increase in the demand for vaccines, which will in turn reduce infection prevalence, therefore
eventually feeding-back on the vaccine uptake and so on, as first noted in [454].
8.1.4. Further extensions and remarks on phenomenological models
The information-dependent framework is a flexible one from several standpoints. As mentioned above,
a model analogous to the one presented here has been applied to investigate the effects of VAE [155] which,
in the current western situation where incidence of most infections is persistently low, appear to represent
the most important component of the vaccine demand. In particular, in [155] the key determinant of the
vaccine demand was the information on the incidence of VAE. Role of VAE as vaccination determinants
will be considered more in detail in the behavior-explicit models of next subsection. However, many other
applications are possible. For example the framework in [448] was also used to consider the possibility that
parents adopt the strategy of delaying the age at vaccination of their children, later extended in a more
general behavior-explicit setting in [458].
More important, the phenomenological model of Eqs. 156-159 represents a general form in that, as
we have remarked, also behavior-explicit (e.g., game theoretic) formulations for vaccine uptake eventually
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Figure 20: Dynamics of model in Eqs. 156-160 for g(S, I) = I under an exponentially fading kernel (T =
4 months) and a Michaelis-Menten-type prevalence-dependent component of vaccine uptake (D = 500).
Transient (left-hand side) and long-term (righ-hand side) paths of: (top) effective reproduction number
RE = R0S; (middle) infective prevalence I (normalized to its equilibrium value); and (bottom) overall
vaccine uptake x(M) (compared to its time average given by the flat line in the right-bottom graph). R0 is
equal to 15. Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [451]
collapse into the same structure, once the vaccine uptake function resulting from the adopted formulation
is set within the framework of a dynamic epidemiological model [453, 454]. For example, game-theoretic
approaches (discussed in section 8.3) often yield step-wise best response behavioral functions. The simplest
example for the vaccination problem would be not to vaccinate with probability one when the risk of infection
is below a certain threshold, to vaccinate above that threshold, and to vaccinate with a certain probability
when the risk is exactly at threshold. However, a number of reasons (e.g., bounded rationality) suggest to
approximate the best response function by a corresponding smoothed responses [459]. The shape of smooth
response function is typically analogous to that of function x1(.) used here.
8.2. Behavior-explicit psychological models of vaccinating behavior
Most available psychological models of vaccinating behavior in previous sections relied on what we will
term Imitation Game Dynamics (IGD), an important class of models developed within Evolutionary Game
Dynamics Theory (EGDT)[460–462], which is a powerful approach to modeling behavior by setting ideas
from game theory into a population dynamics framework [460–462]. Imitation represent a main avenue
through which the different strategies enacted by players can spread within a population, through mutual
learning between individuals [463]. The first application of IGD to investigate vaccinating behavior and its
feedback on infection dynamics and control was developed in a seminal paper by Bauch [463], later extended
[464] by a more general formulation which will prove useful to link the class of imitation-based models with
the phenomenological models of previous section.
8.2.1. Imitation dynamics
IGD is usually presented using the framework of game theory, both in its economic and in bioevolution-
ary standpoints. However, we note that at its very core there is again a mass-action diffusion process based
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on statistical physics [462]. Let us consider a binary decision problem, i.e. one for which only two, mutually
exclusive, strategies are played: strategy V and N (these might for example be to Vaccinate, and Not to
Vaccinate). Let us also assume that individuals can switch from the strategy they are currently playing
to the alternative one by learning and imitating after social encounters with subjects that are playing the
other strategy. Considering a population of constant size, and indicating with yV and yN the fractions of
the N and V sub-populations (yV + yN = 1), leads to the following mean-field double infection model:
y′V =−KV NyNyV +KNV yNyV , (163)
y′N =−KNV yNyV +KV NyNyV , (164)
where the coefficientsKNV ,KV N have a clear "epidemiological" interpretations as the strategy-specific trans-
mission rates following social contacts with individuals playing the other strategy. Following EGDT [462],
these coefficients are proportional to the perceived benefit, or payoff, arising from strategy switching. Since
yN = 1− yV , it follows
y′V = (KNV −KV N )yV (1− yV ). (165)
Note that if KNV −KV N is strictly positive (negative) in all the state space, strategy V (N) will eventually
prevail, by spreading to the entire population with a logistic-type dynamics, as is intuitive given that the
quantity KNV −KV N > 0 must be proportional to the perceived net payoff gain when switching from strat-
egy N to V . More interesting, dynamic situations arise when the net payoff KNV −KV N has non-constant
sign, which happens when it is made dependent on other state variables of the system, as is the case for
vaccination games [400, 458, 463–466].
8.2.2. Basic SIR models with imitation-based vaccinating behavior
Unlike previous subsection where the vaccine uptake at birth x was taken as a "static" function of I
(and/or of S), we assume that x is a state variable determined by the switches of parents between strategy
N (not to vaccinate) and V (vaccinate) according to the above described IGD. Therefore, x(t) actually
represents the proportion of parents favorable to vaccination at time t, which is taken as a proxy for the
actual emerging vaccine uptake. Setting yV = x, yields the following family of mean-field SIR models with
vaccination [110, 464]
S′ = µ(1− x)− µS − βSI, (166)
I ′ = βSI − (µ+ γ)I, (167)
x′ = κ1∆Ex(1− x), (168)
where the term KNV −KV N has been represented by the product between the scale coefficient κ1, tuning
the speed of the imitation process, and the net expected payoff gain of vaccination, ∆E. The latter can in
turn be defined as the difference eV − eN between the vaccinator payoff and the non vaccinator payoff, or
alternatively as CV − CN where Ci = −ei represents the corresponding cost.
Note preliminarly that irrespective of the specific form of ∆E(t), the family of models in Eqs. 166-
168, always has the following three equilibria: (i) a disease-free state with no vaccinators A = (1, 0, 0),
which is unstable due to the above assumption that R0 > 1; (ii) a pure-vaccinator disease-free equi-
librium B = (0, 0, 1) where everyone is vaccinated; (iii) the pre-vaccination endemic equilibrium C =(
SSIR, ISIR, xSIR) = (R−10 , µ(1−R−10 )/(µ+ γ), 0
)
. On the other hand, the stability of B and C as well as
the existence of further equilibria (induced by the behavioral component) depend on the chosen form of the
perceived payoff gain ∆E(t).
8.2.3. The baseline SIR model with imitation-based vaccinating behavior
The seminal study [463], motivated by need to understand the causes and dynamics of vaccine scares,
such as the pertussis or the MMR vaccine scares, rests on two main hypotheses, namely: (a) a prevalence-
dependent cost of not vaccinating (see Fig. 21), of the form CN = rImI(t), where mI(t) is the current
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perceived risk of infection (taken as an estimate of the actual FOI λ = βI), and rI > 0 is the perceived
(conditional) risk of serious disease given infection; and (b) a constant cost of vaccinating CV = rV > 0,
representing the perceived risk of suffering a VAE per single vaccination. Hence
∆E(t) = rImI(t)− rV = rV (ϑI(t)− 1) , (169)
where ϑ = mrI/rV is a measure of the relative cost of disease with respect to that of vaccination. Based on
these hypotheses, a number of substantive results were shown [463]. First, the pure-vaccinator equilibrium
B is unstable, reflecting the fact that in a wholly vaccinated population, prevalence is equal to zero and
therefore the payoff of vaccination is strictly negative (∆E = −rV ), removing incentive to vaccinate, so that
vaccination will start declining. Second, there is a partial vaccinator endemic state D, that is an endemic
state with positive vaccine uptake D =
(R−10 , ϑ−1, x̂), where x̂ = (1 + γ/µ) (ISIR − ϑ−1) . The equilibrium
coverage x̂ is meaningful only for values of the behavioral parameters ensuring that ID < ISIR, i.e. such that
the corresponding endemic prevalence is lower than the prevalence observed in absence of any vaccination.
This in turn requires ϑ > I−1SIR, meaning that D exists only for sufficiently high levels of the relative cost
of disease. Finally, at ϑ = ϑ0 = I−1SIR there is a transcritical bifurcation between C and D. In words, given
that endemic infection for which at some stage a vaccine becomes available, then: (i) if the relative cost of
the infection is low (i.e. the perceived cost of vaccination is high with respect to infection) then the vaccine
would not be adopted due to lack of incentive; (ii) if the relative cost of infection is high then the vaccine
would spread in the population, therefore destabilizing the pre-vaccination endemic state C, and sustaining
the appearance of the new, locally stable, endemic state D with positive vaccination. In turn, the stability
of D depends on κ1(ϑ−ϑ0), showing in particular that appropriately large values of the imitation coefficient
can yield sustained oscillations by Hopf bifurcation of D, indicating that fast social learning is a source of
oscillations.
Previous results add robust evidence, based on a behavior explicit model, to those reported in section 8.1,
indicating that prevalence-dependent vaccinating behavior represents a serious threat for programs aimed
to infection elimination.
8.2.4. An alternative model with myopic perception of the cost of vaccine adverse events
The hypothesis made in previous subsection that the perceived risk of vaccinating is constant, implies
that the public correctly evaluates this risk, as the ratio between total reported VAEs for a given infection,
and the total number of vaccinations for that infection per unit of time. However, due to the current high
levels of herd immunity in modern industrialized countries, the perceived risk of serious disease from many
infections is currently very low, while the large number of vaccinations administered unavoidably yields a
steady flow of VAEs [467]. The VAE burden might then make the perceived risk of suffering vaccine side
effects (VSE) higher than risks perceived from infection.
Therefore, in [464] it was assumed that the public myopically evaluates the risk of VSEs by available
information on the total number of VAE, which is proportional to actual vaccine uptake x. In particular,
it was investigated the case CV = αx, defining the perceived cost of vaccination as the product of the
(perceived) probability of being vaccinated, times a perceived probability of suffering VSE given vaccination.
Similarly, CN is taken as an increasing function of infection prevalence: CN = h1(I(t)). Note that the case
h1(0) > 0 is a realistic one as it might represent a scenario of local elimination where however infection
re-emergence (e.g. by importation of cases) is feared.
The resulting dynamic equation for x(t) is
x′ = κ (h(I)− x)x (1− x) , (170)
where κ = κ1α, and h1(·) = h(·)/α.
Interestingly, if imitation dynamics is fast compared to infection dynamics, i.e. κ >> (µ + γ), then a
quasi-stead state approximation yields
x(t) ≈ min (h (I(t)) , 1) , (171)
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Figure 21: Trends in pertussis vaccine uptake (dashed line) and case notifications (solid) in England and
Wales 1967-2003 motivating the idea of prevalence-dependence in vaccine uptake: (a) absolute levels, (b)
with vaccine uptake represented as deviations from a linear least-squares fit. Note in particular that when
coverage went abruptly down due to vaccine scare (mid seventies), large epidemics restarted, possibly uprising
the perceived risk of infection, and eventually restoring vaccine uptake at high levels. Nonetheless symptoms
of prevalence-dependence persist, though at a lower scale, even after the overall relapse, as evidenced in (b).
Moreover, the initial (pre-1975) persistently high coverage, bringing incidence to low and declining levels,
might have sharply increased the number of VAE, eventually triggering the vaccine scare. Source: Reprinted
figure from Ref. [463].
i.e. the information-dependent model with current information (i.e. Eqs 156-160) presented in the previous
subsection is recovered. In other words, the phenomenological model [448] is a special case of the imitation-
based case when the imitation process is fast.
Comparing with the baseline model of previous section 8.2.3, we note that the alternative model of
Eqs. 166-170 also has the equilibria A (unstable), B (unstable) and C. Unlike section 8.2.3 [463], the
pre-vaccination endemic equilibrium C is always unstable, reflecting the fact that introduction of a vaccine
will always be successful, due to the low perceived cost of vaccination at low coverage levels. Moreover, two
further equilibria are induced by the inclusion of behavior i.e., a disease-free equilibrium E with positive
vaccine uptake (disease free partial vaccinator equilibrium) E = (1−h(0), 0, h(0)), and the partial vaccinator
endemic state D
D =
(R−10 , Ie, h (Ie)) , (172)
where R0 = β/(µ + γ) is the basic reproduction number of the infection, and Ie is the unique solution of
the equation
h(I) = 1−R−10 −
µ+ γ
µ
I. (173)
Eq. 171 alone can explain the behavior of the disease-free equilibrium E. Indeed, from x′ ≥ κ(h(0) −
x)x(1− x) it follows that for large times x(t) ≥ min(h(0), 1) and in turn: if h(0) ≥ xc then x(t)→ 1, i.e. E
is globally attractive. Moreover, linearizing at E it follows that if h(0) < xc then E is unstable. Therefore,
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in case of myopic evaluation of VAE elimination turns out to be possible, but only if the perceived cost
of disease associated with infection re-emergence is so large to bring the vaccine uptake in excess of the
elimination threshold.
As all equilibria are independent of κ, it is natural to choose κ as a bifurcation parameter. Not sur-
prisingly, the dynamics around the partial vaccinator endemic state D depends on the steepness of function
h(I) at D. Namely, it exists a threshold:
th =
(µ+ βIe)
(
(µ+ βIe) + 2
√
βIe(µ+ γ)
)
βIeµ
such that i) if h′ (Ie) < th then equilibrium D is locally stable irrespective of the imitation speed κ; ii) if
h′ (Ie) > th then there is a range of values (κ1, κ2) for the imitation speed κ such that for κ ∈ [κ1, κ2] and
the system’s orbits x(t) = (S(t), I(t), x(t)) are oscillatory (i.e. recurrent epidemics are predicted) in the
sense of Yabucovich [455], which onset via Hopf bifurcations at κ1 and at κ2.
Note that unlike the model reported in section 8.2.3 where sustained oscillations around the endemic
state were triggered by large values of the imitation coefficient κ [463], in the present model oscillations
occur in an intermediate window of values of κ. This suggests that both slow and fast imitation might be
stabilizing forces, quite similarly to what is reported in section 8.1.2 for the phenomenological model. This
is not surprising since x(t) depends on I(t) via a differential equation, i.e. x(t) "follows" h(I(t)) with an
appropriate delay.
Possible dynamics of the system for some parametric constellations promoting sustained oscillations are
illustrated in Fig. 22 for a measles-like infection. A noticeable fact is that large levels of the imitation
coefficient κ, besides triggering very long inter-epidemic periods, can promote long-lasting epochs where the
vaccine uptake x lies above the elimination threshold xc.
Modeling irrational behaviors. A positive aspect of the imitation game-based seminal models [110, 463, 464]
is that they parsimoniously describe, by means of a classical tool of game theory, the complex social learning
underlying the parental decision to vaccinate their children. Moreover, broadly speaking, the imitation
process represent a first deviation from full rational behavior. However, models [110, 463, 464] are based
on an important but implicit assumption, i.e. that the "force" driving the vaccine non-acceptance is para-
rational. Indeed either it is constant (and fully dictated by a rational thought, as in [463]) or it depends on
the information on vaccine side effects (as in [110, 464]). In reality in doing this the models [110, 463, 464]
miss the fully irrational behavior underlying the periods of vaccine scares.
In [465] Bauch and Bhattacharyya go an important step further by assuming that the "anti-vaccination
force" (which depends on the vaccine risk perception) is an empirical function mimicking the rumours-driven
sudden rise, stay and decay of vaccine scare. As far as the "force" favoring the vaccine uptake (i.e. the
feedback from disease prevalence) they assume that it is proportional to the time-series of notified cases.
The resulting dynamics for the fraction of vaccinated newborns x(t) is thus of the type:
x′ = κx(1− x)(uL(t)− ω(t)), (174)
where L(t) is an interpolation of notified cases, u is a proportionality constant and ω(t) is an appropriate
unimodal function. Interestingly, the authors consider also other simplified models,
a) absence of social learning:
x(t) = uL(t)− ω(t); (175)
b) absence of disease driven feedback:
x(t) = 1− ω(t); (176)
c) absence of pro-vaccination "force":
x′ = κx(1− x)(−ω(t)); (177)
d) explanatory model with force pro-vaccine depending on the state variable I (as in [463]):
x′ = κx(1− x)(I(t)− ω(t)), (178)
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Figure 22: Oscillatory dynamics of the SIR model with vaccination decisions governed by Eq. 170 for a
linear h(I) of the form: h(I) = θI, θ > 0. The graphs report the dynamics of the vaccinating proportion
x(t) (top) and of infection prevalence I(t) (bottom), for different values of the rescaled imitation coefficient
κ: κ = 0.0005day−1 (left), κ = 0.002day−1 (centre), κ = 0.0035day−1 (right). The system is initialized from
the pre-vaccination endemic levels of variables S, I and from x(0) = 0.95. Demographic and epidemiological
parameters are: µ = (1/75)year−1, γ = 1/7day−1, R0 = 10, = 15, 000, κ = 0.002day−1. Source: Reprinted
figure from Ref. [464]. With permission from Elsevier.
complemented by an SIR model with vital dynamics, of course.
They applied the various models, and various models of the function ω(t), to available data concerning
the whole cells pertussis vaccine scare and to data on the MMR vaccine scare. These multiple comparison
not only were done in order to find the best fitting and predicting model, but also in order to disentangle the
effect of each component: the social learning, the kind of curve ω(t) modelling the vaccine scare; the type
of disease-related feedback. They obtained the following interesting results: i) the best fit to available data
were obtained by the model of Eq. 178 including both the disease-related feedback and the social learning
mechanism; ii) this model also produced good predictions, up to 10 years in the case of pertussis data; iii)
the model of Eq. 174 performed better than the simplified models.
8.2.5. Delaying vaccination as a further strategy
A wide empirical evidence suggests that parents often adopt the strategy of delaying their children’s age
at vaccination against common vaccine preventable infections ([458] and references therein), mostly because
they fear that the immune system of a newborn is still too weak to adequately tolerate immunization.
Bhattacharyya and Bauch [458] proposed a minimal 3-strategy model, with two possible vaccination rounds,
the first at birth (age 0), and the second one at a fixed subsequent age a1 set to four years [458], always
by a perfect vaccine. This is remindful of the two-rounds MMR (measles-mumps-rubella) vaccination, with
an early first dose and a second one offered during the childhood to reach unvaccinated or non-successfully
vaccinated children. Parents can opt between the following strategies: i) timely vaccinator (V ) i.e. vaccinate
at the first round; ii) delayer (Del) i.e. vaccinate at the second round; ii) Non vaccinators (N). The three
corresponding fractions of the population are denoted as xV , xDel and xN = 1 − xV − xDel. The adopted
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model is a two-age classes meta-population version of the SIR endemic model, with exponential transitions
between age groups and inhomogeneous age-specific mixing (see section 3.9).
Individual learn and switch between strategies according to an IGD driven by the constant perceived
risks of VAE from vaccination at ages 0 and a1 respectively, denoted by rV,1 < rV,2, and by the direct
prevalence-dependent perceived risk of disease in the two age groups [463]. The latter depends on the
corresponding risks ηi (i = 1, 2) of acquiring infection in age groups i = 1, 2, that are modeled as follows
ηi = χiIi/(ρ1 + I1), namely as increasing and saturating functions of the (perceived) group-specific infective
prevalence Ii (i = 1, 2) to mirror two stylized facts, namely that (i) social contacts relevant for transmission
are largely assortative i.e., tend to mostly occur with individuals of the same age group [148], and (ii)
agents form their perceptions of risk according to simple heuristics. As for payoffs: (i) the timely vaccinator
payoff only includes the vaccination cost at age zero, i.e. CV = −rV,1; (ii) the delayer payoff includes the
sum of the cost of acquiring disease in period 1, plus the cost of vaccination at age 2, which arises only if
he/she escaped infection during period 1, i.e. CDel = −rIη1 − rV (1− η1), (iii) the non-vaccinator payoff is
CN = −rIη1 − rIη2(1− η1).
The resulting dynamics of state variables xV and xDel (the dynamics of xN is given by xN = 1−xV −xDel)
obey
x′V = κv(∆EV,DelxV xDel + xV (1− xV − xDel)∆EV,N ), (179)
x′Del = κDel(xDel(1− xV − xDel)∆EDel,N − xDelxV ∆EDel,V ), (180)
where (similarly to the previously illustrated IGD-based models) the quantities ∆Ei,j = ei − ej = Cj − Ci
(i, j = V,Del,N) represent the pairwise perceived payoff gain resulting from social encounters between indi-
viduals belonging to group i and group j, resulting from the difference of the related costs. Quite reasonably
Eqs. 179-180 postulate a simplified mixing pattern between players of various strategies (compared to the
mixing relevant for infection transmission), as indeed parents of children eligible for vaccination represent a
restricted subgroup of the population in age group 2. The full model is obtained by adding to Eqs. 179-180
the equations for susceptible and infective individuals in age groups 1,2.
The qualitative behavior of the model is more complicated than the baseline model, although basic
intuitions from section 8.2.3 explain well the main results. For example, in addition to the unstable infection
free-all vaccinators equilibrium, there is an unstable endemic pure delayer equilibrium with I2 = 0. This
further confirms the impossibility of disease elimination under prevalence-dependent cost of infection.
Several mutually exclusive other locally stable endemic states exist, including the pre-vaccination equilib-
rium and variousmixed states with sub-optimal vaccine uptake combining different proportions of individuals
following the different strategies. Interesting oscillatory regimens were observed in the simulations: individ-
uals switch between strategies depending on the pattern of prevalence, with frequently observed anti-phase
oscillations between strategies V and Del, e.g. epochs of high prevalence incentivate timely vaccination,
which in turn reduce prevalence, thereby promoting the delayer attitude, which in turn favors a restart of
prevalence in age group 1, and so on. However, inclusion of the third strategy has a stabilizing effect with
respect to the basic (V -N) strategy of section 8.2.3 [463]. The model also offers some insight on the role of
the delayer strategy during epochs of vaccine scare.
8.2.6. Dynamical effects of social norms
Previous models assuming prevalence-dependent vaccinating behavior predict that elimination is impos-
sible since vaccine uptake eventually sets around some equilibrium levels below the critical threshold xc.
However, in western countries vaccination coverage for certain diseases such as poliomyelitis and dyptheria
attained and maintained very high levels, ensuring persistent local elimination, even in countries with volun-
tary vaccination. This suggests that further behavioral mechanisms are at work. A number of psychological
theories relevant for health decisions such as the theory of planned behavior [468] and its extensions, have
stressed the importance of social pressure as a determinant of individual behavior. In particular, our own
perceptions of what persons relevant to us might think we ought to do are relevant - the so-called injunctive
social norms (ISNs) [469] might affect vaccinating behavior in a number of ways, i.e. by building self-
legitimation for non-vaccinators, by enforcing their cohesion, or by increasing the conformism of vaccinators
as a majority.
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Figure 23: Bistability of equilibria in the model with imitation dynamics and ISNs: regions of the (δ,m)
parameters plane for the stability of the equilibria B (disease-free full vaccinator equilibrium), C (endemic
pre-vaccination equilibrium), and D (partial vaccinator endemic state). Equilibrium B is stable in the
hatched region below the thick black diagonal line, C is stable in the light grey region, D is stable in the
dark grey region on the left. Details on other behavioral parameters and basic demographic and epidemiologic
parameters are reported in [400]. Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [400].
Oraby et al. [400] included ISNs into the IGD model of section 8.2.3 by assuming, in line with the
game-theoretical work by [470], that ISNs add a new component to payoffs which is proportional to group
pressure, i.e. to how many other people in the population are also playing that strategy. The perceived
payoffs for nonvaccinators and vaccinators become: CN = −rimI(t) + δ0(1 − x), and CV = −rV + δ0x,
where δ0 tunes the effects of social pressure on payoffs, taken as symmetric. Note that social pressure has
the potential to mitigate, or even to sign-reverse, the costs of the two strategies.
After some rescaling, this yields the following equation for the vaccinators proportion x
x′ = κ1x(1− x)(I − ω − δ(1− 2x)), (181)
which, differently from section 8.2.3, emphasizes the relative cost of vaccination and the relative strength of
social pressure with respect to the cost of disease, given by ω = rV /(rimI) and δ = δ0/(rimI) respectively.
With respect to the model in section 8.2.3 considering only the direct costs of vaccination or not, the
inclusion of ISNs yields a far richer dynamics. First, besides the four basic equilibria A,B,C,D observed
in section 8.2.3, there is a fifth equilibrium E induced by social pressure, where SE = 1 − xE , IE = 0,
xE = 2
−1(1 + ω/δ), with xE > 1/2. However, this disease free partial vaccinator equilibrium, which exists
only if δ < ω (i.e. if the strength of group pressure is smaller than the relative cost of vaccination) is
always unstable. Second, the pre-vaccination endemic state C = (SSIR, ISIR, xSIR = 0) is locally stable if
ISIR < ω + δ, i.e. if the perceived cost of disease is small. Third, if δ > ω (δ < ω), i.e. if the strength of
group pressure is larger (smaller) than the cost of vaccination, then the pure vaccinator equilibrium B is
locally stable (unstable). As a consequence of the above two stability conditions, both B and C can coexist
in their stability ranges, i.e. the system exibits bistability and its mathematical behavior will depend on the
initial conditions (see Fig. ??). Bistability phenomena also involve the partial vaccinator endemic state D
(see Fig. ??). Finally, oscillations due to destabilization of D are possible, as in section 8.2.3.
Overall, including ISNs widely expands the spectrum of qualitative mathematical behaviors w.r.t. the
baseline case where payoffs only include direct costs of the alternative strategies. In particular, ISNs can
mitigate the main perverse consequence of prevalence-dependence, namely the "elimination impossible"
result, by allowing the pure vaccinator equilibrium to become stable at large levels of social pressure. Other
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Figure 24: Empirical and modelled (a,c,e) pertussis vaccine coverage and (b,d,f ) pertussis incidence in the
UK, (a,b) from 1971 to 1988 without injunctive social norms, (c,d) from 1967 to 2010 without injunctive
social norms and (e,f ) from 1967 to 2010 with injunctive social norms. The solid line is the empirical data
and the dashed line is the best-fitting model. Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [400]
effects are more controversial, as social pressures can induce bistability phenomena in a large portion of the
parameter space, with the well-known amplification of uncertainity due to both the imprecise measurement of
initial state and and the equilibrium switch that can be induced by extrinsic stochasticity. Thus, depending
on the context, social norms can either support or hinder vaccination goals. Finally, inclusion of ISNs allows,
under a few further assumptions, an excellent fit of prevalence and coverage data of pertussis in the UK
since the seventies, including the epoch of the pertussis vaccine scare and the subsequent epoch of coverage
relapse (see Fig. ??).
8.2.7. Implications of bounded rationality in vaccination decisions
Vaccinating (or not) is a typical example of decision under uncertainty conditions, for which bounded
rationality approaches, such as Kahneman and Tversky prospect theory [471] (see section 7.3) typically work
better than classical rational calculus. Oraby and Bauch [466] have investigated the dynamic implications of
bounded rationality in vaccinating behavior by an SIR model in which vaccination decisions are formulated
according to the ideas of prospect theory. The chosen coupled behavior-disease model is formulated as an
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IGD, i.e. parents still learn about other’s strategies through imitation, also including the effects of ISNs (see
the previous subsection) and a non-perfect vaccine. The x-equation for the proportion of parents choosing
strategy V is formulated as
x′ = κ1x(1− x)F (piV |N (I, x))− F (piN |V (I, x)), (182)
where F (.) is a suitable probability distribution function, and piV |N (I, x) (alt. piN |V (I, x)) is the net reward
that a parent playing stategy N (alt. V ) perceives to gain from switching to strategy V (alt. N), given
current conditions on prevalence and vaccine uptake I, x. The map F transforms net rewards to a probability
scale, so that the term ∆F = F (piV |N (I, x)) − F (piN |V (I, x)), replacing the sure perceived payoff gain of
previous models, represents the probability gain arising from the switch between strategies. The perceived
net rewards piV |N (I, x), piN |V (I, x) are defined as
piV |N (I, x) = piN (V )− piN (N) + (δV x− δN (1− x)), (183)
piN |V (I, x) = piV (N)− piV (V ) + (δN (1− x)− δV x). (184)
In Eqs. 183-184, besides the social norm components (analogous to those described in the previous section
but taken asymmetric for sake of generality), the true core is represented by the differences ∆piV |N = piN (V )−
piN (N), and ∆piN |V = piV (N) − piV (V ), where the quantities piN (V ), piN (N), piV (N), piV (V ) represent the
expected utilities arising from each of the four possible prospects faced by agents. In [466] it is hypothesized
that agents classify the possible realizations of infection in a four item scale ri,I (i = 1, .., 4) i.e. (i) mild
infection, (ii) moderate, (iii) morbid, up to (iv) death due to disease/vaccine adverse events (VAE), scaled to
the base-case of absence of infection, with corresponding probabilities p(ri,I). Analogous classification ri,V AE
(i = 1, .., 4) is done for VAE. At each realization it is attached a utility evaluation UI(ri,I) as well as a weight
W (x(ri,I)) to the corresponding probability. The various prospects are defined consequently. For example,
agents currently playing N who continue to play N can only experience the consequences of infection, so
their prospect includes the utility outcomes UI(ri,I) with expected utility piN (N) =
∑
UI(ri,I)W (x(ri,I)).
On the other hand agents currently playing N who consider to switch to V will include in their prospect both
the utility outcomes from VAE, UV AE(ri,V AE), as well as those due to infection, as a consequence of vaccine
imperfection, and so on. The key step then lies in assigning the utility evaluations and corresponding
weights, according to the principles of bounded rationality, i.e. accounting for the two different possible
parents’ attitudes, namely risk averting vs risk seeking, that classically cause departures from full rationality,
depending on a number of parameters reflecting boundedly rational behavior. This is done by appropriate
parametric specifications of U and W [466] including perfect rationality as a sub-case.
The resulting SIR vaccination model based on Eq. 182 and Eqs. 183-184 is quite richer compared to
section 8.2.6 as it includes, besides bounded rationality of vaccination decisions, also vaccine imperfection and
asymmetric effects of social pressure. In particular, the underlying perfect rationality model is the extension
of the model of previous section accounting for vaccine imperfection and asymmetric social pressure.
The ensuing equilibrium structure differs from that in 8.2.6 due to the appearance of a sixth endemic
state F , which is a pure vaccinator endemic state forced by vaccine imperfection. In particular (i) the
disease free partial vaccinator equilibrium E remains always unstable, as in 8.2.6, (ii) the pure vaccinator,
disease-free equilibrium B is stable for infections that are not not highly transmissible, if the vaccinators
social pressure is relatively strong compared to the vaccine cost, while the pure vaccinator endemic state F
is stable if and only if vaccinator pressure is large and the vaccine efficacy is low.
To sum up, the effects of bounded rationality are mostly dynamical. Indeed, while the dynamics observed
in the underlying rational model are much alike those in section 8.2.6, with bistability regions having simple
forms, the inclusion of bounded rationality yields a zoo of dramatic dynamical changes, which include
complicate nonlinear shapes of the stability regions, and steady oscillations about the pure vaccinator disease-
free equilibrium B. In addition, boundedly rational behavior makes it harder to eliminate infection, because
it can offset the beneficial effects of the social pressure of the vaccinators group.
8.2.8. Modeling public communication on disease and vaccine risks
A parsimonious explanation of some observed features of vaccination systems can be obtained by re-
moving an unrealistic feature of models based on IGD, namely that switching between strategies is entirely
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determined by learning from other agents (i.e., parents of children to be vaccinated) during social encoun-
ters. Indeed, the pure-imitation model poorly represents the process of information provision in modern
countries because, even when a given vaccination is fully voluntary. Public health systems will nonetheless
keep the role of main suppliers of the relevant information on risks associated to diseases and vaccines, as
suggested by a body of evidence [110]. In this subsection we report an extension of the basic imitation-based
framework of sections 8.2.3-8.2.4, which accounts also for perceptions based on information (about risks)
supplied by the public health systems [110]. In this new framework, remindful of Bass classic model for
information diffusion [472], switches between N and V strategies is determined by the balance between
private information, exchanged through inter-personal communication between parents of children eligible
for vaccination during their social contacts, and public information, communicated by the public health
authorities through media and related channels. This allows to amend the equations for the dynamics of
switch between the two strategies as follows
y′V =G(t)yN −KV NyNyV + kNV yNYV , (185)
y′N =−G(t)yN − kNV yNYV +KV NyNyV , (186)
where G(t) represents the rate of transition from strategy N to strategy V induced by mediatic information
(which is independent of the level of individuals’ social activity), yielding
y′V = G(t)(1− yV ) + (KNV −KV N )yV (1− yV ), (187)
where KNV = κθ(I) and KV N = κα(x). In the simplest case one can assume that G(t) is a strictly positive
constant, i.e. G(t) = kG > 0. The underlying idea is that the information provided by public health systems
aims to convey a different perception of risks related to disease and vaccination compared to what might
happen in private social encounters. In particular, a "‘wise"’ public communication aims to convince that
(i) vaccines are highly safe, with a very low, constant, risk of VAE, and that (ii) risks associated with the
disease are prevalence-independent.
Setting x = yV and simplifying Eq. 187 yields the following dynamic equation for the proportion
favourable to strategy V
x′ = κ(1− x) ((θ(I)− α(x))x+ ψ) , (188)
where parameter ψ = G/κ summarizes the effectiveness of the public effort (information, education, avail-
ability of vaccination infrastructures, subsides to vaccination staff, etc) in affecting perceptions on vaccines
and disease.
The properties of the ensuing behavior-disease model arising by coupling Eq. 188 with Eqs. 166-167
depend in a critical manner on parameter ψ. Briefly, there exist appropriate thresholds ψc < ψ1 such that
• For high levels of public effort (ψ ≥ ψ1) only the pure vaccinator equilibrium B exists and it is globally
asymptotically stable (GAS).
• For intermediate levels of public effort (say ψc < ψ < ψ1) the pure vaccinator equilibrium is unstable,
but there is a disease free partial vaccinator equilibrium E, with vaccine uptake above the elimination
threshold, which is GAS.
• For low levels of public effort (ψ ≤ ψc) the disease free partial vaccinator equilibrium E exists but is
unstable, and the partial vaccinator endemic state D appears ensuring endemicity, though it is not
necessarily stable i.e. oscillations may occur.
In a control perspective, if the infection is endemic at D in a scenario where vaccination is voluntary with
public intervention absent, it is possible to increase the equilibrium coverage by increasing the public effort
in providing information about benefits of vaccination. Suitable further increases in public effort can allow
the equilibrium vaccine uptake to expand until the endemic state D disappears by exchanging its stability
with the disease free partial vaccinator E, thus achieving elimination. Further increases in ψ can push E to
collapse on the pure vaccinator equilibrium B.
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These results indicate that public intervention can completely mitigate the negative implications of
prevalence-dependent, pure-imitation models (sections 8.2.3-8.2.4), particularly removing the impossibility
to eliminate the infection. A simple calibration to Italian data on measles coverage shows that this model ex-
plains the recent Italian story, characterized by a fast increase in measles vaccine uptake following substantial
efforts by the public health system, largely better than models including imitation only [110].
8.3. Behavior-explicit game-theoretic models of vaccinating behavior
The first application of classical game theory and epidemiological modeling to investigate the implica-
tions of vaccination decisions dealt with the conflict between group interest and self-interest in relation to
smallpox vaccination upon reintroduction following a terroristic attack [473]. A companion paper [474] ap-
plied the same approach to mass vaccination against common vaccine-preventable childhood infections under
voluntary vaccination. The latter work gave much momentum to subsequent research in the field. In line
with the previous subsections, this subsection reviews this seminal work and a few subsequent fundamental
contributions focusing on childhood vaccination [453, 474–476]. The flavor of the presentation is slightly dif-
ferent however, as the focus of these approaches, though framed within SIR models for vaccine-preventable
infections, is more on classic game theoretic questions, namely existence of Nash equilibria for individuals’
vaccine uptake and comparisons with the level which is optimum for the community as a whole, rather than
on dynamic properties.
8.3.1. The baseline equilibrium model
The work in [474] integrates ideas from the endemic SIR model with vaccination at birth (see section 3.6)
into a game theoretical framework to investigate the interplay between individual vaccination decisions and
the population-level dynamics of infection in a voluntary vaccination scenario. Game theory is the natural
framework given that the vaccination strategy of each specific agent (i.e. parents), whose sum defines the
vaccine coverage at the population level, is influenced by other parents’ decisions in the sense that the
corresponding payoff will depend on the strategies played by all other players.
Letting the individual strategy be represented by the parents’ probability to vaccinate x, authors then
seek a convergently stable Nash equilibrium (CSNE) solution x∗, which is expected to be observed in a real
population of players.
The key determinants of individual strategies are the perceived relative cost of vaccination r, defined
as the ratio between the perceived risk of VAE (rV ) and the perceived risk of disease given infection (rI),
and the probability pix of experiencing infection under a given vaccination coverage x. For the latter it is
assumed that parents correctly know the underlying epidemic model and estimate pix by the corresponding
lifetime probability of infection at endemic equilibrium for an unvaccinated individual, given by
pix = 1− 1
(1− x)R0 . (189)
Note that the scenario of full absence of vaccinators (x = 0) yields pi0 = xc.
The authors show that there is always a unique CSNE solution x∗. For high levels of the relative perceived
risk of vaccination, namely for r > pi0, i.e. for r > xc, the CNSE corresponds to the situation where no one
vaccinates (x∗ = 0), i.e. the pure non-vaccinator strategy. On the other hand, if r < pi0, i.e. r < xc, the
CNSE solution predicts a strictly positive probability to vaccinate x∗. The condition r < pi0 implies
(1− r)R0 < 1. (190)
Under the above constraint, the CSNE is
x∗ = 1− 1
(1− r)R0 , (191)
which is such that
x∗(r) < xc (192)
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Figure 25: The baseline equilibrium model of the vaccination game. Left panel: patterns of the vaccination
coverage x∗ predicted by the CSNE as a function of the relative risk r = rV /rI of vaccination for different
values of the BRN R0. The dashed horizontal lines drawn at the level of the critical coverage xc = x∗(r = 0)
(for the different levels of R0) show the impossibility to eliminate the infection in a regime where individuals
vaccinate according to self-interest driven by direct perceived risks. Right panel: impact of a vaccine scare
as represented by a large increase of the relative risk of vaccination from a very low level r0 << xc to a
new level r
′
, for different levels of the BRN R0. The graph reports the trend of the payoff gain ∆E and of
the change ∆P in vaccine uptake for different levels of r
′
. For moderate levels of r
′
, namely r
′
< xc, the
impact is moderate but becomes dramatic when r
′
exceeds xc causing the CSNE coverage dropping to zero.
Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [474].
(unless r = 0). In other words, under voluntary vaccination elimination turns out to be impossible if
individual only take their self-interest into account (Fig. 25, left panel). Moreover, the case where r exceeds
the elimination threshold (r > xc), a fact possibly observable during periods of vaccine scare, the CNSE
predicts absence of any vaccinator at all. A key point stressed in [474] is that when the perceived relative
risk switches from an initial level r0 < xc to another one r
′
greater than xc, then the resulting payoff gain
is increasing with r
′
and it has no plateau. In other words, the vaccine scare can go unlimited. In [474]
it is also considered the effect of measures induced by the public health systems to counteract the vaccine
scare, i.e. a reduction of the relative risk from a value in excess of xc down to another value below xc.
The authors obtained that the incentive to vaccinate dimishes as the vaccine coverage approaches to its
Nash equilibrium. Summarizing, a vaccine scare easily induces a substantial drop in vaccination, whereas
restoring the pre-scare coverage levels is difficult. These findings are illustrated in the right panel of Fig. 25.
8.3.2. Best individual vs community vaccination response in a heterogeneous population
In [453] a general game-theoretical approach was adopted, aimed to relate the population vaccine demand
to individual decisions in a behaviorally heterogeneous population sharing a common information ‘signal’
about the dynamic spread of an SIR-type infection. In their model the individuals choose between strategy
V (vaccinate their children) and N (not to vaccinate) based on perceived benefits and costs of vaccinating,
in turn based on the information signal σ carrying information about risks of acquiring the infection. This
information signal has the same meaning (and form) of the information index M in the phenomenological
models of section 8.1. The population is assumed to be behaviorally heterogeneous, and its internal structure
is described by a single real variable y. Individuals having type y choose strategy V (to vaccinate) with
probability χ(y, σ) and strategy N with probability 1− χ(y, σ). Benefits of vaccination are summarized by
the utility function of strategy V which depends on σ and y: UV (y, σ), and is increasing in σ. On the other
hand, the utility of vaccine refusal (strategy N) is assumed to also depend on the population average vaccine
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uptake
χ¯ =
∫
y
χ(y, σ)dy, (193)
i.e. UN (y, σ, χ¯), where UN is decreasing in χ¯, mirroring a free-riding effect (compare this assumption with
sections 8.2.4 - 8.2.8 where the perceived cost of vaccination was increasing in the average vaccine uptake).
By taking the individual’s expected utility
U(y, σ, χ¯) = χ(y, σ)UV (y, σ) + (1− χ(y, σ))UN (y, σ, χ¯), (194)
one notes that the resulting individual’s optimal strategy will necessarily depend on the strategies adopted
by other individuals in the population i.e., the above problem defines a game.
The search for the best response strategy χ∗ for the previous problem has to be framed into the theory
of set-valued maps [477], yielding
χ∗(y, σ, χ¯) =

0 if UV (y, σ) < UN (y, σ, χ¯),
1 if UV (y, σ) > UN (y, σ, χ¯),
[0, 1] if UV (y, σ) = UN (y, σ, χ¯).
(195)
In order to completely characterize the Nash equilibrium, it is needed to fulfill a self-consistency condition
concerning the average vaccine uptake at equilibrium:
χ¯∗ ∈
∫
χ∗(y, σ, χ¯∗)dy, (196)
i.e. ∫
inf χ∗(y, σ, χ¯∗)dy < χ¯∗ <
∫
supχ∗(y, σ, χ¯∗)dy. (197)
This condition ensures that there exists a Nash equilibrium and that the population’s average response is
the same for all Nash equilibria.
On the other hand, at the population level, a benevolent social planner will seek the optimal community
strategy by maximizing the community utility
Û(χ(.)) =
∫
(U(y, σ, χ¯)χ(y, σ)UN (y, σ) + (1− χ(y;σ))UV (y, σ, χ¯)) dy. (198)
By elementary functional analysis it is easy to verify that the above individual-wise optimum χ∗ and the
community-wise optimum χC are such that for all y and given σ
χ∗(y, σ) < χC(y, σ). (199)
In other words, the Nash equilibrium for individuals will always be characterized by "less vaccination"
than the corresponding community-based equilibrium, unless the Nash equilibrium is universal vaccination,
confirming in a very general manner a long-standing result of the literature, namely that the pursuit of
optimal self-interest leads to vaccine uptakes that are systematically lower than those that are optimal at
community level.
Note that both the optimal χ∗ and its average value χ¯∗ depend implicitly on the information signal
σ, which is a function of the state variables. For example in [453] it is assumed that σ is an increasing
and saturating function of infection prevalence I: σ(t) = βI/(µ + βI). Note also that χ¯∗ results to be an
increasing function of prevalence if the signal σ has this property.
The implications of the above described approach for infection transmission and control are then investi-
gated by setting the resulting vaccination strategies within the framework of an SIR model with vaccination.
Three main cases are considered: (a) the vaccine coverage x is equal to the average Nash equilibrium re-
sponse x(t) = χ¯∗(I); (b) the vaccine coverage adapts dynamically to the differences between its departures
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from the average Nash response, according to the equation x′(t) = α(χ̂∗(I) − x); (c) the vaccine coverage
adapts dynamically according to an IGD where the switch rate from N to V strategy is determined by
the payoff gain of vaccination (which, as it can be easily seen, is constant) and the inverse switch is deter-
mined by the perceived vaccine cost (which depends on σ(I)). Unsurprisingly, model (a) (compare with the
phenomenological model in section 8.1) leads to a unique locally stable endemic equilibrium with partial
vaccination. Similarly in model (b), where x ’follows’ χ¯∗ with an exponential delay, the endemic equilibrium
can be unstabilized by varying α, yielding sustained oscillations. This confirms the already stated fact that
phenomenological and game-theoretic coupled behavior-infection models are often indistinguishable when
the game-theoretic solution is simply set, heuristically, within the framework of a dyamic epidemiological
model.
8.3.3. Markov decision processes show that the interaction between vaccine-believers and vaccine-skeptics
yields sub-optimal measles vaccine uptake
Within game-theoretic approaches several efforts [475, 476, 478] have been devoted to the investigation of
the population level implications, of individual choices determined within the framework of Markov decision
processes theory (MDPT). An attempt of systematization of the subject in reference to vaccination games
was developed in [475]. The framework rests on three interacting building blocks, namely a model for
individual decisions, a model for changes at the individual scale (I-scale), and a mean-field epidemiological
model for describing the dynamics at the population scale (P-scale). Individuals handle uncertainty by
maximizing their (inter-temporal) expected utility, on the assumption that they are able to predict - in
probabilistic terms - their future evolution in terms of both their future states Y(t) and the ensuing utility
flow, that follow from taking a given strategy (i.e., vaccinating a child at a certain age, or not vaccinating
him), or action, A(t). Path Y(t) is a stochastic process which depends on the adopted strategy as well as on
the strategies that have been adopted by other individuals, that is the average strategy at the population
level. For example, for those not vaccinating the future utility path depends on the risk of catching infection
which under homogeneous mixing depends on the overall coverage prevailing in the population. The P-scale
dynamics of infection is specified by an appropriate mean-field model, e.g. an SIR model, where the actual
coverage is determined by the average of individuals’ strategies. Finally, the I-scale dynamics is specified
by taking a suitable continuous-time Markov chain embedded in the P-scale model. In [476] this framework
was applied to investigate the consequences of a typical phenomenon in current vaccination systems, namely
the coexistence of well-identified and stable groups valuing differently the costs arising from infection and
vaccination.
The simplest scenario, introduced in the static game-theory framework in [479], is represented by the
conflict between two groups, namely vaccine vaccine skeptics (group 1) and believers (group 2), with different
asymmetric perceived costs of infection and VAE: CV,1 > CV,2, CI,1 < CI,2. Let qn (n = 1, 2, q1 + q2 = 1)
denote the relative size of each group (assumed to be constant), φn the vaccination strategy adopted by
individuals in group n and φn the average coverage prevailing in group n. The P-scale model is represented
by the following simple two groups’ SIRV model with a class vaccinated at birth by a perfect vaccine, in a
constant population, where the two groups differ only in the average coverage:
S′n = µ(1− φn)qn − βSn(I1 +I 2), (200)
I ′n = βSn(I1 + I2)− (γ + µ)In, (201)
V ′n = µφnqn − µVn, (202)
where Sn, In, Vn respectively represent the susceptible, infective, removed and vaccinated proportions in
each group, with the removed compartment obeying Rn = qn − (Sn + In + Vn). The rates determining the
various state transitions in Eqs. 200-202 determine the associated Markov chain for state transition at the
I-scale, under the further assumption that agents estimate the FOI faced by their children by its endemic
equilibrium value λ = λe = β(I1,e + I2,e), which agents know from the knowledge of the P-scale model.
It holds λ = µ(RV − 1) where RV = R0(1 − φ1q1 − φ2q2) is the vaccine reproduction number (section
3.6), meaning that individuals correctly perceive the long-term risk as a function of the overall coverage
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Figure 26: Pattern of the best Nash response in terms of vaccine uptake among vaccine skeptics, drawn as a
function of the cost of vaccination relative to the cost of infection (CV,1/CI,1) for different levels of the BRN
R0 consistent with measles infection (R0 = 13, 15, 17), and for a proportion of skeptics (q1 = 0.30, showing
the dramatic fall of the optimal vaccine uptake when the relative perceived risk exceeds a threshold level.
Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [476]. With permission from Elsevier.
prevailing in the community. The corresponding system for the individual’s state probabilities has the form
Y ′n = QnYn, driven by the 4× 4 transition matrix Qn:
Qn =

−(λ+ µ) 0 0 0
0 λ −(γ + µ) 0
0 0 −µ 0
0 0 0 −µ

with initial probability distribution, actually representing the probabilities that the generic individual
occupies at the moment of birth any of the four possible epidemiological states, given by the vector
Yn(0) = [1 − φn, 0, φn, 0]. Note that the transition matrix is the same for both groups, since percep-
tions about epidemiological and demographic hazards are assumed to be the same, so that difference in
I-scale dynamics is only due to the decision to vaccinate or not made at birth. Given the adopted individual
strategy φ, and the ensuing I-scale path Yn(t), individuals belonging to group n have a (discounted) utility
flow
Un = FnXn(0) +
∫ ∞
0
e−rtfTn Xn(t)dt, (203)
where vector fn = [0, 0,−CV,n, 0]T , (n = 1, 2) includes the costs associated with occupancy of various states
at any time, while Fn = [0,−CI,n, 0, 0]T includes the costs associated with transitions occurring at age 0,
which occur only in the event of vaccination. Integrating Eq. 203 yields Un = (FTn + fTn (rI − Qn))Xn(0),
which expands as
Un = −φnCV,n − (1− φn)CI,n(r + µ+ γ)−1 λ
r + µ+ λ
. (204)
The mathematical analysis shows that the Nash strategy, i.e. the best response curve φ̂n arising from the
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maximization of expected utility of Eq. 204, has the following form: (i) not to vaccinate (φ̂n = 0) for levels
of the perceived (equilibrium) FOI λ strictly below a group-specific threshold λT ,n, (ii) to always vaccinate
(φ̂n = 1) for values of of λ strictly above λT ,n, and (iii) to choose some (unspecified) intermediate level
φ˜n, 0 < φ˜n < 1 for λ = λT ,n. The threshold λT ,n depends on the group’s perceived costs
λT ,n =
CV,n(r + µ+ γ)(r + µ)
CI,n − CV,n(r + µ+ γ) ,
and it is obviously larger for skeptics.
Previous results allow a range of possibilities (ranging from both groups not vaccinating to partial
coverage to both groups vaccinating) yielding a number of substantive implications. In particular, the
community vaccine uptake determined by the Nash strategy, which is always lower than the community
uptake based on the maximization of the (expected) average population utility (see also previous subsection),
exhibits a sharp negative relationship with the proportion of vaccine skeptics in the population. Under a
measles-like parametrization Nash strategies therefore imply that even moderate proportions of vaccine
skeptics can bring the overall coverage sharply below the critical level. Moreover, the Nash vaccine uptake
among vaccine skeptics shows a dramatic responsiveness to the relative cost of vaccination CV,1/CI,1 i.e.
while for low relative vaccination cost the coverage among vaccine skeptics can be high, there is a level of
vaccination cost in correspondence of which coverage abruptly falls to zero, as illustrated in Fig. 26.
8.4. Other contributions to mean-field coupled disease-behavior models
In the previous subsections an attempt was made to present some key modeling approaches, and related
dynamic implications, from the recent literature on mean-field coupled behavior-disease models. No-doubt,
deterministic mean-field models represented the vast majority of contributions in the first epoch of the
behavioral epidemiology of infectious diseases. Nonetheless, in order to keep the presentation adequately
self-contained we restricted the choice of the materials, focusing on SIR-like models for vaccine preventable
infections, such as measles and pertussis. This was partly motivated by the fact that many seminal ideas arose
from the conflict between public and self-interest in relation to common childhood vaccinations. Nonetheless
it is to be acknowledged that this choice has left-out several excellent contributions to the field. We therefore
devote this sub-section to depict some of the historical profile of behavioral epidemiology in order to recall the
other many areas and contributions to coupled mean-field models for disease and vaccinating behavior. After
the seminal work by Capasso and Serio [407] and a few other phenomenological models mainly focusing on
the effects of including nonlinear forces of infection in basic deterministic epidemiological model, behavioral
epidemiology developed in the 1980-1990s along two main veins. The first one focused on the already
mentioned conflict between public and self-interest in relation to common childhood vaccinations, and the
free-rider problem [417, 454, 480, 481]. These works prepared the humus for the outbreak of contributions
presented in this subsection. The second vein yielded to the literature on behavioral change triggered by
the HIV/AIDS threat since the 1980s. As noted in [80] "the combination of a long incubation period,
with difficult and costly treatment, and the lack of a vaccine, have made instilling preventive behavior
through the dissemination of information on risky behavior with respect to sexual or intra-venous drug
use the main control strategy, especially in poor resource settings." In this situation, where reliable data
on individuals’ responses to the spread of epidemics were mostly missing, mathematical modeling played a
pioneering role in the understanding of the effects of behavior change on HIV dynamics, including the effect
of prevalence-dependent switching to lower risk groups, reducing contact rates after screening or treatment,
prevalence-dependent sexual mixing patterns, including the warning that availability of effective therapies
and protective vaccine might increases disease severity by raising at-risk behavior [111, 482–487]. Though
most among the cited papers, which were pioneers in an endless list, considered phenomenological models,
there have been also instances of more structured approaches to behavior, such as [488, 489]. This literature
on behavior change in response to the HIV epidemics threat posed, among other things, the bricks for the
current vast literature on behavioral responses to pandemics threat.
In particular, sticking on mean-field models of vaccinating behavior, the current phase has seen an
explosion of contributions. A number of papers have applied the Markov decision process theory (DMPT)
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machinery presented in section 8.3.3 to formulate game-theoretic models of vaccinating behavior in relation
to both seasonal [403, 404] and pandemic influenza vaccination [490]. Mean-field analyses were carried out for
models investigating adaptive influenza vaccination decisions throughout several influenza seasons based on
the inductive vaccination game [491, 492]. Still, DMPT models for childhood immunization were considered
for rubella [493] and varicella [493]. Mean field epidemiological models with vaccination choices derived from
classical utility-based economic approaches were used in [494] to demonstrate the conflict between individual
and social optimum, and the nature of externalities arising from vaccination. Deeper utility maximization
frameworks were used to investigate a number of discrete-time coupled disease-behavior models considering
both risky behavior and vaccination decisions in [495, 496]. In particular [495, 496] revisited Francis’ work
[481], showing that (a) the free market solution always yields inefficiently low levels of vaccine uptake, and
that (b) higher coverage can only result from frictions such as vaccine imperfection, agents heterogeneity,
and in general from strategic interactions. In [497] the implications of vaccination choices were investigated
combining a game-theoretic approach with the framework of projected dynamical systems. A coupled
behavior-disease model within a public choice economic framework was used in [498] to investigate the
effects of the different types of externalities introduced by interventions against infections. An SIR model
with bounded-rational vaccination decisions alternative to the model by Oraby and Bauch [466] presented in
section 8.2.7 has been developed and analysed in [499]. This massive work has prepared the ground for the
next step, i.e. moving towards more complicated and possibly more realistic, network models, as reported
in the next sections.
9. Behavior-vaccination dynamics in structured, networked populations
In Sections 6-8, we have reviewed the progress made in the realm of behavioral vaccination, which is
directly linked to public health measures aimed at eradicating vaccine-preventable infectious diseases. How-
ever, the majority of such research relies on the assumption of a homogeneous mixing population, where
individuals interact randomly with one another, and thus a susceptible agent is equally likely to acquire
the infection from any infected agent in the population. Despite this simplification, as reviewed above,
research along these lines has provided important insights into the spreading properties of highly transmis-
sible diseases, and has outlined effective ways for their containment. Nevertheless, the effectiveness and the
predictive value of the theory relying on the assumption of a homogeneous mixing population falls sharply
for close contact epidemics, which, for example, are brought about by sexually transmitted diseases [6, 500–
502] or the smallpox [415, 503, 504]. To resolve this weakness, the assumption of a homogeneous mixing
population needs to be replaced by an actual social network that describes the contacts among all involved.
In this framework, the nodes of a network represent individuals, while the edges connecting them represent
contacts that enable the disease to be transmitted. Actually, in Sections 4-5, we have summarized the
recent development of infectious diseases and vaccination on networks, where the dimension of individual
behavior is neglected. Here, from a new viewpoint, we will systematically survey how social contact patterns
influence the interplay between individual vaccination behavior and disease dynamics, i.e., we will review
behavior-vaccination dynamics in structured, networked populations.
9.1. Behavior-vaccination dynamics on static networks
Here we review research concerning behavior-vaccination dynamics on classical static networks, including
lattices, small-world networks (SW) [174, 505], Erdös-Rényi random graphs (ER) [506], and Barabási-Albert
scale-free networks (BA or SF) [507]. Under different microscopic rules, like payoff-driven imitation or
opinion-associated dynamics, the vaccination decisions of individuals become dependent on the strategies
(i.e., to vaccinate or not) of their neighbors, the perceived risk of infection in their neighborhood, the
perceived safety and efficiency of the vaccine, as well as on the financial costs that are associated with
vaccination and disease infection. This gives rise to collective phenomena that are akin to the universal
behavior of particles near phase transitions points in classical models of statistical physics, and this in turn
has far reaching implications for the successful mitigation of epidemic spreading.
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Figure 27: (a) Schematic illustration of the voluntary vaccination dilemma game, which is further divided
into two stages. The first stage is the public vaccination campaign, where vaccinated agents (blue) bear the
vaccination cost CV in return for perfect immunity. During the second stage, the epidemic strain breaks
out, and each unvaccinated individual faces the risk of infection. Infected agents (yellow) bear the cost
of infection CI . Unvaccinated individuals who remain healthy are free-riding on the vaccination efforts of
others, and they are indirectly protected through “herd immunity”. (b) The payoffs for different strategies
(to vaccinate or not) and outcomes (healthy or infected). The fractions of vaccinated (c) and infected (d)
agents are shown as a function of the relative cost of vaccination c for the selection strength κs = 1 (open
symbols) and 10 (filled symbols), as obtained on a square lattice. Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [433].
9.1.1. Impact of imitation dynamics: The universal “double-edged sword” effect
Like the public goods dilemma [508–510], voluntary vaccination is often regarded as a problem of the
commons [416]. In particular, if sufficiently few people vaccinate, the “tragedy of the commons” is likely [511].
As the vaccination level increases and herd immunity is achieved, individual often forget the risk of some
infectious disease and they lost the memory of their outbreaks. Increasingly often there is no memory at all
of outbreaks of some infectious diseases. As a consequence, many decide to no longer vaccinate, and thus
to effectively free-ride on the efforts of others who still vaccinate their offspring. With such behavior on the
uprise, the herd immunity gets lost and the outbreak probability increases significantly. To mathematically
describe such a dilemma, Fu et al. have recently integrated the vaccination dynamics and epidemiological
modeling into an agent-based evolutionary vaccination game, where vaccination and non-vaccination are
mapped to strategies [433]. More precisely, the vaccination dilemma is modeled as a two-stage game (see
Fig. 27 (a) for a schematic illustration), with the first stage corresponding to a vaccination campaign, and
the second stage corresponding to an outbreak of the virus. During the first stage, each vaccinated person
acquires perfect immunity at a cost CV , which covers the actual cost of the vaccine, the perceived risk, adverse
long-term health impact (if any), and other intangibles. During the second stage, each infected individual
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bears the cost CI , which covers all expenses related to the infection, including the cost of medication, missed
work days, and so on. There are also those lucky individuals who remain uninfected during stage two despite
being unvaccinated (marked by red circles in Fig. 27 (a)). These free-riders avoid all the costs and are thus
better off as everybody else, benefiting of course from herd immunity. For simplicity but without loss of
generality, to reduce the dimensionality of the parameter space, the aforementioned costs can be re-scaled
by defining the relative cost of vaccination as c = CV /CI (0 < c < 1 since CV < CI). The payoff function
of an individual i thus becomes
Πi =
 −c, vaccinated;−1, infected;
0, free-riding.
(205)
It is worth pointing out that the payoff Πi is negative, simply because agents need to bear the cost rather
than to enjoy a profit. Actually the most profitable outcome is a net zero payoff.
Once the epidemic ends, individuals update their strategies for the next season based on their payoffs.
To accommodate imperfect information, errors in judgment, and irrational decision making in humans [512],
the Fermi function
Wi→j = f(Πj −Πi) = 1
1 + exp[−κs(Πj −Πi)] , (206)
can be used to determine whether an individual i adopts the strategy of one randomly selected neighbor j or
not. Here Πi and Πj are their payoffs, while κs (0 < κs <∞) denotes the strength of selection [424, 513, 514]
(note that κs is different from the imitation coefficient κ for well-mixed population in Section 8). Small κs
values correspond to weak selection, which means that individuals are less sensitive to the payoff difference.
Conversely, large κs values correspond to strong selection, which means that the level of uncertainty during
the strategy adoption process is small.
An important result is that, in comparison to the homogeneous mixing case [436, 464], networks act
as a “double-edged sword”. On the one hand, networks promote vaccination if the cost of vaccinating is
low, but on the other hand, beyond a certain threshold value of the cost, they act as strong suppressors
of vaccination. Also, the more heterogeneous the interaction network, the more pronounced this effect.
Interestingly, a similar paradox exists also for different selection strengths, as shown in Fig. 27(b) and
(c). In particular, weak selection guarantees a larger low-cost threshold cL, below which the epidemic is
completely eradicated. As the selection strength increases, the number of free-riders starts going up, which
in turn breaks apart the clusters of those who vaccinate. However, when the vaccination cost is sufficient
large, the high-cost threshold cH , above which nobody vaccinates, rises with an increasing selection strength.
This means that the coexistence phase with vaccinators and non-vaccinators simultaneously present in the
population widens with larger κs values. Due to the special role of hubs, these phenomena become the more
pronounced the more heterogeneous a network is. In the light of this research, this behavior corresponds to
a scenario where voluntary vaccination provided herd immunity for some time but then it fails [492, 515].
Similarly to other binary-option games [424, 491], the above-reviewed vaccination dilemma game can also
be studied with the mean-field approximation approach [398, 516, 517], as follows. On an uncorrelated and
fully connected graph, we define x as the fraction of vaccinated individuals and r(x) as the probability that
a susceptible individual gets infected in the population (in general, the whole population is initially divided
into two classes: vaccinated agents with fraction x, and susceptible subjectives with fraction 1 − x. r(x)
depending on x is equivalent to being a fraction of susceptible people). Each individual can take the states
and payoffs: vaccinated (V , ΠV = −c), infected (I, ΠI = −1), non-vaccinated and healthy (or free-riding)
(H, ΠH = 0) (i.e., Eq. 205). It is then possible to derive how the fraction of vaccinated individuals x changes
over time. Namely, when an individual with state V turns to compartment H or I, x drops as
x− = x(1− x){[(1− r(x)]WV→H + r(x)WV→I}, (207)
where 1 − x is the fraction of neighbors holding the opposite strategy, WV→H (WV→I) is the probability
that individuals from the compartment V change to the compartment H (I). Accordingly, x rises as
x+ = x(1− x){[(1− r(x)]WH→V + r(x)WI→V }. (208)
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Figure 28: The fraction of vaccinated (a) and infected (b) agents is shown as a function of the vaccination
cost c, as obtained with the mean-field approximation of the vaccination dilemma game. The value of α
defines peer pressure, where α = 0 recovers the setup used in [433], while positive α values introduce social
influence in the imitation processes. Source: Reprinted figure with permission from Ref. [516].
Taken together, the time evolution of x is
dx
dt
= x+ − x−
= x(1− x){[(1− r(x)]WH→V + r(x)WI→V } − x(1− x){[(1− r(x)]WV→H + r(x)WV→I}.
(209)
If the strategy transition probability is determined by Eq. 206, the above equation becomes
dx
dt
= x(1− x){[(1− r(x)]tanh[κ
s
2
(ΠV −ΠH)] + r(x)tanh[κ
s
2
(ΠV −ΠI)]}
= x(1− x){[(1− r(x)]tanh[κ
s
2
(−c)] + r(x)tanh[κ
s
2
(1− c)]}.
(210)
Assuming the right-hand side of this equation equal to zero, we can get the equilibrium vaccination level.
Then, the equilibrium fraction of infected individuals, i.e., the size of the epidemic, is expected to be fI =
r(x), satisfying the self-consistent equation fI = (1−x)(1−eR0fI ), whereR0 is the basic reproductive number
of the epidemic (it is usually related with degree variation or degree distribution of networks [291], but here
equal to the case of homogeneous mixing population owing to full-connections in network population).
In a social dilemma game, whether or not to switch the vaccination strategy depends not only on the
personal success of each individual, but also on the success of others [518, 519]. Using this as motivation,
one recent work extended the decision-making process on the basis of personal imitation and social influence
(or peer pressure) [516]. The pairwise comparison rule for the strategy-updating becomes
Wi→j = f(Πj −Πi) = (ko/ki)α 1
1 + exp[−κs(Πj −Πi)] , (211)
where ko is the number of neighbors possessing the opposite strategy of individual i, ki is the number of all
neighbors of i (i.e., the degree of i), and α determines the so-called peer pressure. Here α = 0 recovers the
setup used in [433], while positive α values make individuals more prone to sticking with the strategy that
is representative for their neighbors. Accordingly, the mean-field equations for the vaccination level (i.e.,
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Eq. 209) become
dx
dt
= x+ − x−
= (1− x)x1+α{[(1− r(x)]WH→V + r(x)WI→V } − x(1− x)1+α{[(1− r(x)]WV→H + r(x)WV→I}.
(212)
Interestingly, compared with the classical version of the model [433], the “double-edged sword” effect
occurs again. Peer pressure (i.e., α > 0) promotes vaccination coverage as its cost is small, but plummets
when costs exceed a critical value, irrespective of the structure of the interaction network. The larger the
value of α, the narrower the range of the coexistence phase for vaccination and non-vaccination. These
findings can be quantitatively validated also by the mean-field approximation, as shown in Fig. 28. If the
vaccination is costly, peer pressure promotes the advantage of vaccinators, and thus forces their neighbors
into following. This gives rise to larger clusters of vaccinators, which become unable to effectively prevent
the spreading of the disease across the network. Only as the cost of vaccination decreases sufficiently is this
cluster formation impaired, and then randomly distributed vaccinators are able to cover wider parts of the
network to provide effective protection for their peers.
Along similar lines, the generality of the “double-edged sword” effect was further confirmed with a
revised imitation dynamics. Recently, Zhang et al. considered a more rational decision-making model from
two aspects [520]. In the first place, the vaccination behavior of individuals was endowed with memory for
their past experiences. The payoff function in Eq. 206 was thus reformulated as
Πi(t) = Πi(t) + wΠi(t− 1), t ≥ 1, (213)
where w (0 ≤ w ≤ 1) is the memory weight. Secondly, a perceived risk threshold ρ was introduced to
avoid the blind imitation of individuals. That is, only when the infection risk surpasses this threshold, the
willingness to vaccinate increases. Despite of these differences in the model, the results have shown that, as
the cost of the vaccine is small, the coverage of the vaccination increases with increasing w and ρ, leading
to lower onsets of an epidemic. If the vaccination is costly, the results also remain qualitatively unchanged,
and the main observations are attributed to the formation and decomposition of vaccination clusters, as
described in [516].
When modeling voluntary vaccination programs, we can choose different decision-making rules that
govern the microscopic dynamics, and these different rules also frequently lead to different outcomes on
the global scale. Social learning or imitation, as reviewed in this subsection, is a popular and realistic rule,
which however is conducive to the emergence of clusters in structured populations. In vaccination dilemmas,
this ultimately leads to a persistent “double-edged sword” effect, where below a certain cost vaccination is
effective, while above this threshold it becomes ineffective. In what follows, we will review results obtained
also with other decision-making rules at the microscopic level, and outline differences among them at larger
scales.
9.1.2. Impact of interaction network topology
In network epidemiology research, it is thoroughly established that the structure of the interaction
network plays an important role in the spread of infectious disease [172, 203, 215, 223, 230, 231, 338, 521–
524]. For example, epidemic spreading on scale-free networks is difficult to control, and with the lack of
an outbreak threshold, the disease can propagate even with a low infection rate [522]. However, this holds
if vaccination is absent. If an effective vaccination program is incorporated into the disease dynamics the
outcome can be different. To account for this, a new modeling framework for evolutionary vaccination
decision-making was proposed [525], where individuals resolved the vaccination dilemma in terms of the
trade-offs between the infection risk, the side effects, and the cost of vaccination. More precisely, if a
susceptible individual has kinf infected neighbors, the total infection probability will be
λI = 1− (1− βI)kinf , (214)
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Figure 29: Time evolution of the number of infected individuals without (a) and with (b) voluntary vacci-
nation, and the number of vaccinated agents (c) on BA (or SF) and ER networks. The parameter values
are c1 = 1 and c2 = 0.7. Source: Reprinted figure with permission from Ref. [525]. c© IOP Publishing &
Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft. CC BY-NC-SA. Reproduced by permission of IOP Publishing.
where βI is the infection rate for a single contact between a susceptible and an infected individual.
Similarly, the total perceived infection probability is
λperc = 1− (1− βperc)kinf , (215)
where if there is full knowledge for the infection risk βperc = βI and λperc = λI .
If the susceptible agent does not choose to vaccinate, it bears the perceived cost
PN = c1λperc, or PN = c1λI . (216)
Conversely, missing out on vaccination yields
PV = c2, (217)
where c1 and c2 are related to the risk of infection, to potential side effects, and to the cost of vaccination.
Unlike with imitation considered in the previous subsection (see Eq. 206), here individuals adjust their
strategies in agreement with another kind of decision-making rule that governs the microscopic dynamics,
namely according to their self-interest or cost minimization. Thus, individuals try either to minimize their
cost or to maximize their benefits (i.e. self-interest rule). The strategy si of individual i will thus be
si = f(PV − PN ) =
{
vaccination, if PV − PN < 0;
non-vaccination, otherwise. (218)
Contrary to the result that the outbreak of disease on SF networks is more likely than on ER random
graphs [230, 521, 522], in the realm of the model above it turns out that, if individuals are inclined to
vaccinate at the initial stage of an outbreak, the epidemic is better constrained on the SF network (see
Fig. 29). Namely, on SF networks, the majority of middle- and large-degree nodes have a higher tendency
to vaccinate. To verify this fact, the authors in [525] provide a mathematical proof for the threshold degree
of vaccination. Taking into account the vaccination condition given by Eq. 218, one obtains the threshold
PN > PV ⇒ c1λI > c2 ⇒ 1− (1− βI)kinf > c2
c1
⇒ kinf ≥ [log1−βI
c1 − c2
c1
] + 1. (219)
Using βI = 0.2, c1 = 1 and c2 = 0.7 as an example, we have kinf ≥ 6. For network of < k >= 6, the
vaccinated candidates are very limited on ER graphs, but more nodes prefer to vaccinate to reduce the
loss because of the existence of middle- and large-degree nodes in SF networks. The vaccination program
on SF networks, in some sense, is like the targeted vaccination in the mandatory model [275, 278], yet
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shows an adaptive character as well. In addition to permanently effective vaccination, temporarily effective
vaccination (taking into account that the vaccine for some disease like influenza and hepatitis B will loose its
efficiency after a given period of time) has also been considered. Though in this case there exist vaccination
oscillations, the spread of disease ultimately can be controlled on complex networks. This further confirms
that the larger inclination for hub nodes to get vaccinated plays an important role and can critically affect the
success of vaccination campaigns, which ought to be considered in the design of incentives for vaccination.
Despite of the inspiring progress, there does not exist a direct comparison between a perfect and an
imperfect vaccine in [525]. Aiming to clarify this, Cardillo et al. introduced a tunable parameter τ to
modulate the quality of the vaccine in influenza-type disease, the vaccine being perfect at τ = 0 and useless
at τ = 1 [526]. When the vaccine is perfect, the research revealed that SF networks outperform ER graphs,
since the overall vaccinated (infected) number is larger (smaller) on SF networks. This result is in agreement
with the general conclusions reported in [525]. However, if the vaccine is imperfect, a crossover effect occurs
such that the ER graphs are more effective than SF networks in enhancing vaccination. In [526], these
results are mainly attributed to the competition of two processes taking place. One is the propagation
of the diseases, and second is the uptake of vaccination behavior. If the vaccine works perfectly, or even
if the vaccine is imperfect but the infection rate is small, the vaccination behavior spreads faster on SF
networks than on ER graphs (i.e., the vaccination onset starts earlier on SF networks), as the natural
epidemic threshold is smaller on SF networks [230, 521, 522]. However, if the vaccine is imperfect and the
infection rate is large, the outcome of the competition between disease and vaccination spreading reverses.
Namely, under such conditions, the smaller benefits provided by the imperfect vaccine cause agents to forgo
vaccination, which naturally promotes the propagation of the disease.
Taken together, these findings significantly enrich our understanding of behavior-vaccination dynamics
on static, complex networks, and can relevantly inform on optimal vaccination strategies.
9.1.3. External incentive programs
The role of subsidy policy: a paradox. Except for internal mechanisms, external incentive programs also
play a vital role in the design of behavioral vaccination [527, 528]. For example, historically, subsidy policy
showed its particular effectiveness in terms of controlling epidemic spreading, which is of significance from
the socioeconomic perspective [529–533]. However, how different subsidy policies might work in structured
populations is still an open issue. Motivated by this, Zhang et al. recently considered two categories of
subsidy policies and explored their influence on different networks, and how they affect vaccination decisions
and disease dynamics [534]. The first class is the so-called free subsidy policy, where the total amount of
subsidy Λ is distributed to a certain fraction of individuals, who take vaccination without any personal cost.
The (net) payoff function (i.e. Eq. 205) thus becomes
Πi =

0, subsidized-vaccinating;
−c, vaccinated;
−1, infected;
0, free-riding.
(220)
where the number (fraction) of subsidized vaccinators or freely vaccinated individuals is NSV = Λ/c (p =
NSV /N , where N is the size of the network). In this case, it is worth noting that, since the number of freely
vaccinated individuals keeps constant in each vaccination stage, the selection process of them does not need
to be repeated. If one individual is initially chosen as the recipient (to receive the vaccine for free), it will
remain a recipient forever. The second class is partial-offset subsidy policy, where each vaccinated individual
is offset by a certain amount ξ, resulting in the actual vaccination cost c(1− ξ). Correspondingly, the (net)
payoff becomes
Πi =
 (ξ − 1)c, subsidized-vaccinating;−1, infected;
0, free-riding.
(221)
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Figure 30: Characteristic snapshots of the stationary state configuration for partial-offset (a) and free
(b) subsidy policies on the square lattice. Blue, green, yellow, and red points represent free-riders (not
vaccinated and healthy), vaccinators, infected individuals, and freely vaccinated recipients, respectively.
Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [534].
Similar to Eq. 209, the mean-field approximation for the fraction of vaccinated individuals x for both the
free subsidy policy and the partial-offset subsidy policy is given as
dx
dt
= x+ − x−
= x(1− x){[(1− r(x)]WH→V + r(x)WI→V } − (x− p)(1− x){[(1− r(x)]WV→H + r(x)WV→I},
(222)
and
dx
dt
= x+ − x−
= x(1− x){[(1− r(x)]WH→SV + r(x)WI→SV } − x(1− x){[(1− r(x)]WSV→H + r(x)WSV→I},
(223)
where SV is the subsidized-vaccinating state and x − p is the fraction of individuals who can change their
vaccination strategies.
Based on the imitation dynamics (i.e. Eq. 206), it is found that the free subsidy policy in general leads
to higher vaccination coverage than the partial-offset subsidy policy, indicating that the former case is more
effective in controlling epidemic outbreaks. This phenomenon can also be verified by means of the mean-field
approximation (i.e., Eqs. 222 and 223). In the free subsidy case, the recipients act as role models, and are
thus more appealing than the non-subsidized vaccinators in attracting their neighbors to take vaccination.
This is expressed qualitatively in terms of the higher fraction of imitated vaccinators in the neighborhoods
of recipients. Although freely vaccinated recipients (red) are randomly distributed on networks, it is quite
remarkable how they are able to excite their neighbors and motivated them to imitate their behavior (see
Fig. 30). This gives rise to vaccination clusters (green), which naturally results in a more effective control
in comparison to the partial-offset subsidy policy. Snapshots in Fig. 30 provide a compelling visual in favor
of this argument.
As can be inferred from 9.1.1, the updating dynamics based on individual behavior choices can directly
decide the final vaccination coverage and the average epidemic size. When studying the impact of sub-
sidies [534], the authors considered also another Fermi-like updating rule, but one that does not involve
imitation [529]. Such updating is known as myopic [535], because individuals update their vaccination pref-
erence by balancing their own advantages and disadvantages of vaccination (like the self-interest rule), rather
than considering input from their neighbors. In particular, an individual first gets the perceived costs PN
and PV , and then opts for vaccination according to the probability
wC = f(PV − PN ) = 1
1 + exp[−κs(PV − PN )] . (224)
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In other words, the strategy si of individual i is governed as
si = f(PV − PN ) =
{
vaccination, if q < 1/{1 + exp[−κs(PV − PN )]};
non-vaccination, otherwise; (225)
where q is a randomly distributed real number in [0, 1].
This myopic updating dynamics leads to completely different results in terms of the effect of different
subsidy policies. Namely, in this case the partial-offset subsidy policy works better than the free subsidy
policy. Under the latter, there is polarization between subsidized vaccinators and general agents, which is
very non-beneficial for the emergence of herd immunity. Owing to the unequal distribution of subsidy, the
perceived infection risk of those recipients greatly decreases, but non-recipients are more prone to taking a
risk (i.e., the willingness of vaccination among non-recipients declines) after balancing the advantages and
disadvantages of vaccination. In the partial-offset subsidy case, the cost of vaccination is evenly reduced for
each vaccinated individual due to the endowment of the policy, which provides natural conditions for the
formation of herd immunity. In addition to group-optimal vaccination, the study revealed that a moderate
subsidy rate can generate the maximal socioeconomic benefic under the partial-offset subsidy policy, which
is a particular meaningful message for the public health authorities.
Considering these results, it becomes clear that the optimization [536–539] of the subsidy policy is indeed
a difficult yet very important issue, which can mean the difference between a successful and an unsuccessful
vaccination campaign. For the optimal outcome, it is important to carefully consider the mechanisms of
individual decision-making, as well as to actually test on a representative sample how people respond to
different external incentives in realistic situations.
The impact of committed individuals, or zealots. In real life, many people hold rigid viewpoints on certain
aspects of reality, regardless of peer pressure, incentives, and media. Such people are known as committed
individuals or, shorter, zealots. The impact of zealots on various aspects of social dynamics has been studied
often before, for example in opinion dynamics [540–543] or in evolutionary social dilemmas [544]. Of course,
zealots are also found with regards to vaccination. Since some agents are much more sensitive to the infection
risk than average, they consistently adopt the vaccinating strategy, i.e., the committed vaccinators do not
engage in the decision-making process [545]. In essence, the setup of committed vaccinators is the same as
the free subsidy policy (the mean-field analysis is the same as put forward forward with Eq. 222), needing
only one additional parameter fC to determine their fraction. Owing to the effect of “steadfast role models”,
committed vaccinators stimulate vaccination uptake and can thus contribute significantly to the prevention of
infectious diseases. The larger the value of fC , the more obvious this effect. As such, committed vaccinators
persuade their neighbors to follow their behavior and form vaccinating clusters, which is, as highlighted
often above, the typical effect of imitation [433, 516, 534].
Of course, zealots can also be committed non-vaccinators. It is thus necessary to look at the down side
too, that is, considering committed vaccinators as good role models, but also considering committed non-
vaccinators as bad role models. This has been done in [546], and the results were as follows. On lattices,
the presence of committed vaccinators (non-vaccinators) exerts a positive (negative) effect on the epidemic
spreading. Moreover, on SF networks the presence of committed vaccinators can not prevent an epidemic
for small and intermediate vaccine cost, predominantly because the hub nodes consistently prefer to reject
vaccination. In this respect, the effect of committed individuals depends not only on their fraction, but also
on the network structure and the cost of vaccination.
9.1.4. Multiple-strategy dilemma framework: A counter-intuitive observation
When an infectious diseases threatens, vaccination is often the first and the most common line of defence
to protect the public. However, due to high economic cost, religious beliefs, as well as possible side effect [548–
550], people sometimes prefer alternative, and frequently also cheaper self-protection measures [110, 407],
such as avoiding contact with risk groups or wearing face masks to at least temporarily mitigate the risks. To
take this into account, three different strategies, namely vaccination, self-protection, and laissez-faire (i.e.,
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Table 5: The payoffs for different strategies and states. Here ΠV , ΠS and ΠL are the (net) payoffs for
vaccination, self-protection and laissez-faire, respectively. The superscripts H and I denote healthy and
infected states, while w is the probability of a susceptible to become infected. For more details, please refer
to [547].
Strategy & State Fraction Payoffs
Vaccinated & Healthy ρV ΠV = −c
Self-protected & Healthy ρHS = ρS [δ + (1− δ)(1− w)] ΠHS = −b
Self-protected & Infected ρIS = ρS(1− δ)w ΠIS = −b− 1
Laissez-faire & Healthy ρHL = (1− ρV − ρS)(1− w) ΠHL = 0
Laissez-faire & Infected ρIL = (1− ρV − ρS)w ΠIL = −1
neither vaccination nor self-protection), were considered in the realm of an evolutionary epidemic game [547].
Assuming that the vaccine provides perfect protection at a cost c, self-protection is effective with probability
δ at a lower cost b (b < c). Moreover, with probability 1− δ a self-protected individual turns to laissez-faire.
That is, self-protection is an alternative in between traditional vaccination and laissez-faire. Analogous to
the binary-choice vaccination game [433], the payoff of this new framework is portrayed in Table 5, where ρV ,
ρS and ρL are the factions of vaccinated, self-protected and laissez-faire individuals, respectively. According
to the mean-field approximation framework, the time evolution of the fraction of strategies is governed by
the following equations
dρV
dt
= (ρV  ρHS ) + (ρV  ρIS) + (ρV  ρHL ) + (ρV  ρIL), (226)
and
dρS
dt
= (ρHS  ρV ) + (ρHS  ρHL ) + (ρHS  ρIL) + (ρIS  ρV ) + (ρIS  ρHL ) + (ρIS  ρIL), (227)
where
ρA  ρB = (ρB → ρA)− (ρA → ρB)
= ρAρB(WB→A −WA→B)
= ρAρB{ 1
1 + exp[−κs(ΠA −ΠB)] −
1
1 + exp[−κs(ΠB −ΠA)]}
= ρAρBtanh[
κs
2
(ΠA −ΠB)].
(228)
Here A and B represent the final states, and the expressions for the fractions and payoffs of each state are
from Table 5. Since the preservation condition ρV + ρS + ρL = 1 holds, it is straightforward to get the
equilibrium fraction of all three strategies from the above equations.
With this setup, the authors in [547] discovered a counterintuitive phenomenon. Namely, intermediate
values of δ lead to a larger epidemic size and a higher collective cost, which is similar to the well-known
Braess’s paradox [551, 552]. More precisely, the whole range of δ is divided into three regions, as shown
in Fig. 31(a). In the left region, owning to the low efficiency, no one self-protects, which returns the
traditional binary selection model [433]. Infected laissez-faire individuals (dark red) and uninfected laissez-
faire individuals (i.e., free-riders, light red) are strictly separated by vaccinators and form percolating clusters
(see Fig. 31(d)). With middle region, for intermediate values of δ (i.e., the region between both dash lines),
the payoff advantage of self-protection starts to play a noticeable role, so that vaccination and partial
laissez-faire are subverted. However, this leaves the heard with insufficient protection, ultimately resulting
in a larger epidemic and the fragmentation of percolating free-rider clusters. Another counterintuitive fact is
that more self-protected individuals (whose individual payoff is higher) generate a lower (rather than higher)
total payoff of the population. Thus, the collective payoff and the epidemic size are negatively correlated
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Figure 31: (a) The fraction of strategies and the epidemic size R∞ are shown as a function of the successful
rate of self-protection δ. (b) The epidemic size R∞ and the total payoff P are shown as a function of δ.
(c) Correlation between the population payoff P and the epidemic size R∞. (d)-(g) Typical snapshots of
the steady state for δ = 0.2, 0.35, 0.5 and 0.95, respectively. Grey, light red, dark red, light blue and dark
blue denote vaccinated, uninfected laissez-faire, infected laissez-faire, uninfected self-protective, and infected
self-protective individuals, respectively. Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [547].
with the spread of self-protected individuals, as shown in Figs. 31(b) and (c). In the third region, when δ
is sufficiently large, self-protection is sufficiently effective. Epidemics decline and vaccination is not a viable
option. Under such circumstances, the percolating cluster of free-riders (light red) recovers due to herd
immunity.
The universality of this interesting phenomenon can be further extended to other networks, and it can be
qualitatively validated by means of the mean-field approximation. In heterogeneous networks, due primarily
to the hubs, those that become infected and laissez-faire individuals fare worse still than they do on more
homogeneous networks where the differences in degree are smaller. Similarly counterintuitive phenomena
can also be observed with myopic updating (self-interest rule) [553], although the differences with the more
commonly considered imitation rule [433, 516, 525, 534] are significant. This should be taken into account,
specifically when considering competing strategies in vaccination programs.
9.2. Behavior-vaccination dynamics on empirical networks
Different from the network models reviewed above, realistic contact networks usually exhibit assortative
and disassortative mixing patterns [169, 176, 554] and community structure [555, 556], both of which signif-
icantly impacts the coupled dynamics of behavior and vaccination taking place on them. In this subsection
we review recent research devoted to behavior-vaccination dynamics on empirical networks.
9.2.1. How does feedback influence well-known passive and pro-active policies?
The voluntary ring vaccination strategy. In a homogeneous mixing population, it is a well-recognized fact
that voluntary vaccination (without any economic incentives) is difficult or impossible to control, and thus
can not be used effectively to eradicate vaccine-preventable disease [403, 416, 448, 491, 492, 530, 558–560].
As vaccination coverage levels increase, herd immunity can provide greater protection. However, soon the
low infection risk reduces the enthusiasm of individual vaccination and leads to the reoccurrence of high
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Figure 32: (a) Schematic illustrations of the perceived costs of individuals. Ellipses represent transition states
while boxes represent formal states. Parameters on arrows denote transition probabilities and expressions
in boxes denote costs for entering that state. For the meaning of used parameters we refer to [432, 557].
The numbers of infected and vaccinated agents are shown as a function of the average neighborhood size
in the theoretical model (b) and the smallpox model (c). The error bars represent two standard deviations
from the mean across 20 simulations per datum. Source: Reprinted figure from Refs. [432, 557].
disease prevalence. That is to say, voluntary policy generates oscillations in the uptake of vaccination [436],
which is particular true for highly transmissible diseases. However, the history of smallpox teaches us that
complete eradication by means of voluntary vaccination is possible [377, 382, 561]. Aiming to elucidate this
observation, Perisic et al. have integrated disease dynamics with a voluntary ring vaccination policy in a
social network [432].
Based on the perceived risk of infection and benefit of vaccination, they obtained the perceived cost
functions of non-vaccination PN and vaccination PV (see Fig. 32(a) for the transition probability of individual
states):
PN = (1− λperc)a+ λperc[(1− dinf )L], (229)
PV = ς[(1− dvac)L] + (1− ς){(1− dvac)[(1− λperc)a+ λperc(1− dinf )L]}, (230)
where a (L) is the payoff for individuals with continued susceptibility (lifelong immunity), ς is vaccine
efficacy and dinf (dvac) represents the probability of death due to infection (vaccine-related complications).
In particular, PV consists of two terms: the first term denotes the total payoff if vaccine is efficacious; while
the second is the total payoff once vaccine loses efficacy. The decision-making process was in accordance
with rational self-interest rule (i.e., Eq. 218). If the cost to vaccinate is smaller than the cost not to vaccinate
on a given day (i.e., PV < PN ), individuals would turn to vaccination. Interestingly, there is a threshold
in the neighborhood size, which guaranteed “first-order” phase transition of vaccination behavior, like the
explosive phenomena of collective dynamics in statistical physics [562, 563]. From Fig. 32(b), it is clear
that voluntary ring vaccination quickly contains the outbreak until the average neighborhood size is larger
than 57. Due to effective control, the total number of infected and vaccinated agents remains very small
below this threshold. Interestingly, as the neighborhood size increases (while the average force of infection
is held constant), the model recovers the homogeneous mixing scenario [403, 416, 448, 558, 559], where each
infected agent could influence more neighbors. As a result, infection breaks through the imperfect rings
of vaccinated individuals, percolates through the whole network and leads to a considerable final epidemic
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Figure 33: The numbers of infected and vaccinated individuals are shown as a function of disease risk (a,
i.e., the probability of death due to disease), vaccine risk (b, i.e., the probability of death due to vaccine)
and probability to vaccinate (c). Note that (a)-(b) are further divided into three phases. The error bars
represent two standard deviations from the mean across 20 simulations per datum. Source: Reprinted figure
from Ref. [557].
size and numerous vaccinated. To further validate the accuracy of these theoretical predictions, the authors
in [432] also carried out the investigation for smallpox-specific disease history and vaccine properties, with
similar results (see Fig. 32(c)). Their efforts thus illustrate the significant difference between continuous
population and spatial structure population in coupled behavior-vaccination dynamics. On the other hand,
it suggests that the design of voluntary vaccination, as a primary control measure, to eradicate outbreak of
some close contact diseases such as smallpox should rely on the number of social contacts and on the local
structure of the population.
Though voluntary vaccination policy enables eradication of the disease in contact-structured networks,
the foregoing model made a couple of simplifying assumptions regarding the natural history of the disease,
pre-existing immunity, and human behavior. To relax some of these simplifications, the authors further
investigated the dynamics via weighing infection risk (i.e., the probability of death due to disease) versus
vaccine risk (i.e., the probability of death due to vaccine) [557]. Of significance, they have shown a coun-
terintuitive phenomenon for the coupled dynamics, which was then divided into three phases (see Fig. 33).
Phase I exhibits a negligible final size of the epidemic and a small number of vaccinated individuals. In this
phase, any node with an infected neighbor would vaccinate immediately, preventing disease transmission.
Thus, the infection risk will be fast, and effectively controlled under a voluntary ring vaccination. Then, in
phase II, nobody is likely to vaccinate due to low disease risk or high vaccine risk (this phase is not shown in
Fig. 33(b)). This finally results in a large final epidemic size. For intermediate epidemic risk and vaccine risk
(i.e., phase III, the area between two dash lines), though a great number of agents prefer to vaccinate, the
disease still percolates through the whole population due to imperfect protection. Except for a deterministic
decision process, the authors also tested the effect of a probabilistic setup. Accordingly, even if PV < PN ,
individuals may still opt to vaccinate with a given probability. If this probability is low, then very few
people are allowed to vaccinate and infection takes over the population (see Fig. 33(c)). As the probability
increases, the outbreak is effectively contained by means of the voluntary ring vaccination. Interestingly,
the continuous enhancement of vaccination probability quickly reduces the essential number of those that
need to be vaccinated for better controlling the spread of the disease (namely, there is a vaccination peak).
Altogether, the study [557] revealed that the final outcome of rational self-interest dynamics under a volun-
tary vaccination policy is closely related with contact patterns, with the perceived vaccine risk, as well as
with the risk of contracting the disease.
The superspreader vaccination strategy. In the context of network vaccination (i.e. Section 5), it has been
thoroughly established that targeted vaccination towards superspreaders can significantly reduce the spread
of disease [275, 291, 344, 371, 372]. However, the assumption that superspreaders (who typically have
many connections and are responsible for the majority of secondary infections [564–568]) always accept
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vaccination does not capture the realistic transmission dynamics with behavioral response, especially for
seasonal influenza-like vaccination. In this regard, Wells et al. analyzed how behavioral feedback affects the
effectiveness of vaccination strategies [435]. In addition to the passive vaccination as the baseline strategy
(whose update is governed by a function of payoff difference f(PV − PN ), individuals can also implement
one of four pro-active strategies: 1) random vaccination (RV) targeting a randomly chosen individual; 2)
nearest neighbor vaccination (NN) aiming to a randomly chosen individual and one of their neighbors; 3)
chain vaccination (CV) targeting either a randomly chosen individual or a neighbor of an individual targeted
the previous day; 4) improved nearest neighbor vaccination (INN) targeting a randomly chosen individual
and one of their most connected neighbors.
Surprisingly, it was revealed that the proposed superspreader vaccination strategies provide little or no
improvements, compared to traditional ad-hoc delivery of vaccination [325, 569]. The behavioral feedback
facilitates policy resistance, which nearly completely undermines the effectiveness of superspreader strate-
gies. Actually, superspreader strategies enhance the vaccination level among superspreaders. However, this
effort is offset by the low coverage among non-superspreaders (representing the majority of nodes in a het-
erogeneous network), which naturally leads to a low overall level of success. These observations indicate that
selecting connection heterogeneity as an important criterion of implementing superspreader strategies is not
sufficiently accurate. For example, individuals with higher infectiousness or a longer period of infectious-
ness may not coincide with highly connected individuals [297, 567]. Moreover, to improve the readiness to
vaccinate in the population, an economic incentive to the targeted individual has also been proposed. As ex-
pected, the undermined benefit of pro-vaccination strategies can be somewhat recovered under a substantial
economic stimulus. Thus, the design of vaccination strategies targeting superspreaders must consider the
possible policy resistance caused by strong effects of behavioral feedback, and mitigate it whenever possible.
The mixed vaccination strategy. Up to now, we have acquired a thorough understanding for the interrelation-
ship between vaccination decision and disease dynamics: via discrete, memoryless strategies, human decision-
making can profoundly influence epidemic incidence as well as vaccination coverage [398, 405, 416, 570]. How-
ever, as the cooperation strategy in evolutionary games [571, 572], vaccination sometimes can be regarded
as one mixed strategy, i.e., choosing vaccination with a given probability and taking the non-vaccination
stance with the remaining probability. It is interesting to consider how does this setup affect the vaccination
program and the spread of disease.
To address this, Cornforth et al. defined the vaccination strategy vk of an individual with degree k as
the probability that it will opt for vaccination [286]. The total perceived payoff of this individual is thus
given by
pik(vk) = u− vk(CV + okCR)− (1− vk)αkCI , (231)
where u is the baseline payoff corresponding to the value of a healthy life over the course of an epidemic,
while CV (CI) represents the monetary cost of vaccination (infection). Because the influenza vaccine is
only partially effective, some vaccinated agents remain susceptible to the infection. Here, CR denotes
the cost of infection to a partially resistant (immune) agent, while ok (αk) is the perceived probability of
becoming infected if vaccinated (non-vaccinated). Thus, different from respective expressions of discrete
strategies [433, 525, 547], the second term in the right hand side of Eq. 231 is the perceived payoff of
vaccination selection, and the third accounts for the perceived payoff of non-vaccinated behavior. It is also
worth mentioning that the estimation of perceived risk depends on the information of past epidemic seasons.
Regardless of the properties of the interaction networks, it was shown in [286] that the likelihood of
vaccination increases with degree (because the infection risk also increases with degree), which is the same
with prediction of voluntary ring vaccination [432]. Nevertheless, the degree threshold for vaccination is
closely related with the overall structure of the network, and increases with the heterogeneity of the degree
distribution (though the perceived fraction of vaccination does not change monotonically with network
heterogeneity). Interestingly, it was also found that vaccination relies critically on the transmissibility of
disease [286]. Results presented in Fig. 34 show how the steady-state risk/prevalence (corresponding to
Nash Equilibria) and unstable limit cycles vary as a function of transmissibility. For small transmissibility,
there is no epidemic risk and thus no vaccination under the threshold (indicated by black arrows). As
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Figure 34: The impact of transmissibility on risk (a) and disease prevalence (b) (steady-states and unstable
limit cycles) in urban networks. Before the threshold (indicated by black arrows), there is no epidemic risk
and vaccination. With transmissibility increasing, these two first diverge and then end at the same state
again. Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [286].
transmissibility increases, epidemic risk/incidence is predicted to converge to a stable Nash Equilibrium.
However, in reality there are considerable oscillations from one season to the next. This is caused by
the polarization of vaccination behavior: non-vaccination is always followed by wide-spread disease and
consequently high vaccination coverage in the next season. At a high level of transmissibility, the oscillatory
pattern in vaccination behavior goes back to the steady state. These oscillations seem empirically inconsistent
with the relatively stable vaccination pattern of influenza. To elucidate this discrepancy, it is further unveiled
that increasing the number of prior seasons that individuals recall during the decision-making process enables
these oscillations collapsing onto a stable vaccination strategy.
9.2.2. Social clustering of behavior and opinions – assortativity of (non-)vaccination
Empirical evidences – clusters driven by strategy and opinion updating. When reviewing results presented
in 9.1, we have emphasized that the updating dynamics plays a crucial role in the final size of epidemic
and vaccination coverage. Notably, during the decision-making process, there exist different criteria and
factors that affect each particular choice, such as payoff maximization [525], stochastic imitation [433], and
social impact theory [573]. While it is clear that taking into account one or the other criterion leads to
different evolutionary outcomes, few works have focused on the impact of joint action. In this regard,
Mbah et al. incorporated imitation dynamics (i.e., Eq. 206) and self-interest dynamics (i.e., Eq. 218) into
a coupled epidemiological model on different contact networks [434]. In particular, individuals could make
their vaccination decision either based on imitation or based on payoff maximization, with probability Θ
and 1−Θ, respectively.
Surprisingly, in this framework the “double-edge sword” effect appears again. Namely, imitation behavior
(i.e., Θ = 1) increases vaccination coverage for relatively low costs of vaccination, yet impedes the incentive
to vaccinate at high costs (see Fig. 35(a)). While in terms of completely eradicating the epidemic, imitation
behavior fails and even enlarges the ultimate epidemic size, irrespective of vaccination costs (Fig. 35(b)). This
unexpected outcome is related to behavioral clusters resulting from imitation dynamics, where vaccinators
tend to contact vaccinators, and non-vaccinators tend to contact non-vaccinators (Fig. 35(c)). Although
vaccination levels increase in some regions, clusters of non-vaccinators (susceptible individuals) exacerbate
transmission and elevate the probability of an outbreak. In this regard, imitation behavior may shed new
light into the high incidence of measles in many countries with high vaccine uptake [243, 574–577]. Realistic
policies should thus consider the impact of non-vaccinated clusters, and empirical data on vaccination
behavior should be explored also in terms of geolocating potential hotspots of non-vaccinated individuals by
public health authorities.
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Figure 35: Vaccination coverage (a), epidemic size (b), and average number of contacts between non-
vaccinators are shown as a function of the relative cost of vaccination in passion (or homogeneous) networks.
The fraction of individuals with imitation behavior is Φ, while the remaining 1 − Φ follow a payoff maxi-
mization strategy. Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [434].
Besides payoff driven updating, opinion dynamics is another possible explanation for the large outbreaks
of some vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles in many high-vaccination countries [578, 579]. Recently,
Salathé et al. assigned either a positive or a negative opinion about vaccination to each node [574], where
positive opinion means that the agent will take up vaccination immediately, while individual with negative
opinion reject vaccination due to personal beliefs, such as the safety and efficiency of vaccine, religious beliefs,
and related considerations. Subsequently, an opinion formation process occurs based on the dissimilarity
index and the strength of opinion formation. Interestingly, such a process leads to clusters of non-vaccinated
individuals, since agents with negative opinion are more likely to contact same-minded counterparts. The
invasion of a single infected agent into such a susceptible clusters may have dire consequences and dramat-
ically decrease herd immunity. Moreover, the research also found that, when the vaccination coverage is
close to or at the level required to provide herd immunity, this effect of opinion formation (or clustering)
facilitating outbreaks is the strongest. This in turn indicates that the estimated coverage level to avert an
outbreak of measles may be much higher than realistic demands [549, 576].
Quantitative characterization. Relative to the above primarily qualitative endeavors, Salathé et al. also
defined a quantitative framework for the mixing patterns of vaccination behavior and opinions related to
vaccinating [580]. Based on publicly available data from Twitter, they firstly constructed a directed social
network of information flow, where sentiment towards new influenza A (H1N1)-like vaccination was classified
into four types: positive, negative, neutral, and irrelevant. Then, building on the Pearson coefficient [177,
521, 581], the assortativity coefficient r is given as (relative to Eq. 4.1.1, the following formula is actually
another expression of correlation coefficient, and their detailed comparison has been proved in [582])
r =
∑
i eii −
∑
i aibi
1−∑i aibi , (232)
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Figure 36: (a) The impact of the assortativity index r on the relative risk increase (compared to risk at
r ∼ 0) of disease outbreaks. Blue line shows the best fit of linear regression (confidence interval based
on standard error). (b) Relative risk increase (compared to risk at r ∼ 0) of disease outbreaks of a given
fraction of the population for two values of the assortativity index r = 0.075 (red) and r = 0.145 (green).
Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [580].
where
ai =
∑
j
eij , bj =
∑
i
eij (233)
and eij is the fraction of edges connecting nodes of types i and j. Moreover, here r = 0 means random
mixing of opinions, while positive (negative) r values introduce assortative (disassortative) patterns, where
nodes are more likely to connect with nodes of the same (different) type. Interestingly, the research found
that vaccination is positively assortative with the sentiment score, which means that agents expressing
positive (negative) sentiment are more often connected and take (reject) vaccination. In this sense, opinion
distributions in different communities (each of which usually shares common opinion) profoundly affect the
ultimate size of an epidemic. Results presented in Fig. 36 show that the likelihood of an outbreak is enlarged,
if unprotected agents are positively assorted and form susceptible clusters (due to the clusters of negative
sentiment). For further details on the role of vaccination sentiment in realistic networks, we also refer to
Sections 10 and 11 for more details.
The aforementioned studies have proved that positively assortative non-vaccinated individuals in contact
networks can lead to an enlarged likelihood of large disease outbreaks [434, 574, 580]. To extend the
universality of this finding, Barclay et al. investigated whether such a pattern existed in influenza vaccination
of contact networks among high schoolers [583]. Contact network were found to be positively assortative
(measured by Eq. 232) with respect to influenza vaccination in that vaccinated (non-vaccinated) individuals
are more inclined to link with their like. Although the overall coverage level may be temporarily high, clusters
of non-vaccinated individuals will destroy the herd immunity and may take over the largest component of
the network in the long term. Relative to the states of randomly assigned vaccination, positive assortativity
thus increases the likelihood of large disease outbreaks. Of particular importance, non-vaccinated males
contribute more than non-vaccinated females towards positive mixing patterns. Another interesting point is
that the effect of non-vaccination clusters (or positive assortativity) becomes more visible if contact durations
are longer or combined.
9.2.3. Belief-decision models and dual-perspective systems
As surveyed in 9.2.2, except for payoff-driven vaccination decision-making (i.e., the game-theoretical
approach) [433, 525, 529], vaccination choices can also be driven by the awareness concerning the disease,
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Figure 37: (a) Schematic illustration of a belief-decision model for a vaccination campaign. A social network
is used to describe the structure of interactions among individuals. There exists a feedback between the
awareness and the vaccination choices of individuals. Namely, vaccination decisions depend on the percep-
tions about disease severity and vaccine safety. (b) Schematic illustration of a dual-perspective view on
modeling vaccination decision making. Here, vaccination decisions (i.e., to vaccinate +1, or not −1) are
in accordance with either cost minimization or the impact of social influence. The conformity rate p is
the probability that an individual finally converts to the formalized social opinion, or otherwise follows a
cost-minimization choice. Source: Reprinted figure from Refs. [444, 573].
and the perception one has about the vaccine and its safety. Actually, awareness has been widely identified
as a significant factor in other disease prevention measures such as social distancing [353, 412, 584–586].
Motivated by this fact, Xia et al. designed a belief-decision framework (see Fig. 37(a) for a schematic
illustration), where three possible vaccination decisions, i.e., to accept, to reject, and yet to decide (or no
decision), are assorted to a set of belief values [444]. The belief function for vaccination is given as follows m(Yes) ∈ [0, 1],m(No) ∈ [0, 1],
m(Θ) = 1−m(Yes)−m(No),
(234)
where m(Yes) (m(No)) means the probability of taking (rejecting) vaccination immediately, while m(Θ)
represents no firm decision and postponing the decision to the next time step. Owning to the spread
of awareness of disease severity and vaccine safety, individuals update their belief values based on the
extended Dempster-Shafer theory (a theory of belief functions or a mathematical theory of evidence, it is a
general framework for reasoning with uncertainty, with understood connections to other frameworks such as
probability, possibility and imprecise probability theories. In details, such a theory allows one to combine
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evidence from different sources and arrive at a degree of belief that takes into account all the available
evidence) [443], which incorporates information of connected neighbors. Interestingly, the authors found
that the reporting rates of disease- and vaccine-related events mainly affect the vaccination coverage. While
another key factor, the awareness fading coefficient, decides the time of individuals’ vaccine administration.
After the above finding, another question naturally poses itself, namely, if both the game-theoretical
approach and opinion dynamics are put together in a unified framework, how does this dual-perspective
system influence the vaccination uptake and potential epidemic outbreaks? A computational model to
evaluate the impact of vaccination associated cost and social opinions on vaccination decision-making (i.e.,
the interplay between payoff optimization and social influence) has therefore been proposed and studied
by Xia et al. [573]. In more detail, the cost minimization scenario assumed that individuals (with mixed
strategy) take up vaccination if the relative cost c of the vaccine is larger than the perceived infection risk
λperc (i.e. c > λperc), where
λperc = βI .(
nnon
nvac + nnon
) (235)
and nvac (nnon) denotes the number of neighbors being vaccinated (not vaccinated). In the opposite case,
individuals give up vaccination. Moreover, according to the social impact theory [587, 588], to either
vaccinate or not can be regarded as two types of opinions, which are acceptance and rejection, respectively.
Individuals then update their opinions in terms of the Fermi-like function, where a normalized discrepancy
between viewpoints replaces the previously used payoff difference [433]. Finally, the conformity rate p is
introduced to control the tendency of individuals towards social opinions (see Fig. 37(b) for an illustration).
When the conformity rate is relatively small (i.e., decision are mainly cost-based), the effectiveness of
vaccination declines with larger costs, which is as reported before in the realm of a purely game-theoretical
model [433]. However, when individuals follow social opinion (i.e., p = 1), the resulting vaccination converges
to a certain level, depending on individuals’ initial level of willingness rather than the associated cost.
For intermediate conformity rates (i.e., the joint impact of cost-minimization and opinion formation), the
ultimate vaccination coverage and epidemic incidence are completely determined by the competition between
vaccine cost and initial vaccination willingness. Thus, in addition to the determinants associated with the
costs and benefits of vaccination, a voluntary vaccination program should carefully consider also the social
aspects and opinion formation in contact networks.
9.2.4. Competing controlling measures (going beyond traditional binary selection)
As mentioned in section 9.1.4, apart from vaccination, there might also exist non-pharmaceutical inter-
ventions that may help mitigate the risks and seem of particular importance before effective vaccines are
widely available [52, 54, 59, 412, 503, 589, 590]. However, the majority of existing research considers either
vaccinating behavior or non-pharmaceutical interventions separately. The effectiveness of the combination of
both types of interventions on social or empirical networks may thus, at least to some extent, be beyond our
knowledge (although both are used in some disease such as influenza). Aiming for a better understanding of
this issue, Andrews et al. recently proposed a model of competing interventions, which assesses the decision
on the basis of subjective expected utility theory [441]. It is worth mentioning that, unlike by vaccination,
susceptible/infectious individuals will implement non-pharmaceutical interventions on different neighbors.
Of note, there exists a tradeoff between two measures. If the vaccination coverage increases, the de-
cay of infections and the resulting changes in transmission patterns enable a decrease in the practices of
non-pharmaceutical interventions. Similarly, if non-pharmaceutical interventions become more common,
vaccination coverage will decrease by roughly a similar extent. Even if changing the utility or the perceived
risk, it seems impossible to simultaneously enhance the effectiveness of both measures. Moreover, it was
also revealed that efforts to reduce spreading by expanding non-pharmaceutical interventions are almost
completely mitigated by the resulting drop in vaccine coverage, whereas efforts to expand vaccine uptake
are only weakly affected by the response of non-pharmaceutical interventions. Thus, (lack of) vaccination
interferes more strongly than non-pharmaceutical interventions as the primary determinant of influenza in-
cidence. Along this line, when considering multiple intervention programs, officials should pay particular
attention to the potential interference among them, in particular looking out for (dis)assortativity between
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vaccination and non-pharmaceutical interventions in real-life situations. It is important to communicate to
the public that these are complementary rather than exclusive measures to mitigate an outbreak.
9.3. Behavior-vaccination dynamics on temporal networks
In the above subsections, we have reviewed the remarkable advances in understanding vaccination and the
spread of epidemics in structured populations, which were described by different complex, yet static networks.
While many empirical observations could be explained in this theoretical framework [432, 433, 525, 580],
it is nevertheless a fact that most social interactions among people change over time. Accordingly, a more
apt description involves using time-varying or temporal networks [52, 218, 591–594]. Such adjustments may
of course be unrelated to vaccination and epidemics, or they can happen precisely because of this. Either
way, changes in the interaction structure of social networks affect how we vaccinate and how effective our
measures are aimed at mitigating epidemics. In this subsection, we therefore cover an important aspect of
behavior-vaccination dynamics in structured, networked populations, namely that on temporal networks.
To that effect, we consider two representative examples.
9.3.1. Outcome inelasticity and outcome variability on adaptive networks
Early on in epidemiology, it has been pointed out that adaptations of various kinds can lead to a series
of interesting phenomena, such as degree mixing patterns, oscillations, hysteresis, and phase transition
between disease-free and endemic states [52]. Along this line one might wonder, if a vaccination program
is placed onto an adaptive network, how do the epidemic incidence and vaccination uptake co-evolve with
time? To address this question, Morsky et al. have recently proposed and studied an edge turnover effect
on networks [595]. Naturally, if an individual in a network is vaccinated (not vaccinated) and dies from
adverse side effects (an infection), any links from and to it are removed from the network (technically,
since the links are undirected, simply an edge is removed). To maintain the balance in the system, i.e,
the average number of edges in the network, the same number of edges are re-introduced randomly among
pairs of individuals, whereby not allowing multiple connections. Interestingly, such a relatively simple
and straightforward setup gives rise to three vaccination regimes. These are successful ring vaccination,
widespread vaccination, and no vaccination, all owing to a different frequency of edge turnovers that are
related to the death of individuals in the network. Moreover, it was shown that stochastic effects can lead
to a large variability in outcomes. For the same parameter values, some realizations guarantee fast control,
while others can not prevent a fast-spreading epidemics. This indicates that the outcome of voluntary
vaccination on adaptive networks may be highly unpredictable, precisely because the interaction structure
changes over time. Thus, many arguments put forward above for static networks simply do not hold. There
exist inherently nonlinear feedback mechanisms between behavior and disease dynamics, which can result
in policy resistance or outcome inelasticity, neither of which would be observed on static networks in the
traditional models that did not take strategic interactions or behavioral responses to disease dynamics into
account [230, 521]. This gives rise to extreme events that we are only beginning to uncover and study, and
which certainly shed new light into just how complex successful vaccination policies might turn out to be.
9.3.2. The impact of closeness driven time-varying topology
Along similar lines, in [596] authors proposed a closeness-driven time-varying framework. In an instanta-
neous network, every individual connects to an acquaintance with probability p, or with probability 1− p to
a random node [597]. After an instantaneous network is formed in this way, the vaccination game proceeds
with an imitation rule at the heart of the microscopic dynamics [433]. These two steps, i.e., the creation of
the instantaneous network and the evolutionary vaccination game proceed repeatedly until a steady state is
reached. In the absence of vaccination there is monotonous increase in the size of the epidemics. Conversely,
if vaccination is introduced, the epidemic incidence reaches a peak and then drops due to the enhanced crisis
awareness. More importantly, the increase of p greatly weakens the vaccination enthusiasm of individuals,
since the links among acquaintances provide convenient conditions for herd immunity. These results indicate
that closeness likely plays an important role in decreasing both the epidemic propagation and vaccination.
Although existing research already conveys clearly that temporal networks bring about novel phenomena
in the mitigation of epidemics and the promotion of vaccination, there is still ample room for further research,
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Figure 38: Schematic illustration of behavior-vaccination dynamics on multilayer networks, which consist of
social and biological contagion networks. The former layer supports the propagation of information related
to the disease, such as opinions and sentiments, while the latter layer allows the actual spreading of the
virus. More importantly, the resulting interplay on the new architecture leads to complex dynamics that is
not present in either network layer in isolation, such as the rise and fall of vaccine coverage during a scare
scenario. Source: From Ref. [609]. Reprinted with permission from AAAS.
for example related to the importance of different time scales that describe changes in the network, in the
epidemic transmission, and in the vaccination uptake, where differences can markedly determine the fate
of the population [598, 599]. Further research on behavior-vaccination dynamics on temporal networks also
requires better integration with empirical data, which we cover in more detail in Section 11 [600, 601].
9.4. Behavior-vaccination dynamics on multilayer networks
In addition to static and temporal networks, the most recent frontier in network science are the so-called
interdependent or multilayer networks [203, 338, 602, 603]. The main premise behind multilayer networks
is that a single layer of interactions is likely insufficiently accurate to describe the complexity of our social
interactions. Arguably, each individual is likely a member in many social networks, including online social
networks, and all these interactions shape markedly our perception of vaccination in the broadest possible
sense. Although one may argue that all these interactions could be placed under the umbrella of a single
network, the multilayer network perspective nevertheless creates better conditions for properly studying
such social systems.
Not surprisingly, multilayer networks have recently been the subject of many novel frameworks to study
various dynamical processes, such as epidemic spreading [216, 231, 372, 604], diffusion [342], voting [605],
synchronization [606], and the evolution of cooperation in game-theoretical models [607, 608] (see [203,
338] for systematic reviews). In this subsection, we therefore cover the still very young field of behavior-
vaccination dynamics on multilayer networks.
9.4.1. The general framework and an example
With respect to coupled disease-behavior dynamics on multilayer networks, one recent work firstly pro-
vided a brief, conceptual framework, where the system is composed of two networks: the social contagion
network [610, 611] and the biological contagion network [609]. The former is assumed to support the spread-
ing of opinions and sentiments related with vaccination, while the latter allows the propagation of the virus
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Figure 39: Outbreak probability with (grey) and without (black) opinion formation in dependence on the
vaccination coverage. The insets show the difference of outbreak probability between grey and black vertical
lines. The parent and offspring networks share F = 1 (a) and F = 0.2 (b) of the intra-layer connections.
(c) The impact of shared connections F on the effect of opinion clustering ∆. Circles, crosses and triangles
represent the probability of forming a intra-layer connection equal to 0.1, 0.2 and unlimited, respectively.
Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [613].
through local intra-layer connections. When both networks are coupled together, a feedback loop between
layers spontaneously emerges, which generates more complex dynamics beyond either isolated network layer
(see Fig. 38 for a schematic illustration). For instance, the vaccination opinions on the social contagion net-
work may play a positive or a negative role in the epidemic trajectory on the biological contagion network
and vice versa.
Along this main idea, Fukuda et al. recently proposed a multilayer infrastructure, which is composed of
a disease transmission network and an information propagation network through which individuals update
their vaccination strategies and health information [612]. Compared with the evolutionary outcomes in
the traditional single-layer network [433], it has been discovered that multilayer infrastructures typically
suppress the vaccination coverage, resulting in relatively larger and more common epidemics. Although
middle-degree and large-degree nodes show higher vaccination enthusiasm, numerous small-degree nodes
make the propagation of vaccination very difficult, which is further exacerbated by the propagation of
negative opinions in the other layer. Overall, successful vaccination policies in multilayer networks require
even more care and consideration to account for multiple channels along which potentially discouraging
information about vaccinating may spread, as we review also in the next subsection.
9.4.2. Parallel, interacting dynamics on different networks – The impact of opinion clusters
As in the case of [434, 574, 580, 583], when opinions of individuals towards vaccination are influenced by
their neighbors or social groups on networks, the susceptible/unvaccinated clusters can readily arise, which
directly affects the likelihood of disease outbreak. Even with very high vaccination coverage, outbreaks
can still occur via these clusters [434, 574]. However, empirical evidence suggests that the transmission of
infections is sometimes separated from decision-making. One typical example for this reasoning are childhood
diseases, for which the primary risk group are young children, while the decisions about vaccination are of
course taken by their parents [550, 614–616]. Motivated by this fact, already in 2009 Eames used a multilayer
network setup, where one network supports the opinion formation among parents (i.e. parent network),
while the network of children allows infection transmission among offspring (i.e. offspring network) [613].
When parents and children are distributed on each network layer, offspring share their parents’ locations
(denoted by the inter-layer links) and intra-layer connections, whose fraction is controlled by the parameter
F . F = 1 means that each intra-layer link in the offspring network also appears in the parent network,
i.e. both network layers are identical; while F = 0 indicates that parent and offspring networks have no
shared intra-layer connection. Using an identical opinion updating dynamics as in [574], it was reported that
even if the vaccination level is extremely high, the opinion formation process greatly enhances the outbreak
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likelihood, relative to the case without opinion dynamics (see Fig. 39(a)). Because the opinion of not to
vaccinate is inclined to clustering among parents, this naturally gives rise to susceptible offspring clusters
and thus creates significant infection risks. Interestingly, the above observation still remains intact, though
less dramatic, when the overlap fraction is low, as shown in Fig. 39(b).
To quantify the difference between outbreak probability with and without opinion formation, in [613]
the author further defined the effect of opinion clustering
M=
∑
vaccination levels,c{Prob (Outbreak with opinion) - Prob. (Outbreak without opinion)}∑
vaccination levels,c Prob. (Outbreak without opinion)
. (236)
As shown in Fig. 39(c), the effect of social influence monotonously increases with the amount of overlap
between the two networks. When the two networks share many contacts, clusters of parents who choose not
to vaccine are more likely to have interacting children, generating clusters of unvaccinated offspring and thus
ultimately enhancing the risk of an infection, which is then likely followed by an outbreak. In this sense,
non-overlapping intra-layer connections between the networks of parents and their offspring seem to be an
important factor for determining the desired vaccination coverage for a successful mitigation of disease.
While the above-reviewed research already delivered inspiring results, just as with temporal networks,
the study of behavior-vaccination dynamics on multilayer networks is still very much a developing field with
vast possibilities for innovative future research. The evolution of links between different network layers, as
well as their weight in determining the course of vaccination in comparison to within-layer links are still
very much under-explored subjects, just as potential extension of the basic theoretical framework to more
than three layers.
So far, we have surveyed most achievements about behavior-vaccination dynamics in networked popula-
tions, which, as a whole, provides novel insight into real-world disease prevention under vaccination policy.
To obtain a clearer understanding, Table 6 provides a summary of these new characteristics. We also notice
because temporal networks and multilayer networks are two novel frameworks in network science, more ef-
forts from statistical physics and mathematics are still needed to enrich the content of behavior-vaccination
dynamics in future. Moreover, another fantastic point is that, except for infectious diseases, complex conta-
gion [365] and corresponding behavioral vaccination strategy [396] deserve great attention as well, especialy
combining with lots of emerging data in this realm.
10. Measuring and assessing vaccination levels: traditional approaches
Due to the overwhelming public health benefits of vaccination, governments and public health institutions
around the globe have invested substantial efforts to immunize their populations against vaccine-preventable
diseases. The population dynamics of vaccine-preventable diseases depend strongly on the magnitude and
distribution as well as the efficacy of vaccines in the population, but measuring these indicators is not
always easy. First, measuring the vaccination coverage - the percentage of the population that has been
vaccinated - is subject to numerous difficulties and biases. Second, even when vaccination coverages can
be measured accurately, measuring the distribution of vaccination in the population - i.e. which parts of
the population have been vaccinated - remains challenging. Third, the effect of vaccination on population
immunity will ultimately depend crucially on the effectiveness of the vaccine, a hard-to-measure but crucial
indicator for many public health policies. In this section, we review the challenges associated with assessing
the vaccination status of a population. These challenges are not only relevant from a data perspective, but
they are also crucial to inform modeling efforts.
10.1. Measuring vaccination coverage
In an ideal world, vaccination coverage would be easy to assess. Every individual in a population who
receives a vaccine would be centrally registered, allowing for an always accurate calculation of the percentage
of the population vaccinated. In practice, numerous problems stand in the way. On the numerator side,
the number of people vaccinated is rendered inaccurate by the non-continuity of registration systems, by
migration flows, and record duplications, as well as other challenges. On the denominator side, estimates
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Figure 40: A vaccination paper card, showing the various improvisations made over time. (Photo courtesy
of Carolina Danovaro, Pan American Health Organization.) Source: Reprinted figure from Ref. [617].
can be equally inaccurate for a number of reasons. The various challenges are particularly difficult in low-
and middle-income countries, where registry systems are often manual, patchy, or entirely absent.
The potential inaccuracy in estimates at the administrative levels means that measures from alterna-
tive data sources need to complement the numbers. Surveys in particular are a well-established source for
alternative vaccination coverage estimates. Globally, there are four types of surveys that are commonly
employed: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), the Ex-
panded Programme on Immunization cluster survey (EPI), and surveys using the Lot Quality Assurance
Sampling (LQAS) method. These common surveys have different characteristics with respect to the primary
objectives, the sampling scheme, household selection, total sample size, questionnaire length, duration, and
so on [617]. They all suffer from a number of biases, of which two are typically highlighted: i) a selection
bias due to sampling methods that are non-representative or reflective of poor field practices, and ii) an
information bias generally - but not exclusively - due to inaccurate data recording manual records involving
a paper card retained in the household (Fig. 40). Many of these problems are expected to worsen in the
future because of the increased complexity of immunization schedules.
In recent times, biomarker surveys have been added to the methods to measure vaccination coverage.
While the presence of antibodies is a good marker of immunity, it’s typically impossible to distinguish
whether their presence is due to vaccination or to natural infection. Furthermore, while natural infection
often causes life-long immunity, most current vaccines require booster shots because of the waning levels
of antibodies following vaccination [618]. On the other hand, the case is reversed for some pathogens such
as tetanus, where natural infection causes a short-lived immunity while vaccination can provide life-long
immunity [619]. Some vaccines, such as the Hepatitis B vaccine, cause the presence of antibodies that are
not created following natural infection [620], providing a clear measurement of vaccination, but this is the
exception rather than the rule. And because of waning antibody levels, the number of doses can still not
be reliably estimated [621]. To complicate matters further, re-exposure to pathogens can trigger an increase
of antibody levels ("immune boosting"), often without developing symptoms, as appears to be the case
in whooping cough [622–625]. Indeed, it has been suggested that immune boosting must be more easily
triggered than primary infection to account for age-incidence data found in the recent increase in whooping
cough cases in teenagers and adults [626].
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10.2. Vaccine efficacy and effectiveness
Many studies looking at the effects of vaccination on disease dynamics at the population level assume
that vaccines have 100% efficacy. In other words, they assume that in the vaccinated group, the disease
incidence following vaccination is zero. This assumption is generally wrong. At its most basic level, vaccine
efficacy can be defined as the opposite of the relative risk (RR) among vaccinated individuals [627]. It
corresponds to the relative reduction of disease attack rate in the unvaccinated group (ARu), compared to
that of a vaccinated group (ARv), all else being equal:
ARu−ARv
ARu
= 1−RR. (237)
In order to comply with the "all else being equal" requirement, vaccine efficacy is usually assessed through
double-blind, randomized, clinical controlled trials, representing best case scenarios. The vaccine efficacy so
established is usually a requirement for a new vaccine to be licensed by the relevant governmental authorities.
Vaccine efficacies vary widely. In influenza, where a new vaccine is developed each year to prevent
seasonal influenza, vaccine efficacy can vary dramatically depending on the match of the vaccine with the
dominant circulating flu strains. A recent meta-analysis [628] has shown that influenza vaccine efficacy
has been measured to be between 8% and 93%, depending on the vaccine type, the year, and the study
population. The pooled efficacy of the trivalent inactivated vaccine in adults of age 18-65 was 59%. For the
vaccine preventing Human Papillomavirus (HPV) infections, meta-analyses have shown a vaccine efficacy of
78% - 90% [629]. The efficacy of an acellular pertussis vaccine among adolescents and adults was shown to
be 92% [630].
Vaccine effectiveness needs to be distinguished from vaccine efficacy. While vaccine effectiveness measures
the same outcome of interest - relative reduction of disease attack rate - it does so in an observational way
under field conditions, rather than in clinically controlled experiments. Vaccine effectiveness is therefore
influenced by many factors, including, but not limited to, vaccine efficacy. These factors include vaccine
characteristics as well as host factors such as age, previous vaccinations and infections, etc. It’s easy to
see that all the challenges relate to vaccine coverage surveillance outlined above apply also to studies of
vaccine effectiveness. Because vaccine effectiveness studies do not require clinically controlled trials, there
are more data available on vaccine effectiveness than on vaccine efficacy. Vaccine efficacy is often assessed
during or after outbreaks. For example, recent data obtained from a large-scale outbreak of measles in a
German public school was analyzed resulting in an estimate of the measles vaccine effectiveness of over 99%
(following two doses of vaccination) [631].
Vaccine effectiveness and vaccination coverage combine to create the dynamics of infectious diseases
observed in populations. In all populations, there will be non-vaccinated individuals, and there will be
individuals for which the vaccine does not prevent disease. During a disease outbreak, we can therefore
expect both unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals to fall ill. Under the assumption of random mixing, the
fraction of unvaccinated individuals among individuals with disease can be easily calculated. The susceptible
population is the sum of the number of unvaccinated individuals U , and the vaccinated individuals who
remain susceptible despite vaccination, V , i.e. S = U + V . If these two types of susceptible individuals get
infected with the same probability, then the fraction of unvaccinated individuals among diseased individuals
will be U/(U + V ). Expressed in terms of vaccination coverage x and vaccine effectiveness τ , individuals
can be susceptible because they did not get vaccinated (1 − x) or because they did get vaccinated but
the vaccination did not render the individual immune (x(1 − τ)). Thus, the total susceptible fraction of
the population is 1− x+ x(1− τ) = 1− τx, and the fraction of unvaccinated individuals among diseased
individuals is
x(1− τ)
1− τx . (238)
This relationship can be leveraged for multiple purposes. First, it can be used to estimate vaccine
effectiveness. If the proportion of cases occurring in vaccinated and unvaccinated as well as the vaccination
coverage x is known, vaccine effectiveness τ can be easily calculated [632]. Secondly, it can be used to
estimate vaccine coverage, if the proportion of cases occurring in vaccinated and unvaccinated as well as
the vaccination effectiveness τ is known. This can be particularly helpful in situations where the vaccine
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effectiveness is well known, such as in the case of measles [633]. An increase in the fraction of cases among
unvaccinated individuals may seem counter-intuitive and worrisome, but indeed is most likely an indicator
of increasing vaccination coverages. The opposite case is just as true, and particularly relevant in situations
of increasing vaccination hesitancy.
Overall, the ability to measure, or at least accurately estimate vaccination and immunization levels in
a population are of crucial importance to public health, and the modeling efforts. As outlined above, the
practical challenges have historically been quite substantial, and continue to pose problems. At the same
time, the advance and widespread adoption of technology, and in particular also consumer technology such
as the internet and mobile computing devices, can help supplement these efforts. In the next chapter, we
will discuss the approaches based on a new set of methods broadly encapsulated under the term digital
epidemiology.
11. Digital epidemiology
As discussed in many of the previous sections, the ability to timely monitor the unfolding of outbreaks,
as well as the capacity to capture our contacts, movements and communications are keys to characterize the
spreading of infectious diseases. This observation is quite intuitive and clear; perhaps since the very first
epidemiological studies. However, major challenges in the data collection process have impeded developments
for many years. Let us think first about surveillance systems. In many countries, health departments have the
mandate to collect epidemiological data. In the USA for example, the surveillance for influenza like illnesses
(ILI) is conducted by a network of about 3, 000 healthcare providers [634]. As we noted in Section 10
traditional surveillance approaches are affected by many limitations [635]. Data is typically affected by
large delays and backlogs. The geographical granularity of the sample is heterogeneous across the country.
Furthermore, selection biases might play a major role. Indeed, only a fraction of infected individuals visit
a doctor. These cases are typically associated with complications or legal requirements (leave from work).
Data collections challenges have been even more pronounced in the observation of human dynamics relevant
for diseases spreading. Indeed, the characterization of the way we interact, move and communicate has been
relegated to ad-hoc small-scale studies for many years. The inherent complexity of such processes strongly
limited the attempts to study their properties in these settings [636, 637].
The digital revolution helped, and is helping, to lift such limitations [638]. Nowadays more than 3 billion
of people had access to the Internet. About 7 billion phone subscriptions have been activated, and more
than 20% of them are associated to smartphones. As result a large fraction of our activities is digital, often
online. Communication using social networks, emails, blog posts, and other forms of digital media are now
commonplace. Countless online resources are now used to access information that researchers can efficiently
mine using search engines. Furthermore, the miniaturization of devices created a wide range of wearable
able to measure our interactions, movements, as well as vital signs [639].
It did not take long before researchers saw the potential of these new technologies for epidemiology [640–
642]. Indeed, the large amount of data we generate, or that we can collect, contains crucial epidemiological
indicators. Just to mention few examples, think people speaking about their health on social networks,
or searching for diseases’ symptoms on search engines. Furthermore, think about the uses of GPS data to
characterize human mobility at different geographical scales, of RFID (radio frequency identification devices)
tags to identify the features of human face-to-face contacts, or of mobile apps to gather health information
from users that sign-up. This unprecedented wealth of data is at the basis for the development, test, and
refinement of many modeling approaches discussed in the previous sections.
In the following, we will review recent developments in this arena (also see Table 7 for a systematic
summary in advance). In doing so, we will consider three main approaches according to the data collection
process. We will first consider participatory methodologies that rely on individuals voluntary contribution
to the data collection. We will then present passive approaches that identify and extract epidemiological
relevant indicators from the digital traces of our daily activities. We will then conclude presenting mixed
approaches of the previous two.
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11.1. Participatory digital epidemiology
The widespread diffusion of Internet connections and the miniaturization of devises is providing unprece-
dented opportunities to collect epidemiological relevant information with the direct participation of large
number of individuals.
11.1.1. Participatory platforms for digital surveillance
Mobile and web-based applications can be effectively used to monitor the emergence and unfolding of
outbreaks in near real-time [643, 644]. FluNearYou [645, 646], and InfluenzaNet [647, 648] are two examples.
The first platform engages individuals living in USA or Canada. The second instead is based in Europe
and includes 11 different countries. The main idea behind both initiatives is to complement the classic ILI
surveillance systems crowdsourcing the data collection. Indeed, users that sign-up become sentinels. Every
week, during the influenza season, they receive a request to answers few questions covering geographical,
behavioral and medical information. In other words, the two platforms are systems for digital surveillance.
Remarkably, several studies have shown that the ILI incidence estimated using these platforms is highly
correlated with the classic ILI surveillance data [646, 648, 649]. With minimal participation from the
subscribed users they allow to overcome several limitations of the classic systems. The data collection is
inexpensive, and scalable. The data can be visualized in near real-time, providing interactive maps describing
the current unfolding of ILIs that are readily available for modeling efforts at the sub-population level as
those described in Sections 3 and 8. Another crucial advantage of these approaches is the reduction of
back-logs and delays in cases reporting. This issues is particular relevant during the initial phases of the flu
season when its severity and general characteristics are mostly unknown. The delays and back-logs of the
traditional surveillance introduce a posteriori change in the projections making forecasts a difficult task. In
other words, the "ground truth" used to inform models is far to be stable and reliable. Instead, data from
digital surveillance can be used to inform realistic and geographically resolved epidemiological models with
timely and high resolution intelligence that can be adopted to define precise initial conditions necessary for
the simulations [650].
Another important aspect of the data collection is the ability to access behavioral information as for
example the vaccination status of each user. On one side this allows geographically resolved real-time
evaluation of vaccination rates complementing those gathered via traditional approaches (i.e. Section 10)
and might be used to refine the input for the modeling efforts described in Sections 3 and 8. On the other
side, it allows to estimate the vaccination efficacy overcoming the issues of classic observational studies [651].
These are often cohort studies performed considering, retrospectively, health records of vaccinated and not
vaccinated patients. Clearly, the same selection biases, black-log and delays we saw afflict clinical surveillance
are a problem also in this case. Digital surveillance approaches, although not perfect, clearly mitigate these
issues. For example, while selection biases can be still a problem, well crafted questionnaires can alleviate
them. Again, the main advantage is the scalability of such methods, and the possibility to perform near
real-time analysis.
When considering participatory platform for digital surveillance, it is important to stress that these appli-
cation have been developed to complement, not substitute, classic surveillance systems. Indeed, the detailed
characterization of circulating strains is crucial and can be achieved, at the moment, just in clinical settings.
However, the penetration of mobile and connected devices in developing countries is offering unprecedented
opportunities to gather richer and timely epidemiological data in cases where classic surveillance methods
are typically limited.
11.1.2. Measuring and understanding close proximity interactions
The data and collection methods we just introduced, provide critical information to estimate diseases
prevalence and vaccination rates. However, they do not provide any explicit information about the spreading
pathways. From a modeling standpoint, such data can inform just mean-field modeling efforts (see Sections 3
and 8). Our close proximity contacts are responsible for the spreading of infectious diseases. As discussed in
Section 4 social networks are far from homogeneous and their non trivial properties have critical effects on
the spreading of infectious diseases. For many years, empirical studies devoted to characterize their features
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have been centered on surveys and diaries [652]. Potentially, these methods allow to gather information
regarding the number, location (work, home, or other places), duration, and frequency of contacts as well
as the health status of the respondent [653, 654]. However, they are affected by several limitations as the
scalability in terms of costs and individuals engagement [653], the introduction of biases by the self-reporting
of events/contacts [653, 655–657], and the introduction of biases by the survey design [653].
The incredible advances in technology as the reduction of costs and sizes of devices allowed the devel-
opment of a wide new spectrum of methods to measure close proximity contacts. In the following, we will
focus on those that are participatory in nature: individuals are asked to voluntarily participate to a data
collection process where their close interactions are measured via some device as smartphones or RFID
tags [394, 658–671]. According to the technology used, the data collection can span few hours, days, or
months. Smartphones allow longitudinal data collections. However, they can record proximity interactions
(via bluetooth or WiFi) that are not necessarily relevant for the spreading of infectious diseases [652, 660–
662, 665, 667, 668, 671]. Furthermore, as we will see later, smartphones allow to access/collect a rich set
of data that can be used to better understand different aspects of human dynamics ranging from digital
interactions to mobility patterns [671]. RFID tags instead can be tuned to detect actual face-to-face in-
teractions. However, they require i) participants to wear specifically designed devices ii) the presence of
stationary nodes deployed to collect information about the location of each interaction [652, 672]. For these
reasons, the data collection with this technology is limited to short time periods and controlled settings.
In general, all these tools have major advantages respect to traditional methods. First, technology
makes their deployment cheap, simple and scalable. Second, they provide an objective measurement of close
proximity contacts. Few recent comparative studies have shed some light in the difference between contact
networks estimated by traditional approaches (surveys and diaries) and those gathered via wearables [656,
673]. The findings show that traditional methods miss the large majority of short contacts, and overestimate
the duration of all interactions. Furthermore, the engagement of individuals with traditional methods
is reduced respect to those based on wearables. Notwithstanding these limitations, traditional methods
reproduce with good accuracy strong ties that are likely to be responsible to sustain the local unfolding of
infectious diseases. However, they provide an incomplete picture. Indeed, they miss weak ties that have
been identified as crucial connections to bridge separated clusters of individuals, thus fundamental for large
scale outbreaks [348, 673, 674].
The analysis of the data collected with wearable devices allows to characterize with precision the fea-
tures of close proximity contacts. The first important observation is that contact networks are time-
varying [219, 652, 675, 676]. The distribution of individuals activity, the duration and time intervals of
contacts are typically heterogeneous implying the absence of characteristic scales, i.e. averages are not
good descriptors. Consequently, the role played by each individual in the spreading is heterogeneous. Fur-
thermore, for diseases in which the probability of transmission is function of the time spent in contact,
different interactions might be associated with very different transmission potentials. In particular, the
large majority of contacts are short and thus associated with small transmission probabilities. However,
some contacts have duration that is much larger than the average and thus can be extremely important for
the spreading. The heterogeneity in time intervals between contacts, burstiness [677], has been associated
with a rich, case-dependent, phenomenology that can either slow down [678–683] or speed up [684, 685] the
spreading. Interestingly, the dynamics ruling the evolution of contacts change depending on the time-scale
considered [652, 675]. In other words, the mechanisms driving the formation of contacts at the time-scale
of minutes are different than those at the time scale of months [675]. This is of particular importance
when studying the spreading of infectious diseases [230, 593, 596, 684, 686–704]. Indeed, contacts dynamics
that affect the spreading of transmissible illnesses are those unfolding at comparable time-scale respect to
the disease [219, 652, 676, 686]. For example, the characteristics of contacts networks at the time-scale of
days are relevant for the spreading of ILIs. In order to show more clearly this crucial point we will now
consider a simple, yet not trivial, model of temporal human interactions. This modeling framework is based
on the empirical observation that the propensity of individuals of being engaged in social acts, activity, is
heterogeneous [596]. Interestingly, such observations have been performed in a wide range of real datasets
describing different types of human interactions or human dynamics ranging from conversations on Twitter
to R&D alliances between firms [596, 705]. For a given time interval ∆t the activity of each node i can be
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measured as the fraction between the number of interactions made by i, ni, divided by the total number of
interactions made by all the nodes:
ai =
ni∑
l nl
. (239)
While the value of ai might change in time [706], observation in real data shown that the distribution of
activity is virtually independent of the choice of ∆t [596, 704, 705]. This candidates the activity as good
variable to describe some important aspects of time-varying networks. The modeling framework we are
describing starts from such evidence and generates so called activity-driven networks [596]. Each node is
assigned to an activity a extracted from a distribution F (a). At any time step t the network Gt is build
starting from N disconnected vertices. In their simplest form the creation of activity networks is as follows:
• With probability ai∆t the node i becomes active and generates m links connected to m randomly
selected nodes
• With probability 1−ai∆t the node will not be active. However, it will still be able to receive connections
from other active vertices.
To reproduce empirical observations, activities are extracted from heavy-tailed distribution as for example
F (a) ∼ a−ζ with a ∈ [; 1]. The average number of active nodes at each time step is N < a > that is in
general much smaller than N . Consequently, the large number of nodes will be not active and the topology
of each Gt will be based on set of mostly disconnected stars centered around active nodes. On the other end,
it is possible to prove that integrating links over sufficient T time-steps such that k/N  1 and T/N  1
the resulting network will have a degree distribution that follows the activity distribution [596, 696]. In
other words, the heterogeneity in the number of contacts integrated over time is driven by the heterogeneity
in the propensity of nodes to be engaged in social acts. In this model, hubs emerge in time due to their
constant engagement rather than due to some first mover advantages as in classic preferential attachment
models. In general, the full dynamics of the network and its ensuing structure is completely encoded in
the activity distribution. Interestingly, it is possible to derive the epidemic evolution equation in which a
spreading process and the network dynamics are coupled together. We will consider an SIS model, but the
same results holds for an SIR. As done throughout the review, let us define βI the infection probability per
contact, and γ the recovery rate. At a mean-field level, we can assume that nodes with the same activity a
are statistically equivalent. In these settings, we can describe the epidemic process considering the number
of infected individuals in the class of activity rate a, at time t, as Ita. The number of infected individuals of
class a at time t+ ∆t is given by
It+∆ta = I
t
a − γ∆tIta + βIm(N ta − Ita)a∆t
∫
da′
Ita′
N
+ βIm(N
t
a − Ita)
∫
da′
Ita′a
′∆t
N
, (240)
where Na is the total number of individuals with activity a [596]. In Eq. 240, the second term on the right
hand side refers to infected nodes that recover, the third term takes into account the probability that a
susceptible node of class a is active and acquires the infection getting a connection from any other infected
individual, while the last term takes into account the probability that a susceptible node, independently of
his activity, gets a connection from any infected active individual [596]. In order to solve Eq. 240 we can
consider the total number of infectious nodes in the system by summing over all the activity classes:∫
daIt+∆ta = I
t+∆t = It − γ∆tIt + βIm〈a〉∆tIt + βImθt∆t, (241)
where θt =
∫
da′Ita′a
′ and we have dropped all second order terms in the activity rate Ita. Indeed, we are
interested in the early stages of the spreading where the number of infected individuals is much smaller
than the number of susceptible nodes. In this regime the equation can be linearized. In order to obtain an
closed expression for θ we multiply both sides of Eq. 240 by a and integrate over all activities, obtaining the
auxiliary equation
θt+∆t = θt − γ∆tθt + βIm〈a2〉It∆t+ βIm〈a〉θt∆t. (242)
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In the continuous time limit we obtain the following closed system of differential equations
∂tI = −γI + βIm〈a〉I + βImθ, (243)
∂tθ = −γθ + βIm〈a2〉I + βIm〈a〉θ, (244)
whose Jacobian matrix has eigenvalues
Λ(1,2) = 〈a〉βIm− γ ± βIm
√
〈a2〉. (245)
The epidemic threshold for the system is obtained requiring the largest eigenvalue to be larger than 0, which
leads to the condition for the presence of an endemic state [596]:
βI
γ
>
1
m
1
〈a〉+√〈a2〉 . (246)
The epidemic threshold can be derived considering that the per capita infection rate is given by the infection
probability per contact, βI , times the contact rate, 〈k〉: λI = βI〈k〉. It is easy to prove [596] that 〈k〉 = 2m〈a〉,
and consequently
λI
γ
>
2〈a〉
〈a〉+√〈a2〉 . (247)
The threshold is function of the first and second moments of the activity distribution thus it takes into
account the dynamics of interactions. Furthermore, the epidemic threshold is not function of the time-
aggregated network presentation. It depends just on the interaction rate of nodes. This results show the
importance of time-scales. Indeed the spreading condition is dependent on the interplay between the time-
scales of the network and spreading process. It is important to remember how in the case of uncorrelated
annealed networks the threshold is function of the first and second moment of the degree distribution (see
Section 4 for the detailed derivation). In Fig. 41, we show the density of infected individuals in the endemic
state as a function of λI/γ for three different networks [596]. In green diamonds and blue squares we show the
results obtained running an SIS model in static networks generated aggregating links of an activity-driven
network over T = 40 and T = 20 time-steps respectively. In red circles instead, we show the results obtained
running an SIS model on activity-driven networks in which both links and disease evolve in time. Clearly,
the results are quite different and show the effects of dynamical connectivity patterns on disease spreading.
In particular, the threshold in static networks is significantly smaller than in their time-varying networks
counterparts. Indeed, in static networks the disease can spread using all links activated in a certain time
period independently of their activation time or order. In time-varying graphs instead, the disease spreads
over a different, more homogeneous, topology in which at each time-step just few links are available for the
contagion. Consequently, the disease will need a larger per capita infection rate or smaller recovery rate in
order to percolate in the system.
In their simplest form1 activity-driven networks consider a very simple and unrealistic link formation
mechanism. Indeed, empirical contact networks are characterized by several types of correlations as mod-
erate modularity, transitivity and different types of assortativity [394, 583, 671, 679, 708]. In order words,
individuals don’t form random connections but tend to connect in groups/communities [190]. For example,
a study conducted in a high-school showed significant levels of clustering and different types of assortativity.
In particular, the project collected data for three days in a high-school with a population of about 1000
individuals (students, teacher, and staff) [583]. Each day about one third of them volunteered to wear a tag
to collect their close proximity contacts and shared their flu vaccination status via an online survey. The
assortativity measured considering the vaccination was significantly more positive than what expected by
chance [583]. Furthermore, the levels of assortativity increased for longer contact duration and combining all
data collected across the three days. The mechanisms driving such features could be associated to differences
in vaccination coverage and assortativity within sub-networks such as age, gender, role, and ethnicity [583].
1The models has been extended to include more realistic link’s formation mechanisms [591, 707]
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Figure 41: Density of infected nodes, i∞, in the stationary state, obtained from numerical simulations of
the SIS model on activity driven networks and two others resulting from an integration of the model over
20 and 40 time steps, respectively. N = 106, m = 5, F (a) ∝ a−ζ with ζ = 2.1 and  ≤ a ≤ 1 with  = 10−2.
Each point represents an average over 102 independent simulations. The dashed lines marks the analytical
epidemic threshold in Eq. 247.
Some hints supporting these hypothesis are found in the coverage respect to gender and role. Around 48%
of female reported to be vaccinated respect to 33% of male. Around 52% of staff reported to be vaccinated
respect to 39% of students. Remarkably, epidemics spreading simulations suggest that the observed fea-
tures of contacts networks might induce larger average outbreak size and increase the probability of such
outbreaks [583]. More in general, the presence of correlations in links’ creation might have contrasting
effects on disease propagation. Locally the presence of dense connections might promote the propagation
(especially in SIS models), the low connectivity between communities might hamper and slows down the
global spreading [195, 591, 697, 709, 710].
Summarizing, empirical contact networks are characterized by heterogeneous activity, duration and time
intervals between interactions as well as different types of correlations shaping the creations of links. Inter-
estingly, a recent and simple model able to reproduce many of these properties has been developed [711, 712].
The basic ingredient of the model is the idea that each node i is characterized by an attractiveness bi. This
is a proxy for social appeal/status. In the model, attractiveness are extracted from a uniform distribution
with b ∈ (0, 1]. In order to mimic close proximity interactions, nodes move in a box of fixed size performing
a biased random walk. More precisely, at each time step t, each node i moves, with probability pi(t), a step
of length r along a direction given by a randomly chosen angle. Instead, with probability 1− pi(t), the node
does not move. The probability pi(t) is defined as
pi(t) = 1− max
j∈Ej(t)
bj , (248)
where Ej are the nodes within a distance d from i at time t. In these settings, the node i will create a
connection with all the nodes in its proximity, and it will be driven to stop and interact with a probability
that is proportional to the attractiveness of the most attractive node in the circle of radius d. The model
considers also that nodes might not all be present, and willing to make connections, at the same time.
To include this aspect, nodes might be active or inactive. At each time step, an inactive node i become
active with probability ti, and an active node becomes inactive with probability 1− ti. These probabilities
are extracted from an uniform distribution with ti ∈ [0, 1]. Although, nodes do not keep memory of past
interactions and despite its extreme simplicity, the model is able to reproduce contact duration, time interval
between contacts, and weight distributions of real contact networks. Also, it captures the evolution of the
average degree as function of time and the distribution of groups sizes. It is of particular interest consider
that a simple biased random walk in 2D driven by a random distribution of attractiveness is able to capture
highly not trivial properties of empirical close proximity networks.
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The study of close proximity contacts shows robust statistical patterns from one day to the next [708].
Interestingly, the same holds considering different years (for different students) [708]. However, the interac-
tions of each individuals are not always the same. In fact, the study of the renewal of contacts in different
days shows significant variations in the ego-net of each individuals [708]. At this time-scale the distribution
of number of contacts does not show large heterogeneities [168, 394, 637, 671, 679, 708]. As we saw above
in the analysis of the epidemic threshold in activity-driven networks, this observation is of particular impor-
tance. Indeed, as we discussed in details in Section 4 heterogeneities in degree distributions make systems
extremely fragile to the spreading of infectious diseases (lowering the epidemic threshold) and at the same
time make targeted vaccination strategies extremely efficient [168, 281]. Consequently, contacts networks at
the time-scale of the day are more resilient to the spreading of infectious diseases, but also less susceptible
to targeted vaccination strategies than networks whose contacts are integrated over longer time-scales, i.e.
months or years. These observations clearly point out the importance of better understanding the features
of close proximity contacts in order to devise efficient vaccination strategies [394, 593, 594, 713, 714]. To this
end, let us extend what discussed in Section 5 for annealed and static networks by considering the efficiency
of different vaccination protocols on time-varying networks. We will focus on the case of activity-driven
networks [593]. First, let us consider a random strategy (RS) in which a fraction of nodes x is vaccinated.
In this case, it is easy to modify the Eq. 241 and obtain [593]
λI
γ
≥ ξRS ≡ 1
1− x
2〈a〉
〈a〉+√〈a2〉 = ξ1− x. (249)
In words, when a fraction x of nodes is randomly vaccinated, the epidemic threshold can be written as the
threshold with no intervention, ξ, rescaled by the number of nodes still available to the spreading process.
Indeed, vaccinating random nodes is equivalent to rescale the per capita spreading rate by the fraction of
available nodes λI → λI(1− x). As observed in Section 4 this is the same in static and annealed networks.
Fig. 42 shows the ratio between the number of infected nodes in the endemic state with random and no
interventions, I∞/I0, as function of x. As clear from the plot, the random strategy (green triangle) requires
more than 50% of vaccinated to reduce the endemic state to less than 20% respect to the scenario without
interventions. Let us now consider a targeted strategy (TS) in which xN nodes are vaccinated in decreasing
order of activity. This method is equivalent to fix a value ac so that any node with activity a ≥ ac is
immune to the contagion process 2. Also, for this scheme, it is possible to derive the analytic expression for
the epidemic threshold [593]
λI
γ
≥ ξTS ≡ 2〈a〉〈a〉c +√(1− x)〈a2〉c , (250)
where 〈an〉c = ∫ ac

anF (a)da describes the moments of the activity distribution discounting the vaccinated
nodes. Eq. 250 is not a simple rescaling of the original threshold expression and implies a drastic change
in the behavior of the contagion process. Interestingly, vaccinating a very small fraction of the most active
nodes is enough to stop the contagion process. Indeed, as clear from Fig. 42 vaccinating just the top 0.04%
of nodes is enough to halt the disease [593]. As discussed in Sections 4-5, the network-wide knowledge
required to implement targeted control strategies is generally not available [715]. In the case of time-varying
networks, this issue is even more pronounced as the characterization of nodes depends on how long it is
possible to observe the network dynamics [594]. Understanding the efficiency of strategies that use partial
information about the network is crucial. A possible implementation of this is based on egocentric samples
(ES) on the networks [593]. In particular, a fraction w of randomly selected nodes might act as “probes".
During an observation time T , their egonet generated by their interactions in the network can be monitored.
After the observation window, each probe is asked to randomly select a node in the egonet that is then
vaccinated. In this strategy, the probability of vaccination for one node with activity a after a single time
step is:
Pa = aw
∫
da′
mNa′
N
+ w
∫
da′a′
mNa′
N
1
m
. (251)
2The value of x and ac are linked by the relation x =
∫ 1
ac
F (a)da
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xFigure 42: Comparison of the stationary state of an SIS model with and without control strategy, I∞/I0, as
a function of x when λI/γ = 0.81. In green triangles, we consider the random strategy, in blue diamonds the
targeted strategy, and in orange circles the egocentric strategy. Each plot is made averaging 102 independent
simulations started with 1% of random seeds. N = 104, m = 3,  = 10−3, activity distributed as F (a) ∼
a−2.2. Adapted with permission from Ref. [593]. Copyrighted by the American Physical Society.
The first term on the right considers the probability that a node of class a is active and reaches one
of the probes; the second term, instead, takes into account the probability that one node of class a is
connected by an active probe. Solving the integrals in Eq. 251, we can write Pa = w (am+ 〈a〉). Starting
from this consideration, the probability of vaccination after t time steps is P ta = 1 − (1 − Pa)t. The
total number of nodes protected from the disease can be obtained summing over all the activity classes:
RT =
∑
aNaP
T
a =
∑
aNa
[
1− (1− Pa)T
]
.3 Using this expression, it is possible to obtain the epidemic
threshold [593]:
λI
γ
≥ ξES ≡ 2〈a〉
ΨT1 +
√
ΨT0 Ψ
T
2
, (252)
where ΨTn =
∫
da an(1 − Pa)TF (a). This last integral is a function of the observing time window T . As
clear from Fig 42 this strategy is much more efficient than the random one, although not as performant as
the targeted one. It is important to stress how the efficiency of this strategy is due to the ability to reach
active nodes by a local exploration done observing the systems for few time steps.
Another particularly important application of understanding close proximity contacts is the character-
ization of pathogen transmissions in hospitals settings [669, 716–719]. Indeed, nosocomial infections are a
major problem for the safety and health of patients and induce high economical costs [720]. However, due
to challenges in the data collection, very little was understood until very recently. Wearables provide an
unique opportunity in this context. To the present day, RFID tags have been used to identify or estimate
pathways of transmission [716–718] and to help the test and develop prevention as well as containment
measures [669, 719].
11.2. Non participatory digital epidemiology
Our daily interactions with technology generate an unprecedented amount of data that can be harvested
for digital epidemiology applications. Contrary to what we discussed above, here we will focus on methods
that use data not generated, nor stored, explicitly for epidemiological studies. In other words, we will review
recent non participatory approaches in which data is mined in search for proxies of epidemiological relevant
behaviors/indicators.
3The equation for Pa does not consider the depletion of nodes in each class due to the vaccination process. The formulation
is then a good approximation for small w and T , when the probability that a probe is selected more than once is very small.
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11.2.1. Social media based methods
Social media provides unique opportunities to communicate, gather and spread information. The incred-
ible progresses of technology and the consequent diffusion of mobile smart devices boosts the penetration
and relevance of such rich medium. It did not take much time before our queries on search engines [721],
communication on online social networks [722–726], visits to Wikipedia pages [727–729], cancellations of on-
line reservations [730], satellite images of parking lots of hospitals [731], or online sources [732, 733] started
to be adopted for epidemiological applications. Indeed, all these behaviors and interactions between us or
with technology can be extremely relevant to model, characterize, anticipate, and forecast the unfolding of
infectious diseases [640].
While the details behind each methodology are case specific and clearly beyond the scope of this review,
the basic underlying ideas, as well as the associated pitfalls, are a common feature. In order to better
understand them, we will describe the prototypical example of Google Flu Trends (GFT) [734]. The service
premiered in late 2008 and used our queries on Google to predict the unfolding of the seasonal influenza
(and in some countries also dengue) in 29 countries. As we will describe later in more details, despite the
initial glory, the service has been now discontinued and it has been reshaped in the form of a data sharing
collaboration with few institutes [735]. The basic intuition behind GFT is extremely simple and powerful:
traditional surveillance data (as for example the percentage of ILI visits) can be estimated and predicted by
mining search engine queries. In particular, the epidemiological real data describing the progress of ILIs in
a specific country, P , is estimated using proxy data, Q, describing the fraction of ILI related queries. More
formally, the value of P at a given week is obtained via a liner model:
P˜ = ϑ0 + ϑ1Q˜+ %, (253)
where the tilde refers to the logit of each quantity (y˜ = log
(
y
1−y
)
), the ϑs are fitting parameters, and %
is an error term. In other words, GFT obtains an estimation of P considering the fraction of ILI relevant
queries, Q. Interestingly, this quantity is evaluated mining about hundred billions of queries on Google’s
search engine. The methodology focuses just aggregated signals, no information/features about users are
considered. Furthermore, the classification of queries as ILI relevant is performed measuring, independently,
the correlation between 50 millions queries and historic surveillance data. Remarkably, this unsupervised
method, returns as most relevant queries, searches associated to influenza, influenza complications, and
remedies [721]. It is important to mention that the expression reported above could be generalized to
include a set of Q variables:
P˜ = ϑ0 +
∑
i=1,n
ϑiQ˜i + %, (254)
each one associated to a different query [724]. However, as noted in the original paper, the performance of
the method was higher adding up all the signal in a signal explanatory variable [721]. The initial results
reported were extremely impressive: GFT had a mean correlation with surveillance data of about 0.97 and
was able to predict it one/two weeks ahead. It is worth thinking about this a bit more. A simple linear
regression model fed with an unparalleled dataset of queries to a search engine is able to estimate with great
accuracy information about the unfolding of ILI.
Clearly the methodology described is quite simple. The strength of the approach is the unique and
unprecedented dataset used. For many different reasons this data cannot be easily shared. Consequently,
researchers applied, extended, and improved the GFT archetype to other data streams that are instead
accessible. Examples are Twitter and Wikipedia. Indeed, in both cases large samples and/or relevant
complete information can been gathered via their standardized APIs. Methods using Twitter data rely on
the assumption that people post tweet, information about their health status. In particular, tweets are
mined in search of ILI related terms that are fed to regression models [723–726, 736]. The relevant terms
are typically provided a priory or learned via machine learning techniques. Indeed, researchers do not have,
typically, the computational resources of Google to test independently each n-gram used on Twitter. An
increasing fraction of tweets contains geographical information that can be adopted to create models at
different granularity going from cities [725] to countries [723, 724, 726, 736]. Methods based on Wikipedia
118
consider pages view of particular entries as data proxies [727–729]. The underlying assumption is the
same of GFT: users visit specific pages to gather information about diseases, their symptoms, and possible
medications. The approaches presented so far have been not focused just on ILI, but they considered a wide
range of transmissible diseases going from dengue to ebola [727]. As we observed in the case of participatory
digital surveillance data, the results of GFT or similar tools based on different data proxies can serve as
input for modeling efforts based on unstructured (sub)populations (see Section 3). A nice summary the
results of such approaches in providing actual predictions for the 2013-2014 flu season in the USA is detailed
in Ref. [737].
Social media offers unprecedented opportunities to access information and communicate. Unfortunately,
they can also be used effectively to spread misinformation, myths, or conspiracy theories [738]. In the
realm of public health this phenomenon has been extremely clear. Indeed, as discussed in Section 7-9
vaccination coverage has been affected by the spreading of myths (as the link between vaccines and autism
or sterilization) or miscommunication and poor policy making from public officials (as in the case of Nigeria
boycott of polio vaccination) [739, 740]. Social media has changed significantly the way people acquire
health information. We transitioned from classic doctor-patient to more patient-patient or patient-social
media interactions [7]. On one side, this allows digital epidemiology based on social media to work. On the
other, it makes us susceptible to the spreading of unfounded and unscientific information.
Many experts are now referring to the decrease of vaccination rates as a confidence crisis linked to the
spreading of unscientific myths on social media, but also to socio-economical, socio-cultural, psychological,
and political factors [7, 388, 404, 741–743]. The features of online discussions about these and other topics
can be mapped and as discussed in Section 9 used to model behavior-vaccination dynamics [738, 739, 744–
747]. Interestingly, different opinions (pro and anti vaccination) induce effects of polarization in which
individuals of different ideas do not interact much. As consequence, communication networks cluster in
separated communities, eco-chambers, that exacerbates the challenges in spreading factual and expert-based
knowledge. Furthermore, a recent study on the diffusion of sentiments regarding vaccines on Twitter suggests
other peculiar dynamics [747]. First, individuals that are connected with large number of opinionated users
are inhibited from expressing their own opinions. Second, exposure to negative sentiments is contagious
while exposure to positive sentiments is not. All together these results indicate that peer influence and
social contagion are content dependent and far from being trivial. It is important to mention how social
media and more in general technology are also used to improve vaccine communication and coverage via
texts, emails, calls, apps, and web services [748–750].
Despite good performances, all digital epidemiological methods based on social media are affected by
several limitations (see Table 8). Also in this case, we will consider GFT as example to better understand
the shortcomings and potential pitfalls of these approaches. GFT has been released in November 2008
showing great results. However, the tool was not able, despite being updated, to predict the unfolding of
the pandemic in 2009 [751, 752]. Furthermore, GFT overestimated i) 92% of the weeks in the seasons 2011
and 2012, ii) the peak in 2013 (the prediction was more than double the real value). As we wrote above the
service has been now discontinued [735] and it is limited to data sharing with research partners. The reasons
behind these bad performances are several. Firstly, GFT adopted simple correlations between online queries
and ILI surveillance data. In doing so, it captured other phenomena correlated with ILI as for example
winter patterns. The pandemic in 2009 peaked much earlier (late October early November) than the classic
flu. Probably, this is what impeded GFT to capture its unfolding. Secondly, Google search engine is highly
dynamical. Changes are constantly implemented. Some of them might modify users’ searching behaviors, as
for example the auto-complete suggestions. It is important to consider all of these points as they are likely to
affect all digital tools for epidemiology. Indeed, they are typical shortcomings and issues associated to all non
participatory data collections. In particular, simple correlations might not be enough to describe complex
phenomena unfolding at different scales in time and spaces respect to those used for training purposes. More
in general, correlation does not guarantee causation. A recent study on Twitter shows that the time series
of the word zombie is a very good predictor of the seasonal flu [724]. Furthermore, matching searches or
keywords to context (in this case disease) without taking in account that the same word can be used in
discussions completely unrelated to illness might introduce spurious correlations or decrease the signal to
noise ratio [753]. Notwithstanding, it is fundamental to acknowledge the potential of these tools in the fight
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Table 8: Summary of the main advantages and disadvantages of social media based methods in digital
epidemiology.
Main Advantages Main Disadvantages
Sample size Possible biases in sample
Access to different geographical
granularities
Correlations might be spurious
Near real-time analysis Simple word matching might not
sufficient
Cheaper data collection n-gram selection computation-
ally expensive
Rich set of information available Changes in platform design and
functionalities might influence
users behaviors
against infectious diseases. They offer unprecedented opportunities to estimate epidemic proxies at high
geographical resolution or in locations where surveillance data is not available. Furthermore, these data can
be used to inform realistic epidemic models [650, 754] as well as a large number of more theoretical models
as those described in Sections 4-9.
11.2.2. Mobile phone based methods
Mobile phones are one of the most diffuse technological device. About 96% of the worldwide population
has one [755]. For billing purposes phone carriers collect call data records (CDRs) that can be mined and
used to study our communications, social networks, and mobility (see Ref. [756] for a recent review). The
last two phenomena are of epidemiological relevance. In particular, contact networks estimated via CDRs
can be used to characterize human interactions at large and long-term scales well beyond those accessible
via participatory experiments mentioned above. Although, not all connections mediated by mobile phones
are relevant for disease transmission, recent studies clearly show the possibility of inferring close proximity
networks from CDRs [757, 758]. The temporal features describing mobile phone networks are similar to
those of actual closed proximity interactions [591, 680, 681, 759]. However, CDRs can provide just contact
networks integrated in time. Indeed, the empirical timestamp of each interaction is not per se relevant for
disease spreading. Interestingly, also these, time-aggregated and static, networks share several statistical
features with close proximity contacts. In particular, high clustering, transitivity, and assortativity have been
reported [756]. Furthermore, integrated mobile phone datasets are typically characterized by heavy-tailed
distributions of contacts and weights. However, their heterogeneity are, also in this case, function of the
time window used to aggregate data [760]. From a modeling stand point, CDRs perfectly lend themselves
as input and test bed for the different modeling efforts beyond the homogeneous mixing approximation
discussed in Section 4. Human mobility is another crucial ingredient for spreading of infectious disease.
CDRs provide unprecedented opportunity to study this human phenomena. The large body of literature on
the subject identifies three main characteristics of our movements [756, 761]. Firstly, the exploration of new
places is very slow. Secondly, our movement is relatively predictable. Thirdly, the way each one of us moves
is rather unique. The understanding of such features has been crucial for modeling and understanding of
the spreading of infectious diseases. For example approaches informed with data from CDRs have been
used to map and control the spreading of Malaria [762, 763], Ebola [764], and ILIs [250, 765]. In order to
better understand the potential and importance of this data we will briefly summarize the methods and
results recently reported in Ref. [762]. The diffusion of Malaria is the results of a complex process that
involves the interaction between its parasite and two hosts: mosquitoes and humans [762]. In particular,
the movement of people increases the dispersal of the parasite beyond the reach of mosquitoes. CDRs in
combination with spatially resolved information about Malaria prevalence have been used to define how
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human movements drive parasite importation between different regions of Kenya. In particular, CDRs were
used to quantify the travel patterns of about 15 millions of people (around 34% of the total population) over
one year. The calls of such individuals have been mapped to one of the 12, 000 cells towers spread across 692
settlements [762]. In order to define the primary settlement for each person, the researchers considered a
majority rules according to the time spent in each location. Furthermore, they collected information, such as
destination and time, about the movements of individuals made out of their primary settlement. This data
has been combined with an simple epidemic transmission model based on high resolution maps of Malaria
prevalence. The fusion of these two data sources allowed to define the networks of parasite movements across
the country as well as source (net emitters of people and parasites) and sink (net receivers of people and
parasites) regions [762]. These results provided unprecedented lens to characterize Malaria dynamics and
spreading. More importantly, they suggested a novel set of strategies for containment that targets large
flows of human movements associated with high risk of importations. These encode many aspects of the
complex dynamics driving the spreading and go well beyond the typical based on local transmission hot
spots or routine surveillance in high-risk areas [762].
11.3. Mixed approaches
We distinguished among the various methods and tools of digital epidemiology considering the strategy
used for data collection. So far we presented active (participatory) or passive (non participatory) approaches.
This division is quite clear and includes most of the notable tools. However, there are some that are a mix
between the two. In the case of Health Map [766] the mix is quite asymmetric and it could have been
classified as non participatory tool. This project is a data grinder. It considers a wide range of data sources
such as different online data streams, eyewitness reports, expert-curated discussion, and official reports [766–
768]. It has been lunched in 2006 with the goal of monitor, nowcast, and predict the spreading of infectious
disease. The data is fetched, classified, and visualized 24/7/365. The system is automatized and allows
to process and digest incredible amount of relevant information providing comprehensive reports that are
used to facilitate the detection or monitoring of public health threats across the world. The Health Map
infrastructure is behind an impressive number of projects and specific applications [769, 770] . Examples
include Health Map Flu Trends in which all the different data streams are combined to provide forecasts
of flu activity in the USA [771, 772], Dengue Map that provides real-time alerts of dengue outbreaks [773],
or Health Map Vaccine which connects the population with vaccines [750, 774]. As for the partecipatory
survelliance systems described above, the data provided by Health Map does not provided any information
about the contacts of individuals. It provided instead, data at the (sub)population level that can be used
to develop unstructured compartmental models (see Sections 3 and 8)
Another application that mixes data from social media to active participation of users is Crowdbreaks [775].
This tool mines Twitter in search of tweets of epidemiological relevance. Crowdbreaks is a system for digital
surveillance able to provide geographically resolved information about diseases in the USA. The selection
of relevant tweets process is what makes it unique. Indeed, the task is crowdsourced to users visiting the
webpage. In particular, it adopts the wisdom of the crowd to classify tweets as relevant, not relevant, or
potentially relevant to a particular disease. With the collaboration and direct engagement of people the
performance of machine learning methods used to automatically detect relevant tweets increases in time.
The system, is currently in a beta version during which the contribution of individuals is crucial to help
make it operational.
12. Conclusion, discussion and future research
This review has summarized the rich opportunities and challenges for studying theoretical and empirical
aspects of the complex interactions between vaccinating behavior and disease dynamics, as well as the many
opportunities to apply methods and concepts from statistical physics to these interactions. This was first
seen in the contrast between mean-field models that do not incorporate human behavior versus mean-field
models that do incorporate them (Sections 3 and 8). Mean-field models continue to play an invaluable role in
the development and application of the behavioral epidemiology of infectious diseases in at least two respects.
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Firstly, they have shown the intrinsic complexity of coupled behavior-disease dynamics: coupled behavior-
disease models generate emergent dynamics that are not present in models where vaccinating behavior is
ignored, and coupled models also exhibit more dynamical outcomes in general. For instance, these models can
exhibit oscillations in disease outbreaks and vaccine coverage even when the corresponding compartmental
model does not exhibit any such dynamics. By incorporating human behavior (either explicitly or implicitly)
we can ask questions that are not possible with models lacking behavior, such as how do different modes
of communication (e.g. word-of-mouth versus mass media) influence the probability of eradication of a
vaccine-preventable infection? Secondly, coupled behavior-disease models have demonstrated the ability to
explain observed data better compared to simple behavior-free epidemiological models, in cases where data
availability permits such a comparison. As a result, mean-field behavior-disease models show potential for
informing public health policy makers of modern industrialized countries planning the introduction of a new
vaccine; planning the response to a decline in vaccination coverage following a rumor; or more generally to
strategically act to increase the degree of resilience of public vaccination systems in face of the threat posed
by human behavior in a world where risks from most common infections are typically perceived as “minor".
Future research on mean-field behavior-disease models should aim to further exploit benefits and poten-
tialities of simple models, such as representing simple and parsimonious environments for coupling behavior-
disease dynamics and allowing predictions at a high level of abstraction (e.g. population-level prevalence
and coverage). As such, a first line of inquiry should use mean-field models for investigating the implications
of further social, economic, or psychological theories of behavior relevant for vaccination in order to achieve
a more detailed understanding of the “typically observed" behaviour (see e.g. [400]). A second line should
aim to more extensively develop the–just initiated–empirical use of mean-field models by applying them over
different datasets (e.g. different countries) and different infections (e.g. measles vs pertussis). This would
allow to test the role of different behavioral factors and improve our understanding of why such factors
promoted different behavioral responses to the same rumour, such as observed in the MMR vaccine-autism
rumor. A third line of inquiry should aim to systematically include stochasticity in simple behavior-disease
models, with the aim to preserve parsimony but at the same time to better account for the fact that most
challenges due to vaccine refusal will appear under circumstances of disease rarity, i.e. when infections
become sub-critical due to efficient control, thereby lowering the perceived payoff of vaccination. These
situations are of special relevance for large scale elimination plans, as the World Health Organization plans
for measles elimination, where local infection rarity is expected to become the rule of infection dynamics
and chance effects become fundamental. Last, straightforwardly incorporating behavioral responses in the
realistic age-structured models typically used to evaluate the impact of intervention programs would help
such models account for possibly the most important source of uncertainty about the future success of vac-
cination programs–human behavior. We emphasize that these suggestions do not exhaust the possibilities
for further development of mean-field behavior-disease models.
Mean-field models assume that the population can be approximated as a continuum, and they are often
deterministic in nature. However, for many applications, it may not be possible to ignore the discrete,
individual-based nature of real populations. Section 5–on models for disease dynamics and vaccinating on
networks that do not explicitly represent behavior dynamics–showed that even without taking individual
behavior into account, understanding networks of individual contacts in a population has a critical role
to play in shaping our understanding of epidemiological processes. It is vitally important that network
structure is taken into account if we attempt to predict population-level dynamics from individual-level
observations. In addition, many intervention strategies such as contact tracing or ring vaccination can only
be accurately captured and modeled using network-based approaches. The emergence of network modeling
tools enables different strategies to be tested in an artificial environment. Finally, vaccination on time-
varying networks is another interesting research topic in this area, requiring high-resolution temporal data
to track and understand the control of disease and the dynamic evolution of networks.
Given that network models lend themselves so easily to representation of individuals, it is perhaps no
surprise that the recent growth in network-based coupled behavior-disease models has been so rapid, as
described in Section 9. As with the mean-field models, many behaviors were noted in network behavior-
disease models that were not possible in network models lacking behavior, such as the difficulty of eradicating
infection. Moreover, the importance of local structure and stochasticity take on new meaning, in networks
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where nodes actively adapt to their local epidemiological environment. In Section 9, we provided an overview
of current results about behavioral vaccination in networked populations. Starting from the simple single-
layer networks, we first reported the influence of benefit-inspired imitation dynamics, network topology,
external incentives as well as additional protection measures on individual vaccination willingness and total
vaccination level. We then demonstrated how social clusters expand and induce a large outbreak probability
even if there exists extremely high vaccination coverage on empirical networks. It is worth mentioning
that opinions about vaccination have been well identified as another type of method for protection measure
updating. Finally, we briefly discussed the recent progress of behavioral vaccination on the novel framework
of temporal and multilayer networks, where the links among nodes are time-varying or multiple. Along
this line, behavioral vaccination on metapopulation networks deserves our considerable attention in future,
because this topology supports the human mobility and information exchange among different patches,
which will directly affect how human update their measures and seems closer to realistic situations. This
framework, on the one hand, will further enrich content of behavioral vaccination (especially the feedback
loop between human behavior and disease) with mobile fashion, similar to reaction-diffusion processes in
physical chemistry. On the other hand, such a framework can be well-integrated with empirical data, such as
the control of an infectious disease pandemic driven by air travel [776]. As mentioned above, (benefit-inspired
or opinion-based) updating dynamics plays a crucial role in the final vaccination level and epidemic incidence.
Most existing literature assumes that everyone has the same updating criterion, namely, identical cognition
process for infection risk, vaccine risk and benefit brought by vaccination, which in fact greatly differs among
individuals due to social norms, education background, age structure, etc. This point may attract great
interest in future research. Risk perception on networks is another unexplored field of voluntary vaccination.
The vast majority of models assume that information transmission of infection risk is completely local (i.e.
coming from the contacting neighbors) and neglects information dissemination to the whole population or
network, which is ubiquitous in reality, due to public media. Thus, how to incorporate local and global
information into one modeling framework will be of particular significance in future.
Other unexplored problems concerning behavior-disease interactions on vaccination networks also merit
great attention in the future. For instance, these approaches could be extended to other types of vaccination
on multilayer networks, like local vaccination, or targeted vaccination based on various centrality indices.
However, the development of a theoretical framework for multilayer networks still lies at the beginning stages:
there are no uniform definitions of these centrality indices, which indicates that such a task needs in-depth
interdisciplinary collaborations, especially with network scientists. Another scenario that must attract more
attention is when multilayer networks support different dynamical processes on each layer. An infectious
disease can spread simultaneously on different layers, or disease and awareness can diffuse in their respective
layers. In such cases, how to implement vaccination becomes a novel challenge. Additionally, one of the
most sophisticated and commonly used models for non-behavioral infectious disease modeling is the meta-
population network, where individuals can move between different patches due to migration or commuting,
as in many real-world populations. Vaccination on these and other social structures using endogenized
behavioral dynamics remains little explored. Finally, one of main needs in theoretical epidemiology of
infectious diseases is the development of new analytical or approximated theoretical physics methodologies
in order to make simulation-independent inferences concerning individual-based models. Indeed, inference
uniquely based on simulations can sometime hide the underlying big picture of a complex system. We
suggest that Ising models, percolation theory, and related approaches from statistical physics may be useful
for studying coupled behavior-disease dynamics on networks, just as these approaches has proven useful in
the study of (non-behavioral) epidemiological processes on lattices [223, 251, 777].
The ultimate standard in any scientific discipline should be testing hypotheses against data, and the
standard for models of coupled behavior-disease dynamics should be no different. The last few sections of
our review explored existing data sources like surveys and vaccine coverage records, which could be used
to parameterize or validate such models. Measuring and assessing immunization levels remains a difficult
problem. As more health systems globally are moving into the digital area, we can expect an improvement
in the quality of the data. Furthermore, novel biomedical approaches may make it easier to assess whether
individuals could mount an immune response, the expected waning time, and how immunity came about
(vaccination vs. infection). Such individual-level characteristics are highly relevant to population-level
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infectious disease models. Nevertheless, as problems of vaccinations are particularly pronounced in low-
income countries, the general challenges will remain in the foreseeable future. Surprisingly, the problems
described here–uncertainty in vaccination coverage, and variability in vaccine efficacy and effectiveness–are
only rarely taken into account in theoretical studies of infectious disease dynamics. We hope that in the
future, these real world issues will get more attention in the modeling literature.
The last few sections of our review also explored new digital data sources that could facilitate a new
era in the theoretical and empirical development of coupled behavior-disease models. Digital epidemiology
is a very new and promising area of research: a natural evolution of epidemiology in the digital era. Such
data sources lend themselves very naturally to network coupled behavior-disease models. Recent advances
in mobile phone technology, information from twitter, Facebook, and GPS location enables us to determine
individual connections, or even track the movement of people in real time. This would help us to build full and
comprehensive networks for many airborne diseases such as influenza. It will also track how these network
topologies change in the face of a severe epidemic, or even how individual behaves when an intervention
measure is implemented. The vibrant body of literature on digital epidemiology shows incredible potential
as well as future directions and challenges. The size and heterogeneity of the datasets we will face is
destined to increase dramatically. This will require the development of new algorithms and techniques
to effectively collect, store and analyze large-scale epidemiological data. In particular, new approaches,
specifically designed for epidemiology, will be needed to filter, classify, and model massive data streams.
Cheaper and more scalable devices will be required to improve our understanding of face-to-face interactions
and thus of spreading pathways. From a theoretical standpoint, new frameworks able to further characterize
the complexity of human contacts and their effects on epidemic spreading will be needed. In particular,
it will be crucial to deepen our understanding of the temporal, and high-order structural features of social
interactions. Furthermore, a better understanding of the dynamics of social contagion will be necessary to
characterize behavioral changes induced by spreading of information/misinformation that affect vaccination
rates and more in general disease spreading. The future of digital epidemiology is also tied to the development
of new approaches for data access, sharing and privacy. Indeed, the ethical and legal challenges that
arise from mining human digital traces are in general far from be understood or well regulated. Digital
epidemiology is a truly interdisciplinary endeavor that currently connects a wide range of disciplines ranging
from data science and mathematics to network science and medicine. A new breed of practitioners able
to bridge all of these disciplines are necessary to face the challenges ahead. Furthermore, the prospect
of being able to relate individual-level behavioral dynamics to population-level behavioral dynamics with
unprecedented spatial and temporal resolution raises the possibility of attempting to develop a statistical
physics of behavior. The extensive literature on non-equilibrium thermodynamic theory may prove useful
in this endeavor [778].
Clearly, the opportunities for new theory and new applications, as well as the potential awards of suc-
cess, are enormous in the field of coupled behavior-disease modeling. But how can the field move forward
on these opportunities? Review papers often include a discussion paragraph on how more interdisciplinary
interactions are needed. We fall to the temptation of including such a paragraph here, but we will explain
exactly why interdisciplinary interactions are valuable in the context of this particular field. The field itself
emerged from interdisciplinary interactions when researchers–usually trained in other areas like physics or
mathematics–took an interest in disease systems. Despite this, there remains a need for more interdisci-
plinary interactions than currently take place. For instance, physicists, mathematicians, and economists
often develop models of behavior-disease interactions in parallel with one another and apparently without
interfacing with the knowledge of the other fields. This not only risks duplication, but also means that
research fails to benefit from cross-fertilization of ideas. Interactions with epidemiologists and public health
researchers could also be more pervasive than they currently are, in order to ensure that these models are
ultimately applied to improving population health outcomes in the real world. In a similar vein, the scope
of interdisciplinary interactions needs to expand to include new fields. For instance, digital data and ma-
chine learning hold significant promise for helping us better understand behavior-disease interactions and
parameterize coupled behavior-disease models. However, properly harnessing these new sources of data will
require help from statisticians and computer science experts.
Interdisciplinary interactions are stymied by different terminology used by differently trained researchers.
124
For instance, the theoretical study of interactions between disease transmission and behavior has been
variously referred to using terms such as “behavioral epidemiology", “economic epidemiology", “coupled
disease-behavior systems" and other terms although in some cases, it should be noted that these terms
do not completely overlap because they are used differently to marry different sets of concepts. Similarly,
economists use the word “rational" to describe selfish, socially blind behavior, although other fields would
not describe such behavior as rational in its usual sense. The problem of inconsistency in language could
be addressed through workshops devoted to bringing together different fields, which would also help the
more general lack of interaction between different disciplines. A degree of coordination as exhibited by the
nomenclature committee of the International Astronomical Union for studying interactions between behavior
and disease is probably impossible due to the nature of the subject, but efforts to bring together different
types of experts could at least accomplish some of the benefits of greater coordination.
Shakespeare famously ended his play “A Midsummer Night’s Dream" with an apology from the spirit
Puck to the audience: “If we shadows have offended, Think but this, and all is mended—That you have but
slumbered here While these visions did appear." We also wish to apologize to the readers in advance, for
having inadvertently missed some excellent papers in the literature, having unintentionally misrepresented
other papers that we did include, or being completely wrong about where the field should go next. However,
there is no need for the reader to pretend our review was something they dreamed while slumbering. Instead,
please write us if you feel our review was lacking in some respect, or better yet, publish some research
that shows us the value of other perspectives on the field. If nothing else, we hope that our review has
convinced the readers that coupled behavior-disease modeling is a rapidly growing area that promises exciting
theoretical developments and empirical applications in the coming decade, especially if we draw on the
accumulated knowledge of many decades of statistical physics.
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Appendix
Here, we provide a summary of abbreviations of the used terminologies in the main text.
Table A1: Abbreviations of the used phrases in our report.
Abbreviations Full names First appeared
SIR
SIS
SEIR
SEIRS
ODE
GAS
AIDS
FOI
BRN
ERN
VRN
NGO
AR
DFE
EE
WAIFW matrices
ME
CLE
FPE
SDE
CCS
Susceptible-Infectious-removed
Susceptible-Infectious-Susceptible
Susceptible-Exposed-Infective-Removed
Susceptible-Exposed-Infective-Removed-Susceptible
ordinary differential equation
globally asymptotically stable
acquired immune deficiency syndrome
force of infection
basic reproduction number
effective reproduction number
vaccine reproduction number
next generation operator
attack rate
disease-free equilibrium
endemic equilibrium
Who Acquires Infection From Whom matrices
Master equation
Chemical Langevin equation
Fokker-Plank equation
Stochastic Differential equation
critical community size
Section 3
ER graph
SW network
WS model
SF network
BA network
DMS model
DBMF
IBMF
ICM
GEMF framework
STD
Erdös-Rényi graph
small-world network
Watts and Strogatz model
scale-free network
Barabási-Albert network
Dorogovtsev-Mendes-Samukhin model
Degree-based mean-field theory
Individual-based mean-field theory
Independent cascade model
generalized epidemic mean-field framework
sexually transmitted diseases
Section 4
CBF
BHD
community bridge finder
bridge-hub detector Section 5
SIAs
MMR
AIC
special immunization activities
measles-mumps-rubella
Aikaike Information Criterion
Section 6
SEU
ESS
subjective expected utility
evolutonarily stable state Section 7
126
VAE
IGD
EGDT
VSE
ISNs
CSNE
MDPT
vaccine adverse effects
Imitation Game Dynamics
Evolutionary Game Dynamics Theory
vaccine side effects
injunctive social norms
convergently stable Nash equilibrium
Markov decision processes theory
Section 8
RV
NN
CV
INN
random vaccination
nearest neighbor vaccination
chain vaccination
improved nearest neighbor vaccination
Section 9
DHS
MICS
EPI
LQAS
HPV
Demographic and Health Surveys
Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys
Expanded Programme on Immunization
Lot Quality Assurance Sampling
Human Papillomavirus
Section 10
ILI
RFID
ES
GFT
CDRs
RS
TS
influenza like illnesses
radio frequency identification devices
egocentric samples
Google Flu Trends
call data records
random strategy
targeted strategy
Section 11
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